Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII

220. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, November 26, 1957, 5 p.m.¹

Washington, November 26, 1957, 5 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Provisional Agreement on Bases and Drafting of Joint United States-Moroccan Statement

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.
  • Mr. William M. Rountree, NEA
  • Mr. Joseph Palmer 2nd, AF
  • Mr. James Wilson, Defense
  • Mr. John A. Bovey, Jr., AFN
• Morocco
  • His Excellency Ahmed Balafrej, Minister of Foreign Affairs
  • Mr. Mohammed Jaidi, Chief of Cabinet, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
  • Mr. Mohammed Laraki, President of Air Maroc

Mr. Balafrej produced a draft of a Joint Statement for the end of the King’s talks in Washington, based on suggestions already made in Rabat. Mr. Rountree suggested that our job now was to revise this in the light of the conversations which had taken place earlier in the day between the King and the Secretary. He then handed Mr. Balafrej the United States proposals for a Joint Statement.

Mr. Balafrej remarked that so far as the bases were concerned, our draft was the same as that put forward to the King earlier in the day by the Secretary. He said that this would in effect leave United States bases and troops in status quo during the negotiation of the definitive agreement. That status was established by the United States-French Agreements of 1950, which had never been valid and which were not based on Moroccan sovereignty but rather on a military system of which France alone was a member. If the bases were to pursue their activities the status of our forces should be brought into conformity with the present status of Morocco, especially from the juridical and financial point of view.

Mr. Rountree said that it was certainly our desire to create a formal relationship in this matter which would take full account of Moroccan sovereignty, and that the conduct of our military activities during the interim should also be consistent with that principle and with the interests of both countries. He had thought the American draft pointed up our desire to proceed with arrangements in conformity with these principles and to exclude any idea that we wished to operate solely on the basis of earlier arrangements. The United States would hope that the efforts of the negotiators in Rabat could be directed toward a permanent agreement rather than assuming that such an agreement was impossible. Negotiation of a short-term agreement would present the same difficulties as those of a long-term agreement, and there would be much less to show for our efforts.²

Mr. Balafrej said that Mr. Rountree had stated the principles involved correctly but that under our formula no practical results would be produced during the interim before a definitive agreement. He too hoped we could reach an agreement but in the meantime Morocco was occupied by France and Spain, and she needed a modus vivendi with us which would set no precedent to embarrass her in renegotiating the present status of these two countries and which would not entitle them to demand permanent bases.

Mr. Balafrej said that Moroccan opinion could no longer live with a system in which the French served as intermediary (as in the Liaison Mission) between the United States and Morocco, and the French flag continued to fly over the bases. Morocco wished us to continue our activities but to proceed immediately with a readjustment of French-United States arrangements.

Mr. Rountree said he understood the problem which Morocco had in negotiating with France and Spain but would appreciate Mr. Balafrej’s explaining more fully why an interim agreement would produce less difficulty for Morocco in this respect than a definitive agreement.

Mr. Balafrej said that a provisional accord would not produce any precedent to which the French and the Spanish could appeal in making demands of a permanent character. It would merely provide interim coverage for the present negotiations. If we wished to leave things as they were during this interim, this was conceivable in many fields but changes were definitely needed now in the realm of customs, taxes, and jurisdiction. Mr. Balafrej suggested three years as a possible duration for the provisional agreement.

Mr. Rountree expressed his appreciation for the Minister’s explanation and said that we would like to consider further the idea of the provisional agreement, which presented great difficulties for us. We would prefer postponing our reply until the next day. Meantime Mr. Balafrej might wish to answer certain questions: (1) Would the provisional agreement be detailed or merely state the general principles we had just discussed? (2) How did he envisage the mixed Commission which had been mentioned in this connection?

Mr. Balafrej did not go into the second question, but merely indicated that a provisional agreement should be as supple as possible. Its primary purpose would be to link the United States and Morocco directly in the matter of our forces and installations. He did not want us to think that Moroccan reticence regarding a definitive agreement was due to mistrust or unfriendliness toward us, when it was really due to current problems with other states. Morocco perfectly realized that she needs United States help in consolidating her independence—and this despite the reticence of the United States, which only desired to play a role complementary to that of France.

He produced a rough draft of a provisional agreement which contained two articles and a list of subjects; the latter were later limited to customs, jurisdiction, and taxes. (Copy attached)³ He also read off a suggestion for a paragraph in the final communiqué, which ran as follows:

“The Government of the United States affirms its desire to negotiate an agreement concerning the installations in Morocco in full respect for the sovereignty of that country. Pending conclusion of an Agreement, the two Governments affirm their desire to proceed to the necessary rearrangement of present conditions concerning the stationing of United States forces in Morocco.”

Finally Mr. Balafrej said that since the King had brought up the Algerian question, His Majesty and he felt strongly that, for their own purposes at least, a reference to it should be included in the Joint Statement.

It was left that each side would study the other’s drafts and that Mr. Balafrej and Mr. Rountree would meet again the next day before the final meeting of the King and the Secretary.

1. Source: Department of State, AF/AFN Files: Lot 63 D 250, Base Negotiations (1957) M–12. Secret. Drafted by Bovey.
2. On November 25, Mansfield D. Sprague, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, wrote Palmer to reiterate the military’s opposition to a provisional agreement. (Ibid., Central Files, 711.11/11–2557)
3. Not printed.