Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII

236. Memorandum of a Conversation, Khartoum, March 13, 1957¹

Khartoum , March 13, 1957

SUBJECT

• Visit of Vice President Richard M. Nixon

PARTICIPANTS

• Sudanese:
  • His Excellency Abdullah Khalil, Prime Minister of The Sudan
  • His Excellency Muhammed Ahmad Mahjub, Foreign Minister of The Sudan
• American:
  • Vice President of the United States Richard M. Nixon
  • Lowell C. Pinkerton, United States Ambassador to The Sudan
  • Joseph Palmer 2nd, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs

The Vice President said that he was delighted to have this opportunity of visiting the Sudan in connection with his tour of Africa. He had heard a great deal about the important progress which was being made in this country and had been most anxious to see it at first hand. He added that it was his custom in trips of this kind to learn as much as he could about conditions in and policies of the countries which he visited in order to make a report to the President and to the Secretary of State.

The Prime Minister replied that he was similarly most happy to have this opportunity to exchange views with the Vice President. He said that the Sudan found itself in agreement with most of the policies of the United States. He added that he was happy to be able to speak in complete frankness. The Sudan has adopted the attitude that it has nothing to hide and is anxious to open up its policies and attitudes for all to see.

The conversations then ranged over a wide variety of subjects, which may be summarized as follows:

1. Economic Aid.

The Foreign Minister said that the Sudan requires two types of economic development. The first relates to projects which are bankable and can therefore be financed either through private loans or by such agencies as the World Bank. He mentioned, illustratively, textile mills, papyrus processing plants, hydro-electric projects, et cetera. These types of projects present no problem, since the Sudan can plan for them as it is able and can pay for them out of its own resources. The second category relates to projects which bring no direct financial return but are necessary to the development of the country. The Sudan’s primary needs in this category are the development of water resources and roads. With respect to water, it is essential to the future economy of the country that means be found of settling the nomadic tribes in more permanent locations and water is necessary to this process. Such permanent settlement of the nomads would permit the development of certain of the Sudan’s resources. For example, the production and export of gum arabic could be doubled if the nomadic tribes in the areas of production could be persuaded to remain there and assist in gathering this product. He went on to say that roads are necessary to open up new areas and to get products to market. The Sudan is unabashed at requesting assistance for such projects as these, because it knows that such aid will strengthen the Sudanese economy and create conditions which may make it possible in the future for the Sudan to assist some other less fortunate economy. He went on to say that the Sudan is determined to preserve its independence and will not accept aid from any country under conditions which might prejudice that objective. The Government has given considerable thought to U.S. assistance and is convinced that American aid is given without strings and for the sole purpose of aiding the country concerned to develop its own resources for its own good. Discussions had been held with Mr. Hollister during his recent visit to the Sudan and the Government is hopeful that the United States understands Sudanese needs as a result of these conversations.²

The Vice President confirmed the Foreign Minister’s statement regarding the objectives of United States aid. He said that he would be happy to make clear in his press conference this evening that U.S. aid is given without conditions and for the purpose of building stability and preserving independence.

2. The Eisenhower Doctrine

The Foreign Minister said that his Government is giving careful consideration to the Eisenhower Doctrine and is looking forward to hearing Ambassador Richards’ further explanations with respect to it.³ (The Prime Minister intervened to indicate that in his opinion the Sudanese Government would certainly go along with the President’s program, but the Foreign Minister reiterated that no decisions had been taken.)

The Foreign Minister went on to say that he personally felt that from an American point of view the President’s program would have been better understood and accepted in the Middle East if it had been generalized with respect to the problem of aggression rather than directed solely at the Communist menace. The Prime Minister intervened at this point to say that he disagreed with the Foreign Minister. He pointed out that he and his Government have taken the firm decision to combat communism and that he thought it is better to be outspoken on such matters and to identify the real nature of the threat. The Foreign Minister said that he was speaking purely from the point of view of how the United States could most effectively present the President’s program.

The Vice President explained that there are two main aspects of the President’s program. The first is to extend an assurance to the countries of the Middle East against communist aggression. The second is to so strengthen the countries of the area through economic assistance as to decrease and remove their susceptibility to communist infiltration and subversion. The objective of the Doctrine is to enable the countries of the area to maintain their independence. Naturally, U.S. motives in this respect are not purely philanthropic. The United States believes that the best way to preserve its own independence is to assist other countries in the maintenance of their independence. This means freedom from all types of domination from whatever sources.

3. Military Assistance.

The Vice President said that he had noted that contrary to what he had heard in other countries, neither the Prime Minister nor the Foreign Minister had made any mention of military assistance. He asked whether this reflects a judgment on their part that economic development must have priority over the building of larger armed forces. The Prime Minister confirmed the Vice President’s analysis. He said that the country presently has excellent neighbors and does not feel threatened. In due course, it will want to expand and improve its armed forces, but it expects to do this from its own resources. First, however, it is anxious to develop the country and to create the economic base necessary to support an expanded military establishment.

The Vice President said that this is eminently sound and that he was glad to see that this question was viewed with such good sense.

4. Foreign Trade.

The Foreign Minister stated that the Sudan is most anxious to expand its trade with the United States. At the present time, it earns only a comparatively few dollars from the export of gum arabic and hides and skins and from the operations of the U.S. diplomatic mission. He was hopeful that some means could be found of expanding the sale of Sudanese cotton in the United States. This is of the long staple variety and therefore not entirely competitive with American cotton. He mentioned, in this connection, the fact that the Sudan is losing part of its Indian market as the result of the sale of U.S. surplus cotton to that country and he had recently been forced to tell the Government of India that unless it resumes its former level of purchase of Sudanese cotton, the Sudan will be forced to cut its imports of Indian gray sheeting. The Foreign Minister went on to say that the Sudan’s foreign cotton markets are generally assured because of the political situation in the Middle East. It is likely that both France and Great Britain will take little Egyptian cotton as compared to the past and that the Sudan will be able to sell more to those two countries. This, however, is only a temporary solution and the Sudan is most anxious to assure the retention of its regular markets.

The Vice President suggested that the Sudanese Government look into the possibility of increasing sales of cotton to the American market. He pointed out that we have a private enterprise economy and that the Sudan would therefore have to proceed through ordinary commercial channels. With respect to U.S. surplus disposal programs, he knew that it is the desire of the United States Government to endeavor to avoid disruption of normal commercial markets.

5. Communism.

The Prime Minister reiterated that the Government of the Sudan is strongly and openly opposed to communism. It believes that the best way to combat this menace is to give it complete freedom to operate above the surface rather than to drive it underground. Thus, there is a quasi-legal Communist Party which operates three newspapers. He did not think that communism had made very great inroads in the Sudan and seemed confident of his ability to cope with it, particularly if the economy can be strengthened and benefits demonstrated to the people. There has been some communist penetration of the University of Khartoum and estimates of the number of students who are communist-influenced run as high as fifty percent. However, it is his experience that those students usually forgot about communism once they graduate and assume their lifetime vocations. He noted, with respect to an inquiry by the Vice President, that there has also been some communist infiltration of Sudanese students at school in Egypt. In fact, the Egyptians have complained to him that the Sudanese are spreading communism in Egypt.

The Foreign Minister spoke of the success which communist propaganda is achieving in various areas of the world. He thought that in general it is more effective than American propaganda. The communists are particularly attacking U.S. aid programs, which he and his colleagues in the Sudanese Government know are without conditions, but which the communists represent as an effort at political domination by the U.S.

The Vice President asked the Prime Minister whether he foresaw any difficulty from the communists or from any of the Near Eastern states, particularly Egypt, in accepting U.S. assistance. The Prime Minister replied that he does not intend to be deterred by the communists. As far as Egypt is concerned, it is hardly in a position to criticize since it has accepted American economic assistance itself.

6. Relations with Egypt.

The Vice President asked the Prime Minister for his estimate of the situation in Egypt. The Prime Minister replied that he thought Nasser would be careful not to be taken over by the Soviets. He said that in a recent conversation with Nasser, he had asked the latter whether or not he was a communist and Nasser had replied emphatically in the negative. Nasser had added that he wished to have good relations with a foreign country called the Soviet Union but that he would not submit to the domination of any country. The Prime Minister went on to say that Nasser is a Moslem and has aspirations of leadership among the Moslem states. Most of the Moslems are aware of the menace of communism and for Nasser to embrace this heresy would be to throw away any pretensions he has to such leadership.

The Prime Minister went on to say that the Sudan does not presently feel menaced by Egypt. It is apparent from recent events in the area that Egypt does not possess the military capability for taking over any adjoining area by force. He said that the Sudan desires good relations with Egypt, but can not accept any Egyptian domination. Although Egypt earlier had aspirations to annex the Sudan, he thought that Nasser now realized, after more mature reasoning, that this would not be in Egypt’s interest.

The Vice President asked the Prime Minister if he had any suggestions to make as to what United States policy should be toward Egypt. The Prime Minister said that he thought we should not attempt to strengthen Nasser, but should help him in small ways. He thought we should be careful not to do anything which would result in a further deterioration of relations between the U.K. and Egypt. He was sure that Nasser desired to resume relations with the U.K. as soon as possible and, in fact, Nasser had told him this in so many words shortly after the Anglo-French intervention in the Canal area.

7. The Sudan and Africa.

The Vice President said that he had seemed to detect in the other African countries which he had visited a disposition to remain somewhat aloof from blocs and to act in the UN and otherwise in an independent manner. He thought that there was a growing tendency, in other words, for the states concerned to act in accordance with their own best interests, rather than to defer to the interests of others in the general area. The Prime Minister said that he thought that this was a correct interpretation. The Sudan desires close relations with countries in similar circumstances to its own, but it would, in the last analysis, act in accordance with its own best interests. He referred, in this connection, to the close relations which the Sudan is evolving with Ethiopia. He said that his country is most anxious to strengthen that relationship.

8. Nile Development.

The Vice President said that if he understood Sudan’s policy correctly, it believes that the Nile should be developed on a cooperative basis by the riparian states concerned. The Foreign Minister confirmed this view, citing the importance of the river to the economies of all the states concerned.

9. Inflation.

The Vice President asked what the Prime Minister foresaw as the greatest danger to the Sudan at the present time. The Prime Minister unhesitatingly replied “inflation”. He emphasized the low per capita income of the average Sudanese outside of the Gezira area and noted that inflationary trends could cause acute distress.

The Foreign Minister said that he would like to sum up the discussions by reiterating that the Sudan would give careful consideration to the Eisenhower program and would listen with attention to Ambassador Richards’ further explanations. With regard to technical and developmental aid, the Government is confident that such assistance is offered by the United States without political conditions and the Sudan is therefore most desirous of receiving such aid.

1. Source: Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, North Africa (Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, NSC 5614, 5614/1). Secret. Attached as Tab E to Document 19. No drafting information is given on the source text.
2. The Permanent Under Secretary of the Sudanese Ministry of Finance, Hamza Mirghani, visited Washington in mid-December 1956, to meet with IBRD, Export-Import Bank, ICA, and Department of State officials. He made no specific requests. The Sudan, however, in other approaches, expressed interest in a ground water specialist and a statistician. (Telegram 429 to Khartoum, February 7; ibid., Central Files, 745W.5–MSP/2–757) John B. Hollister met with the Sudanese Prime Minister and Minister of Finance on February 25. The Sudanese made no direct requests although Finance Minister Ibrahim Ahmad noted Sudan’s need for a complete water survey, improved communications, and the construction of the Roseires Dam. He commented that the Sudan might request a survey mission. (Despatch 223 from Khartoum, March 8; ibid., 745W.5–MSP/3–857)
3. See infra .