Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII

235. Instruction From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Sudan¹

CA–8750

Washington, May 7, 1956.

SUBJECT

• Instructions for Ambassador Lowell C. Pinkerton

These instructions for the Ambassador are based on the estimate that the Sudan as a new nation facing decisive choices is of importance to the United States.

The Sudan may have close relations with the Soviets, thus opening the African continent to further Soviet penetration, or continue close relations with the West; it may add to the accumulation of Arab extremism or exert a modifying influence in the Arab League; it may be the means of furthering Egyptian designs for domination or the means in certain cases of frustrating Egyptian plans inimical to the West. The orientation of the Sudan away from the Western World would involve a serious set back to American policy in the Near East and Africa.

The Sudan is strategically located, being a member of both the Arab World and of Africa. If we are to exert influence for the achievement of our objectives, we must be more directly concerned with the Sudan itself in view of its new independence. This is especially true since Britain, which has carried nearly exclusive responsibility for the Sudan’s Western orientation, no longer enjoys the status of a condominium power and has suffered several reverses in the Arab World. Egypt, a former condominium power, has not relinquished its ambition to exercise a dominating influence in the Sudan and seems bent on moving the Sudan in the direction of its own “neutralism”, nationalism and cooperation with the Soviets.

Our objectives in the Sudan may be described as follows:

1. To support the maintenance of Sudan’s independence.

2. To encourage stable governments friendly to the West generally and the United States in particular.

3. To prevent Soviet penetration of the Sudan and thus deny its use as a bridge to further Soviet penetration of the African continent. For this purpose, Sudan-Soviet relations must be nominal only.

4. To encourage the Sudan to cooperate with Egypt in cases where Egypt is friendly to United States objectives; to encourage the Sudan to frustrate Egypt in all cases where the Egyptians serve the Soviet purposes; to encourage friendly relations with the Sudan’s other neighbors.

Accordingly, you are instructed to seek the earliest convenient opportunity following presentation of credentials to discuss the following matters with the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs² and other officials as you deem appropriate.

Political

1. You should say that the United States has had pleasure in welcoming the Sudan to the family of independent republics and in taking an initiative to propose the Sudan for membership in the United Nations. We will continue to support the Sudan for membership, will be pleased to give our support in the case of United Nations agencies which the Sudan would like to join, and will be helpful in every appropriate way.³

2. The United States has agreements for economic assistance with more than fifty countries and agreements for military assistance with more than forty countries. There are no strings attached to these agreements. Only provisions for mutual security are included. The Soviets may not include any provisions in extending their aid, but they proceed on the assumption of unseen subversion.

3. If the Sudanese authorities should request further information regarding agreements, you may leave the enclosed copies of agreements between the United States and various countries of the area. These include the Technical Cooperation Agreement with Egypt, the Amity and Economic Relations Treaty with Ethiopia, the Military Defense Assistance Agreement with Lebanon, and the Military Assistance Agreement with Iraq.⁴ You should stress that these represent the various types of economic and military agreements in which the United States is engaged and in no sense are submitted for purposes of negotiation.

4. You should explain that the Government of the Sudan must be under no illusions regarding the relationship in which our offers of aid stand to Soviet offers. The United States has a history of economic and military assistance to friendly countries which antedates the recent Soviet entry to this field. We do not ask any country to take aid from us. We do not believe that threats to accept aid from Soviet sources are in the interest of any nation which desires aid from the United States. We are not bidding against the Soviets because we are not offering the same thing. Our aid does not have subversion as its ultimate purpose.

5. The Sudanese may be assured that the United States expects to have relationships with the Sudan based on its independence and not as an appendage of Egypt. From the first the United States has assumed the position that Egyptian-Sudan agreement on the division of Nile waters is a sine qua non of full United States participation in financing the High Aswan Dam project. We hope that the Sudan will have good relations with all its neighbors, including Egypt, but are confident in the Sudan’s announcements that such good relations will be sought as an independent country.

6. You should say that the United States Government continues to hope that the Sudan will not exchange diplomatic representatives with Communist China, Communist North Korea, Communist Vietnam, or Communist East Germany. Our Chargé has made these representations formally. They continue to constitute our policy.⁵

Military

1. You should inquire concerning the progress in connection with the purchase of arms for the Sudan in view of the reports which have appeared in the press on this subject. If the reply suggests that Soviet arms are under consideration, you should point out:

(a) A transaction with the Soviets in arms inevitably increases the number of Soviet agents in the country and may tend to subvert Sudanese independence.

(b) Soviet exchanges of cotton for arms are politically inspired. The Soviet bloc is rapidly expanding its cotton production and will be able in the future to export cotton if it could promote its political objectives by so doing. Even after the transaction with the Soviets, Egypt is still selling two-thirds of its cotton to the Free World as against less than one-third to the Soviets who are in turn reselling some Egyptian cotton on the world market at a discount. The ultimate in this process is that all Egyptian cotton would be marketed through Soviet hands with the resultant power which this gives to the Soviets over the Egyptian economy.

2. If the Sudanese raise the question of American military assistance, you should reply that you will report the matter to your Government.

Economic

1. You should advise the Government of the Sudan that the United States is most anxious that the Sudan qualify for membership in the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development at an early date. If there is appropriate help we can render in this connection, we will be glad to do so.

2. You should make it clear to the Sudanese authorities that the United States has no desire to specify what assistance should be given to the Sudan. The Sudanese authorities know their situation and can be the best judges of what their economic needs and the various sources of assistance are. We desire that any United States aid programs be the outcome of discussions between representatives of the two governments concerned. For this purpose the United States is willing, should the Government of the Sudan desire, to send a technical group to Khartoum to discuss with the appropriate officials, Sudan’s need for technical assistance and development assistance.

3. The Sudanese may attempt to get a specific figure from you describing the contemplated level of our aid. If so, you should reply that the amount will depend on the discussions of the Sudanese authorities and the United States technical groups. FYI. Subject to action by Congress, plans have been made thus far on the basis of up to $5 million for Development Assistance, $1.5 million for Technical Assistance. Since the time is near when it will be too late to obligate FY 56 funds it is expected that funds or a Sudanese program would be from FY 1957 appropriations. However, if developments are unexpectedly rapid it might be possible to draw on FY 1956 funds to a limited extent, i.e., to send the survey group referred to in Paragraph 2 above. End FYI.

4. You may say that we appreciate the problems the Sudan must be facing in the organization of its fiscal system and government administration. It is possible, should the Sudan desire, that a few American experts in these fields now employed in the United States Government could be made available for service in the Sudan. It is also possible that the United States could participate in the remuneration of such experts. If the Government of the Sudan is interested along this line, you should communicate their requirements and suggested terms of employment and remuneration to the Department. FYI The United States Government could provide the entire remuneration for American experts, but would prefer Sudanese participation though only token. The International Monetary Fund is admirably suited to give financial advice and the Sudanese should not be discouraged from accepting such aid. Furthermore, we must not suggest any competition with the British civil servants already employed in the Sudan. By virtue of their historical experience, the British enjoy an unusual competence as advisers on administration in this country. End FYI.

5. You may say that the United States Government is prepared to sell surplus agricultural commodities to the Sudan under Public Law 480 if they are desired. The enclosed agreement with Egypt illustrates this type of transaction.⁶ The Agricultural Attachés resident in Cairo, but also assigned to Khartoum, will be of assistance in explaining the transaction should the Sudanese express interest. A detailed instruction on the drafting of surplus commodity agreements is under preparation and will be sent to Khartoum in the near future.⁷

6. You may say that the United States is prepared to negotiate a treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation if the Sudan desires. If interest is expressed, the enclosed copy of such a treaty with Greece⁸ may be left with the authorities.

Cultural—Informational—Exchange of Persons:

As appropriate opportunity is provided, you should make the following proposals:

1. That the educational exchange program with the Sudan be expanded in the interests of furthering mutual understanding and continuing the interchange of knowledge and skills. Such opportunities can be provided under either the Fulbright Program or the program conducted within the authority of Public Law 402.⁹ The United States would be willing to enter into a bilateral agreement to establish a Fulbright Program with the Sudan, provided Sudanese currency is available to the United States Government as a result of the sale of surplus United States agricultural commodities to the Sudan under Public Law 480. The United States would consider using a portion of the funds accruing to it from the sale of these commodities to finance an exchange of students, teachers, professors and research scholars between the two countries. In addition, the United States would be willing to provide opportunities for Sudanese leaders within and outside the Government to receive grants to visit the United States under the Public Law 402 educational exchange program. The enclosed pamphlets explain in further detail these programs.¹⁰

2. That a Sudanese art exhibit be arranged in the United States and an American art exhibit in Khartoum.¹¹

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 123–Pinkerton, Lowell C. Secret. Repeated to Addis Ababa, Cairo, and London.
2. Mubarak Zarroug.
3. The Sudan applied for U.N. membership on January 30. The United States placed the subject on the Security Council agenda. On February 6, the Security Council voted unanimously to recommend to the General Assembly the admission of the Sudan. The General Assembly acted favorably on November 12. (Resolution 1110(XI)) Documentation on this subject is in Department of State, Central File 310.2.
4. Except for the Ethiopian accord, Pinkerton presented copies of these agreements to the Sudanese Finance Minister, Ibrahim Ahmad. The Economic and Technical Cooperation agreement with Egypt had been concluded on May 5, 1951; the Military Assistance Agreement with Lebanon was dated March 23, 1953; the Military Assistance Agreement with Iraq was dated April 21, 1954; and the General Agreement for Technical Cooperation with Ethiopia had been signed on June 16, 1951. See, respectively, TIAS 2479, 3 UST 2960; TIAS 3147, 5 UST 2908;TIAS 3447, 6 UST 6014; and TIAS 2271, 2 UST 1227.
5. On January 14, Beach forcefully made known to Zarroug U.S. opposition to Sudanese recognition of Communist China and North Korea. (Telegram 126 from Khartoum, January 14; Department of State, Central Files, 745W.02/1–1456) In telegram 152 to Khartoum, April 3, the Department advised Beach to renew strong representations against Sudanese recognition of Communist China, East Germany, North Korea, and North Vietnam. (Ibid., 745W.62/1–2056)
6. Not printed.
7. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 120.171/5–856)
8. Not printed. The Treaty was signed August 3, 1951, and went into effect on October 13, 1954. See TIAS 305; 5 UST 1829.
9. U.S. Information and Educational Act of 1948 went into effect on January 27, 1948. (62 Stat. 6) The Fulbright Act, or P.L. 584, was approved on August 1, 1946. (60 Stat. 754)
10. None printed.
11. Ambassador Pinkerton reported on actions taken in despatch 188, June 27. (Department of State, Central Files, 745W.00/6–2756)