Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII

250. Telegram From the Consulate at Rabat to the Department of State¹

Rabat, May 6, 1957—2 p.m.

835. From Richards. Report on visit to Tunis.

No difficulties encountered Tunis over re-endorsement ME proposals and Bourguiba welcomed my offer $3 million economic assistance on grant basis as “symbolic” of US friendship and support. However, we failed to reach agreement on projects or methods extending aid and up to time my departure no firm commitment existed. I did not evade question application doctrine to Tunisia but stated nation could count on US assistance if requested in event of attack by international Communism in same manner as other states in ME. To have attempted to draw fine distinction would have destroyed effectiveness of mission in Tunisia and in face of Bourguiba’s acceptance of doctrine immediately after it was enunciated could have caused setback in Tunisian coop with West.

Bourguiba spent considerable time setting forth his position on Algeria and “colonialism” in general. He described economic misery and denial aspirations of peoples for independence as two main contributors to spread of Communism. He also made clear his wish to work with France and recognition Tunisian dependence on French economic assistance. Morning of May 4 prior to arrival of mission he called in French Ambassador² to inform him of mission’s visit. Bourguiba told me he reached full understanding with Ambassador concerning Tunisian interest in my mission. I believe this was statesmanlike move helpful both to US and Tunisian relations with French. Regarding Algeria Bourguiba left no doubt of Tunisia’s firm support for its independence. He argued forcibly against colonialism in general making point that Soviet bloc effectively capitalizing on issue. By failing to grant independence to colonial peoples free world opened itself to charges of hypocrisy when it dwelt upon enslavement of satellite countries by Communism and gave “microbes” of Communism opportunity for penetration. He urges us to bring friendly pressure on both France and Britain, two principal colonial powers in Western bloc, to make them realize need to grant independence. Although really sympathetic to those desiring freedom, for “official reasons,” Bourguiba asserted, US continues to take positions which make it appear to strugglers for freedom that it backs “colonialism.” He was careful to say however that he knew most vicious form of colonialism was behind Iron Curtain.

In reply I referred to US emergence from colonial status and long history of support for independence of peoples when they able exercise independence effectively. I called attention to fact US after two great wars had refrained from accepting any territory and on contrary had granted independence to former possessions. Because of complicated world responsibilities US unable at times to take as straight and open position on such problems as colonialism as it might really wish. US considered international Communism overriding danger to freedom independent people everywhere. Therefore it was obliged to place primary emphasis upon arrangements to contain this menace. Although all might not be perfect in administration of dependent territories by certain Western states, nevertheless there was great and continuing progress toward freedom and self-government of people under their tutelage. Same could not be said of Soviet “colonialism.” In conclusion I said that I personally had good deal of sympathy for Bourguiba’s viewpoint and although matter outside scope my mission I would report his views to President.

First meeting May 4 was “courtesy” call on Bourguiba. He described his policy of coop with West and said he unable understand attitude of countries which professed to be anti-Communist and yet refused coop with West. Their position made no sense. If those governments really anti-Communist they should welcome chance work with West.

In later plenary meeting presided over by Bourguiba and attended also by VP Lagdham and other Tunisian Cabinet members I described principal features of ME proposals. I said that if Tunisia were attacked by international Communism or country dominated by international Communism and requested US assistance it could be sure of US support. I also pointed to assistance which US prepared give against subversion by Communists at same time making clear my belief GOT in no danger from subversion at this time. I told Bourguiba mission able to provide Tunisia $3 million on grant basis in economic development assistance. Sum would be in addition to regular FY 57 program and any program undertaken in FY 58. Bourguiba while welcoming offer professed disappointment at figure. He elaborated at some length on manifold problems facing new country, maintaining that French credits and US aid sufficient to finance only small part of necessary work.

Since Bourguiba had to leave for another appointment communiqué then discussed. He accepted quickly our suggested draft asking only omission any reference economic aid. He thought that if aid linked to matter of “political ideology” it could be misconstrued as “counterpart” for Tunisian support for doctrine. I readily agreed to his suggestion. Despite failure agreed on aid projects both Director General of Foreign Office and Director Prime Minister’s office confirmed May 6 intention issue communiqué. Text transmitted separately.³

After departure Bourguiba Vice Premier Ladgham made further plea for further economic assistance.

He said Tunisians were of course aware of figure mentioned in Joint Resolution⁴ and had drawn up list of projects in magnitude of $57 million. I explained limitations of funds and heavy demands elsewhere. I pointed to large portion of US budget devoted to defense which served in terms of entire free world, increasing number of complaints from US taxpayers, and growing Congressional sentiment in favor reduction foreign aid programs. I also emphasized Congress wished future aid extended on loan basis. While making clear FY 1958 funds subject to action by Congress, I said there every reason anticipate US would continue an assistance program for Tunisia. During discussion I also called attention to 15 day requirement of Joint Resolution. We agreed that economic experts would meet morning May 5 to consider specific projects.

Question US military aid to Tunisia not raised.

Regarding economic aid—after prior discussion Embassy I had decided that in view shortness of time it would be necessary immediately to give Tunisians figure on magnitude of aid. In our briefing session Ambassador Jones called attention to large foreign debt Tunisia already carrying and Washington decision regular FY 1957 program should be entirely on loan basis. He cited growing Tunisian disappointment over US aid as realization spread size interest charges compared to those asked by French. I concluded that by adding $3 million on grant basis (Deptel 445 to Tunis)⁵ political effectiveness of entire US aid program would be considerably enhanced. No question exists that there is need in Tunisia for additional economic assistance. Furthermore Tunisians justifiably would be at loss to understand failure of US provide some assistance under doctrine after quick acceptance and in face of their strong support for West. Especially in view of Tunisian initiative in informing French Ambassador of mission visit I do not anticipate adverse French reactions.

In discussions with economic experts principal difficulties arose over findings suitable projects. Tunisians stated they had hoped magnitude of doctrine aid would have enabled them fund certain major projects such as capitalization development bank, some major dam construction, rural development of Gamouda plain ($9 million project), establishment of university. They refused consider partial funding any project on grounds they would not embark on any major project unless total financing in sight. Under circumstances they declared that top priority request was for vehicles and communications equipment for “internal security” forces, and 5 vessels for customs patrol. Upon examination established that equipment sought was primarily designed increase effectiveness army, including formation four mobile infantry battalions. We indicated willingness provide some vehicles and radio equipment for police but nothing for army. They would not differentiate between army and police, calling attention to need protect frontier villages from increasing number border violations. Insisted $1.5 million package deal minimum required this purpose and refused substitute any project in economic area for this request. With respect to balance $1.5 million they first asked for $600,000 to fund broadcasting station for which balance funds available through French. Later withdrew this request and asked for 3 helicopters ($170,000) for locust control, 25 tank trucks to water arid central and south Tunisian regions, and balance for local currency cost of rural development in coastal Haouaria plain (includes drainage, small harbor construction, road building, electrification, reforestation, et cetera).

Insisted they would not accept counterpart generation through commodity imports—francs must be purchased through French by dollar check because of degree to which Tunisia fiscally and economically tied to French franc area. We felt dangerous precedent would be established if we complied while recognizing difficulties implicit in present nature Tunisian economy. Discussions ended in impasse, Tunisian experts insisting their instructions categoric that $1.5 million “minimum essential” for armed forces needs and dollar check indispensable for local currency purchase. Negotiations made more difficult by absence from Tunis May 5 of Bourguiba and Ladgham. Negotiators resumed night of May 5 after Bourguiba, Ladgham allegedly contacted by telephone and confirmed stand taken by economic experts. We emphasized that funds available to Richards under special authority might cease to be available to him May 8 but left small chink in door open for possibility Tunisians might decide on less obdurate line and communicate through US Embassy Tunis with us in Rabat or Department in Washington. I think it possible that on Bourguiba’s return Tunis in next day or two Tunisians will adopt more flexible attitude. If so, we should be responsive.

My observations here confirm Bourguiba has decided upon policy of cooperation with West. He seems genuinely to believe this course in best interest of his country and also to hope that satisfactory arrangements may be worked out with French. He undoubtedly expects increasing US economic assistance and intends to press for start of military aid program. Big stumbling block of course is Algeria which bound continue plague relations with entire Western world and provide opponents of Bourguiba and his policy of cooperation with West popular opposition rallying point. Although Tunisia on surface appears relatively prosperous, economic problems obviously formidable and it is difficult to see how country could survive financially should France decide to withdraw large financial outlay still being made.

Cannon

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/5–657. Secret. Repeated to Paris, London, Tripoli, New Delhi, Rome, Addis Ababa, Athens, Karachi, Kabul, Beirut, Ankara, Jidda, Damascus, Cairo, Baghdad, Tehran, Khartoum, Amman, and Tel Aviv. Regarding the Richards Mission, see Document 17.
2. Georges Gorse.
3. For text of the joint communiqué, dated May 6, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1957, p. 849.
4. $200 million.
5. Telegram 445, April 6, authorized Richards to offer Tunisia an additional amount of economic aid, given Bourguiba’s support for the Eisenhower Doctrine and Tunisia’s need. The International Cooperation Administration believed such aid was not economically justifiable so soon after the conclusion of the March agreement. Richards was advised to stay within a limit of $3 million. (Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/4–657)