Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII

238. Operations Coordinating Board Report¹

Washington, September 25, 1957.

OPERATIONS PLAN FOR THE SUDAN²

I. Objectives and Special Operating Guidance

A. U.S. Objectives regarding the Near East are:

1. Availability to the United States and its allies of the resources, the strategic positions, and the passage rights of the area, and the denial of such resources and strategic positions to the Soviet bloc.

2. Stable, viable, friendly governments in the area, capable of withstanding communist-inspired subversion from within, and willing to resist communist aggression.

3. Settlement of major issues between the Arab states and Israel as a foundation for establishing peace and order in the area.

4. Reversal of the anti-American trends of Arab opinion.

5. Prevention of the extension of Soviet influence in the area.

6. Wider recognition in the free world of the legitimate aspirations of the countries in the area to be recognized as, and have the status of, sovereign states; and wider recognition by such countries of their responsibility toward the area and toward the free world generally.

B. Special Operating Guidance:

In pursuing the policy objectives set forth above, U.S. actions in the Sudan should be guided by the following:

7. Nationalism and Foreign Relations. Because of the Sudan’s geographic location and the Nile River, Egypt has always had a special position in the Sudan and is at the present time using various means to increase that influence at the expense of the Western powers. Egyptian activities have also given encouragement to the Soviet bloc and international communism to focus attention on the Sudan with a view to gaining political and economic strongholds in the newly independent state. We must encourage Sudanese independent development and support those elements which consider that continued Egyptian influence will ultimately result in undermining the Sudan’s independent sovereign status. We should assist efforts of the Sudan to unify the diverse cultural and religious elements of the country and to reduce or eliminate divisive factors which facilitate Communist and/or Egyptian penetration and subversion. We should continue to impress on the Sudan that its future status as an independent and sovereign state will be in grave doubt if action is not taken to prevent the subversive activities of Egypt and international communism. We should seek a reduction in the size of Soviet bloc missions. We should foster further close ties between the Sudan and its neighbors in Africa, particularly Ethiopia, in an effort to expose more Sudanese officials to the views of Western-oriented countries. We should also encourage the Sudanese, when appropriate, to continue to look to the U.K. as a friend, and as a possible source of development capital.

8. Economic Development. In evaluating the Sudan’s agricultural and natural resources, we should determine what diversification can be recommended to strengthen the present economy and assist in avoiding future adverse effects of over-reliance on an almost one-crop economy (cotton). We should promote the conclusion of a satisfactory agreement between the Sudan and other countries as appropriate for the sharing of the Nile waters. We should also bear in mind the need for an improved communications and transportation system, the lack of which is a limiting factor in economic development. The United States should use its technical assistance program, if initiated,³ to promote the favorable orientation of Sudanese technicians and leaders toward the U.S. and the West, and to demonstrate progressive Western methods. Sudanese development projects should be given consideration under the proposed Development Loan Fund, or by other arrangements.

9. Foreign Investment. Encouragement should be given to the participation of U.S. business and industrial interests in the development of the Sudan, and at the same time Sudan should be encouraged to offer a favorable climate for private foreign investment.

10. Military. The military potential of the Sudan for providing base and transit facilities for possible future United States military needs should be kept under review, in the event restrictions in other more desirable Middle East areas make an alternative imperative. At the present time, Sudanese permission has been granted for MATS aircraft to overfly the Sudan and to make refueling stops at Khartoum.⁴ Thus the Sudan constitutes an important communications link in the strategic military air line of communications around the world.

We should encourage the development of bilateral mutual defense arrangements between Ethiopia and the Sudan as a possible contribution to the elimination of Egyptian influence in Sudanese affairs.

11. Labor. Toward achieving the objectives of preventing the extension of Soviet influence in the area and in view of the influence of the Sudanese Communist Party and international communism in trade unions and peasant organizations, we should promote closer relationships between the free trade unions in the Sudan and American labor unions. These free trade unions need the kind of encouragement and moral support that comes from association with veteran non-Communist trade union leaders who know how a responsible movement can be built for the economic benefit of their membership and community. The significant capture of one-third of the Sudan trade unions by the Communists, their recent action in endeavoring to achieve unity between the Communist SWTUF (Sudan Workers’ Trade Union Federation) and the free SGWTUF (Sudan Government Workers’ Trade Union Federation), and their current bringing of the officials of those unions to the Soviet Union and to China for further indoctrination is a development which must be checked and reversed.

12. Information and Cultural. The United States should use its cultural exchange programs to promote the favorable orientation of Sudanese students and leaders toward the U.S. and the West. We should continue to promote close association between American universities and Khartoum University. We should urge the Sudan Government to take the necessary measures to counteract Communist and Egyptian activity and influence in educational and cultural institutions and organizations.

13. Internal Security. An increased capability to maintain public order and internal security is an important need of the Sudan. We should be prepared to offer advice and assistance on training and equipment for the Sudan’s defense force and internal security organizations should such assistance and advice be requested.

C. Selected U.S. Arrangements With or Pertaining to the Sudan:

14. U.S. Involvements Which May Imply Military Security Guarantees. The United States, by joint congressional resolution on the Middle East, signed by the President on March 9, 1957,⁵ announced its determination to assist Middle East nations to maintain their independence. The resolution declared that the United States is prepared to commit its military forces, at the discretion of the President, against overt armed aggression by any nation controlled by international communism if the nation subject to that aggression requests such aid. The Richards Mission was in the Sudan from April 20 until April 22 of this year and thoroughly discussed the President’s Middle East proposals with the Sudan Government. To date, however, the Sudan Government has neither rejected nor accepted participation in the program. Subsequently, an informal approach to the U.S. for technical assistance and substantial grants or loans has been made. An ICA survey group will go to the Sudan shortly to review Sudanese economic development needs and plans.

15. U.S. Commitments for Funds, Goods or Services. None.

16. Other Arrangements. In December 1956, on the basis of an ad hoc arrangement, three banking and monetary experts from the staff of the Federal Reserve Board were provided to assist the Sudan Government in drawing up a charter for a Central Bank.

[Here follows section II, “Current and Projected Programs and Courses of Action,” comprising paragraphs 17 through 41.]

Note: National Intelligence Estimate regarding this area is: NIE 72.1–57, “The Outlook for the Sudan”, August 6, 1957.⁶

1. Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Near East Jan.–July 1957. Secret. Attached to a memorandum by Charles E. Johnson, Executive Assistant of the OCB, which noted that the OCB at its September 18 meeting had revised and concurred in the operations plan and had agreed that the United Kingdom should be encouraged to satisfy any future Sudanese military assistance requests. The Sudan should also be persuaded to approach the United Kingdom with their requests.
2. This plan was devised pursuant to NSC 5428, “United States Objectives and Policies With Respect to the Near East”, July 23, 1954. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. ix, Part 1, p. 525.
3. Telegram 374 from Khartoum, November 26, conveyed a formal Sudanese request for technical and economic aid under the Mutual Security Act of 1958.(Department of State, Central Files, 745W.5–MSP/11–2657) In response, the Embassy was instructed to indicate U.S. willingness to enter into negotiations. (Telegram 619, November 27; ibid.) An announcement to this effect followed shortly.
4. Cole reported that on October 5, Permanent Under Secretary in the Foreign Ministry Mohammed Osman Yassein expressed Sudanese concern in regard to the September overflights by U.S. aircraft carrying military equipment to Jordan.(Despatch 99, October 14; ibid., 745W.5411/10–1457) The Embassy was instructed to convey U.S. regret and emphasize U.S. appreciation of landing and overflight rights granted to military aircraft. (Airgram 26, November 15; ibid.)
5. 71 Stat. 5.
6. Not printed. (Department of State, INR–NIE Files)