253. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Minister of the French Embassy (Lucet) and the Deputy Director of the Office of Western European Affairs (Tyler), Department of State, Washington, June 1, 19571
SUBJECT
- 1. U.S. Aid to Tunisia
- 2. Mediterranean Conference on Algeria Suggested by Bourguiba
Mr. Lucet said that he wanted to talk to me as a follow-up on Ambassador Alphand’s call on the Acting Secretary the previous day (see memorandum of conversation dated May 31 1957).2
[Page 674]He said that the Ambassador had derived the impression that perhaps the Acting Secretary had not wanted to give too specific an answer to the two major questions which he had raised with regard to the two subjects he had brought up: U.S. aid to Tunisia, and the proposal for a Mediterranean conference on Algeria. Mr. Lucet asked me if I could tell him whether the policy of the U.S. on these two points was undergoing a change.
I commented that the Ambassador’s presentation had not conveyed the impression of a direct question requiring a specific answer on either of the two points. I reminded Mr. Lucet that the Ambassador had referred to the existing U.S. policy on aid to Tunisia, and had merely stated the French point of view and the hope that this aid would not be increased during the period of suspension of French aid, pending the formation of a new French Government.3 I recalled that the Acting Secretary had stressed the grave concern with which we viewed recent unfavorable developments in Franco-Tunisian relations, and that he had added that apart from the utilization of certain counterpart funds under existing U.S. economic aid, it was not at this time planned to increase aid to Tunisia.
With regard to the proposed Mediterranean conference on Algeria I said that we were aware of the French view that it would be unacceptable. It was our hope and our desire that a peaceful and equitable solution would be found for the Algerian problem. We did not think that in view of French opposition to the idea of a Mediterranean Conference, this would be a development likely to advance a solution of the Algerian problem, and we were not in favor of anything which might further embitter Franco-Tunisian relations. I pointed out that, in this case also, the Ambassador had not solicited a direct expression of opinion from Mr. Herter.
Mr. Lucet said that he did not wish to exaggerate the point which he had made, but that in view of the grave concern which Mr. Herter had expressed with regard to the Tunisian and Algerian problems, the Ambassador had wanted him to ascertain whether our policy in these two matters was still the same or was subject to modification.
I told Mr. Lucet that the Acting Secretary had reflected and expressed the concern which the U.S. Government feels with regard to recent events, and to the basic situation in North Africa. I pointed out that the policy of supplementary U.S. aid to that of France had been based on the premise that there would be French aid to supplement, as the French Government had informed us. I said that it was not based on the premise that a situation would long continue [Page 675] in which the prospect of French aid would be used as an instrument of political pressure on Tunisia and Morocco, in such a way that the supply of aid would be turned on and off by France as a form of coercion.
I said that while it was understandable that in these difficult times French political sentiment should be both intense and subject to severe strains and pressures, I personally had grave doubts about the wisdom and the prospects of success of tactics such as these. I said I thought I could speak with Mr. Lucet frankly as an old personal friend, and as a friend of France, and that I was not asking or expecting him to agree with me. I said I understood that the majority of Frenchmen, particularly in the National Assembly, were exasperated by the painful and complicated character of the Algerian question. I said I was sure that all kinds of plausible and emotionally justifiable arguments could be advanced to support various political and military actions, particularly the latter, which were, nevertheless, incompatible with the sustaining and strengthening of normal and friendly relations between independent states. As a newly independent country it was inevitable that Tunisia should be hyper-sensitive to what she considered to be violations of her independence and sovereignty. For example, the issue of internal security was obviously one which provoked very strong feelings, since the Tunisian Government was responsible for internal security. I said I hoped that the foreseeable psychological effect of political and military actions by France would be carefully assessed before they were taken, whatever might be considered to be the immediate provocation or justification. It was perhaps because we doubted the wisdom of certain French attitudes in terms of the goal which France had proclaimed with regard to her relations with Tunisia and Morocco, that we felt an increasing concern about the evolution of the general situation in North Africa.
Mr. Lucet did not have very much to say in reply. He asked whether we supported Bourguiba’s policies with regard to Algeria. I said, and he agreed, readily, that in so far as Bourguiba’s political efforts were directed toward persuading the FLN to discuss with France the conditions of a cease-fire, in order to set the stage for free and internationally supervised elections, and thus to put an end to the hideous atrocities which were taking place in Algeria, we thought that this represented a constructive effort which both France and ourselves supported. I said, I thought it was unreasonable to expect that Tunisia’s and Morocco’s support of the Algerian Nationalist cause could be crushed, and I thought that any policy attempting to bring about such a result by means of pressure was doomed to failure, with attendant dangers and complications for the future of [Page 676] the whole of North Africa, and the interests of the free world in that area.
Mr. Lucet then referred briefly to Ambassador Houghton’s visit to the States and asked whether it had any particular significance at this time. I told him that Ambassador Houghton was coming back for consultation in accordance with a timetable which had been established before the cancellation of President Coty’s visit, and that there was no special significance to his trip.