Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII

237. Telegram From the Consulate at Asmara to the Department of State¹

Asmara, April 22, 1957.

71. From Richards. Results Khartoum visit. Although our information indicates Prime Minister and majority Cabinet willing accept American Doctrine and would like obtain economic aid, it appears they were unable persuade minority to go along. They therefore, have made no request for aid and I have made no commitments. We agreed on brief communiqué (being telegraphed separately).² On arrival April 20 we found political atmosphere uncertain. Sudanese carrying pamphlets denouncing my Mission had just been arrested leaving Egyptian Consulate. It seemed evident Nasser agents were very active and that he making special effort forestall approval American Doctrine on his southern flank. Egyptian influence was making itself felt even inside Cabinet.

Shortly after arrival Khartoum Mission and Ambassador Pinker-ton met with specially designated committee headed by Foreign Minister (Mahgoub³) and having as other members Deputy Prime Minister–Minister of Agriculture–Irrigation and Power (Hamza⁴), Minister of Finance (Ahmed), Minister of Public Works (Lwoki⁵), and Minister of Interior (Abdel Rahman⁶). Foreign Minister opened by reading note verbale (being pouched⁷) which took generally dubious view of American Doctrine, arguing it would stimulate unfortunate reaction by USSR, split Arab League, and establish Israel as permanent danger for Sudan. Document further criticized President’s proposals as couched in excessively general terms, failing to deal with basic ME problems and omitting promise of aid against any aggression other than Communist. Note included statement that Sudan’s policy is one of “positive neutrality” which was explained to me as that country takes no sides in east-west struggles so long as there is no direct threat to its independence and sovereignty.

Note concluded with following series of questions:

Verbatim text.

• “(1) Are the military and economic aids suggested in the proposals intertwined, or can the two types of aid be separated?
• “(2) Are the proposals basically intended to combat Communist states?
• “(3) Are the proposals, whether they are looked at from their economic or military aspects, intended to defend independent states equally against the influence of Eastern or Western blocs?
• “(4) Do the proposals aim at bringing pressure to bear on one Arab country or another?
• “(5) Would the proposals allow us to maintain our policy of positive neutrality between the two major blocs?
• “(6) Are the proposals and the mutual security aids interdependent?
• “(7) Do the proposals envisage the acceptance of certain conditions such as those we propose to attach to economic aid when we take a decision?

“To illustrate our point, we think that (1) economic aid should not encroach on our sovereignty and national independence, (2) that the funds should be large enough to meet our needs on the one hand and justify participation in the scheme on the other, (3) that expenditure from the funds should be on those schemes proposed by US for the benefit of our country, (4) that no action that we may take in that respect should hurt the interests of any other Arab country, and (5) that we should have more dollars and few experts. Do you think that such conditions would be acceptable?” End verbatim text.

I made general statement stressing American friendship for Sudan and explaining US reason for declaring ME policy and objective toward which it was directed. Pointed out six Arab States and several others in ME have already publicly endorsed policy. Emphasized we not trying force policy on anyone and would still remain friends even if Sudan declined accept it.

I then gave oral answers to specific questions put in Sudanese note verbale. Further discussions followed during which I emphasized time and again that only condition, if it could be called that, attached to aid under American Doctrine was that country requesting it should agree with objectives of Doctrine and take such steps as it was fit to preserve its independence against threat of international Communism. Foreign Minister concluded meeting by saying he would report to Council of Ministers and let me know their attitude next day.

On following morning we met again with same group. Foreign Minister read from prepared notes statement that Cabinet had instructed him to make re his understanding of my answers to questions raised previous day, as follows:

Verbatim text.

• “(1) Economic aid can be separated from military aid;
• “(2) It is understood that acceptance of economic aid will not deprive US from maintaining a policy of positive neutrality;
• “(3) Economic aid does not in any way hurt Arab country;
• “(4) The schemes to be financed under this Doctrine are those which we would propose and which would be agreed upon by the US;
• “(5) The funds to be spent by the Sudanese Government on the projects agreed upon would be placed at the disposal of the Sudanese Government;
• “(6) The technical experts involved will be limited only to those required for the agreed projects;
• “(7) Acceptance of economic aid does not bar us from accepting from other countries including the USSR.” End verbatim text.

Foreign Minister concluded by reading following:

Verbatim text.

“This being our understanding of the picture, Council of Ministers prefer at the present time to refrain from taking any resolution accepting or rejecting such aid; it will continue its study of the matter and let its decision be known in due course.” End verbatim text.

Discussion following this presentation brought out certain points: (a) Foreign Minister and negotiation committee had received definite instructions from Cabinet and were either unable or unwilling to deviate in any way from them or even to seek their modification at this time. However, Foreign Minister obviously envisaged that Cabinet might later adopt more favorable position and he suggested our respective experts might hold exploratory talks re projects. I declined this suggestion, (b) It appeared Sudanese Government thought that if it reached decision within few weeks to request aid under Doctrine it could still present its request to me. I tried to explain it would be most unlikely I could take any action to help Sudan after end my visit Khartoum. Jernegan later made this crystal clear in talk with Foreign Minister, who indicated his understanding but reiterated he could give us no more definite answer at this time than was contained in message from Cabinet which he had read to us. (c) While saying US would not close door on possibility future US-Sudan cooperation, we made plain that if Sudan failed take advantage of special aid available under American Doctrine, future aid request would have to be treated in different context and in light of circumstances which might prevail at that time. This connection, we explained greater limitations on provision aid under normal programs and uncertainties re future availability of funds. Referring repeated Sudanese references to their policy of “positive neutrality”, I pointed out many countries have taken forthright stand in line with our policy of combating international Communism and that Congress might well be unfavorably disposed toward voting funds for country which insisted upon position of neutrality. (d) Foreign Minister confirmed my impression that if Sudan requested any aid at all it would only be in the economic field. In reply my question he said Sudan was not seeking military aid from any country. (e) Foreign Minister explicitly stated he was unable to say at this time whether Sudan agreed with American Doctrine or not. He could go no further than to say Cabinet had agreed to give matter further study.

We agreed some form of joint statements should be made re Mission’s visit. Foreign Minister wanted to include seven points stated above as Cabinet’s understanding of my answers to questions posed in note verbale. I demurred, saying in that case we would probably have to ask for inclusion various other points I had made. I got impression Foreign Minister felt seven points would facilitate acceptance of Doctrine and American aid by Sudanese public, and I expect he will use them in reply press questions or in some other public fashion.

After this second meeting adjourned, I sent Foreign Minister written note verbale replying questions he had raised and which I had answered orally on previous day. I did this in order make sure my oral answers were complete and not misinterpreted. (Copy this note verbale being pouched.)

I was disappointed at early and unsatisfactory end of discussion. However, in view of firm refusal of Sudanese representatives state their position on Doctrine or even make request for aid, there seemed nothing further to be done. I did not think it wise appear to attempt to force aid upon them or indicate that they could obtain it without at least giving some statement (private or public) of endorsement our policy objectives.

My impressions are:

(1) Country is in relatively good economic condition and consequently does not feel great pressure to obtain foreign aid.

(2) Government underestimates danger of Communist infiltration.

(3) Government fears involvement in great power politics and is also fearful of antagonizing Egypt and other Arab States.

(4) Prime Minister and majority in present coalition are friendly to US but are not prepared for show-down with coalition minority, for fear of causing fall of government. (Ambassador Pinkerton believes fall of Cabinet would be unfortunate for US.) We heard from highly reliable sources that vote in Cabinet meeting after our first session with Sudanese representatives was 11 to 3 in favor of acceptance American aid. All three opposed were members minority PDP Party.⁸ All of negotiation group voted in favor except Ministry of Interior who leads PDP.

(5) Even those favoring US cooperation might shy away from clean cut public statement of support for American Doctrine or opposition to international Communism.

(6) Whole issue of acceptance Doctrine and request for American aid is far from settled within government. It is entirely possible request for aid will be made in next few weeks or months. If this occurs, it will be sign of victory pro-American majority group. (Whether we should respond affirmatively is of course another question and will depend on circumstances.) Prime Minister told Iraqi Minister to Sudan⁹ last night that Sudan would certainly align itself with American Doctrine in time; “it had to”.

(7) Because of its location and its Arab and African connections, Sudan is definitely worth wooing. If I had been given opening, I would have thought it worth while to offer relatively substantial amount of aid to achieve Sudan alignment in favor American Doctrine. We should remain receptive and use all available means to keep it from falling under Egyptian domination or Communist influence, even though it will probably be impracticable utilize special authority of this mission in taking any concrete steps to this end. For present, I can only suggest policy of watchful waiting and gentle encouragement. We painstakingly attempted to leave an impression of understanding and friendship and believe we succeeded in that.¹⁰

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/4–2257. Secret. Also sent to Cairo, Damascus, Amman, London, Paris, Addis Ababa, and Jidda; repeated by pouch to Aden, New Delhi, Rome, Karachi, Kabul, Tripoli, Beirut, Tel Aviv, Rabat, Tunis, Athens, Ankara, Tehran, Khartoum, and Baghdad. Regarding the Richards Mission, see Document 17.
2. Telegram 68, from Asmara, April 22, contained the text. (Ibid.) It is printed in Department of State Bulletin, May 13, 1957, p. 764.
3. Muhammad Ahmad Mahjub.
4. Mirghani Hamza.
5. Benjamin Lwoki.
6. Ali Abd al-Rahman.
7. Despatch 282, April 21, transmitted the note verbale presented to the Mission on April 20, an informal record of the April 20 discussion, a note verbale dated April 21 from the Mission responding to the questions raised in the Sudanese note, and an informal record of the April 21 meeting. (Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/4–2157)
8. Identified as Ali Abd al-Rahman, Minister of Local Government; Mahammed Nur al-Din; and Hammad Tewfik, Minister of Commerce. (Telegram 67 to Asmara, April 23; ibid., 120.1580/4–2357)
9. Yassin Umar.
10. There is no signature on the source text.