219. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, November 26, 1957, 9:30 a.m.1

SUBJECT

  • U.S. Bases and Economic Aid

PARTICIPANTS

  • U.S.
    • The Secretary
    • Mr. William M. Rountree, NEA
    • Mr. Joseph Palmer 2nd, AF
    • Mr. John A Bovey, Jr., AFN
    • Mr. Camille Newfel
  • Morocco
    • His Majesty Mohamed V, King of Morocco
    • His Excellency Ahmed Balafrej, Minister of Foreign Affairs
    • Dr. El-Mehdi Ben Aboud, Ambassador of Morocco
    • Mr. Abderrahman Neggai, Chief of the Royal Cabinet

The Secretary expressed the President’s profound regret that he was unable to be present and hoped that His Majesty would feel free to speak and to discuss matters of interest just as if the President were there.2 He asked him to pose any questions which he might have. The King replied that he hoped the President would be well soon and sent his best wishes for a speedy recovery, adding that he knew that with the Secretary there all would go well.

He said that in the last two years Morocco had recovered its independence and that certain questions which he hoped could speedily be resolved were still outstanding. Among those was the question of the American bases in Morocco. He said that the Moroccan viewpoint on this had already been made known to us and that he hoped to find a solution which would both safeguard Moroccan sovereignty and strengthen relations between our two countries.

The Secretary said that he was sure the King was well aware of the genuine friendship existing between the United States and Morocco which was more than we would normally have with another country and was based on a real sympathy which dated back to the early times to which His Majesty had referred on the previous evening.3 He said that we had also had close relations with France throughout our history and that in fact there had been what might be called a race between Morocco and France to recognize the [Page 591] United States at the dawn of our history—a race which in the light of the communications of those days might be said to have ended in a tie. Thus we had a historic friendship for both Morocco and France, as well as for Spain and we would like to be helpful in resolving any of the outstanding questions between these countries and Morocco.

He said he thought it would be helpful if His Majesty could indicate more precisely ways in which we might be helpful in straightening out the pending questions to which he had referred. We would be especially happy to do this since we had a particular admiration for the wisdom and statesmanship of His Majesty.

The Secretary observed that the United States knows from experience that separation at the time of independence leaves many problems which require great patience for their solution. He mentioned the acute differences which we had had with Great Britain following independence and their resolution which had led to a lasting friendship. France, he said, was today in a difficult mood and he called His Majesty’s attention to the violent reaction in France to our delivery of a small quantity of arms to Tunisia. He said that it would be easy for both the United States and Morocco to draw inferences from this, and that it would be bad for the future if either of us were to act hastily in the midst of France’s present difficulty in adjusting to her problems and responsibilities.

Turning to the United States bases, the Secretary said that our present position in Morocco results from United States-French Agreements concerning which, unhappily, the French had perhaps failed to consult adequately with the Moroccan Government. He said that the desire of the United States was that any of our facilities in Morocco should be there under conditions which fully respected Moroccan sovereignty and independence. We hope and believe that Morocco on its side will recognize the importance of these bases to the collective defense of the Free World.

His Majesty would of course recall that the United Nations Charter is based on the principle of collective security. We had hoped that security could be achieved through renunciation of force and that the Security Council could organize its own forces to deter aggression. Unhappily, these hopes had not been realized; the Soviet Union had vetoed the idea of an international police force and did not itself observe the principles of the Charter which deal with the use of force. The Secretary cited the examples of Iran, Greece and Korea, mentioning that the attack on the Republic of Korea had been conducted with Soviet arms and Soviet guidance. Thus, the nations which were devoted to the principle of collective security had had to turn to Article 51 of the Charter which the Secretary himself had helped to draft and which consecrates the principle of [Page 592] individual and collective self-defense. This article had originally been written to provide for situations in which the United Nations itself could not serve as a deterrent.

The Secretary said that he wished to state most emphatically and categorically that the United States had no aggressive purpose whatever. At the end of both World Wars we could easily have taken the path of aggrandizement; instead we withdrew to our own shores as soon as possible and disarmed ourselves. Thus anyone who knows the United States knows that our people covet nothing and want only a system in which each country retains its independence. This, however, is impossible if we each stand alone. Interdependence is vital and both His Majesty’s country and the country of President Eisenhower can give a fine example of interdependence for peace.

We recognize, the Secretary said, that a definitive agreement between us in regard to the bases will take some time to achieve. Our desire, if the King shares it, is to bring these negotiations to an early conclusion but we believe that we can reach an understanding during the interim which will justify our use of and expenditure for the bases.

The Secretary said he wished to add that the mutual security of which he had spoken was by no means limited to military matters. The United States recognized the economic needs of Morocco and we have acted to meet those needs at least to some extent. It will be our purpose to continue these efforts and even, if necessary, to increase our aid, although as the Moroccan Government must be aware, the Congress had put us on somewhat short rations in the matter of foreign aid.

The King thanked the Secretary for this exposition and especially for what he had said regarding economic assistance. His Majesty said he knew that we had always had the best sentiments towards Morocco and he thanked us for this. He wished to assure the Secretary that whatever misunderstanding might arise between Morocco and other nations, Morocco would always try to solve these through peaceful negotiations, but not in such a manner as to impair either the national sovereignty or the interests of foreigners in Morocco. His Majesty said that he knew that the United States was always ready to defend and preserve the independence of peaceful countries. Within this framework, Morocco, as an independent country, faced certain problems, including the presence of foreign armies and questions about her frontiers.

The King said that of course a definite base settlement would take time and that he hoped an interim settlement could be made by a Joint Commission which would examine the progress made thus far in the negotiations with a view to arriving at a provisional agreement. He said that he was anxious to avoid any final settlement [Page 593] which would leave room for anyone to consider it as a precedent for other nations to ask for bases in Morocco. While under the Protectorate, Morocco was not free to choose what collective formations she might wish to join, and the situation with respect to pending questions which were left over from the Protectorate still blocks Morocco from such free choice. His Majesty said he had no doubt as to the United States good intentions and hoped that we would understand Morocco’s difficulties today during the transitional period.

Mr. Balafrej, after conferring briefly with His Majesty, explained that in the transitional period through which Morocco was now passing many difficulties were posed for the Government and notably the presence of French and Spanish troops. There arose therefrom the problem of equality of treatment which the Moroccan Government was anxious to solve. France and Spain were in Morocco for different purposes, which he described as colonial, from those of the United States, which was in Morocco for the purposes of collective security. A definitive base agreement at the present moment would risk creating precedents with regard to bases and troops and might thereby perpetuate the unacceptable purposes for which other nations were still present in Morocco. His Majesty asked whether the United States could aid in resolving differences between Spain and France because until this was done it was most difficult for Morocco to arrive at anything beyond provisional agreements with the United States.

He again thanked the Secretary for his assurances regarding economic aid. The French economy over the years had become deeply involved with, and dominant over that of Morocco. Morocco was now working to create an independent economy and was grateful to the United States for any assistance in this sense. The Moroccan economy, the King said, was fundamentally sound but was affected by the stresses and strains of the French economy to which it was linked. His country was therefore now negotiating to untie the Moroccan currency from that of France and he felt that this would permit a healthy economy.

Mr. Balafrej interjected that what His Majesty had suggested was a Joint Commission to watch over the base negotiations and to help them along in Rabat. He said that each side had posed many questions to the other and that certain questions put by the Moroccan Government had not yet received an answer, notably those on the security of the bases, customs and taxes, and the status of our forces.

His Majesty said that there was no objection to the principle of the United States bases. He did not, however, think it wise to [Page 594] prejudice the situation of Morocco with regard to France and Spain by according permanent status to the United States right now.

The Secretary said that he wished to suggest a formula on which the two Chiefs of State might agree and which would run as follows:

“With regard to the United States installations in Morocco, the United States desires that the governing arrangements accord fully and completely with Moroccan sovereignty and independence. The two Governments declare their intention to reach a formal agreement in detail to this effect and agree that in the meantime the United States use of these installations will continue to be facilitated through the friendly cooperation of their Governments. To this end, the United States will maintain qualified persons at Rabat to discuss and resolve current problems with Morocco.”

The King said that he would accept this text for study and reminded us that the Moroccan Government had already submitted to our representatives the elements of a text which would serve as a preamble.

The Secretary asked whether His Majesty envisaged negotiating both a provisional and a definitive agreement at the same time.

The King replied that he envisaged negotiations now to reach a provisional settlement but that these would lead later to the achievement of a definitive settlement as well.

Mr. Balafrej explained that we could conclude a modus vivendi on the status of our forces pending a definitive agreement. The U.S.-French Agreements were no longer valid and thus a provisional agreement was necessary to replace them.

The Secretary said that we had hoped rather for a simple declaration that our forces would remain in Morocco pending a definitive agreement, with the additional stipulation that a Commission in Rabat could deal with current problems as they arose. The King said that he would study the text and it was agreed that Mr. Balafrej would get in touch later in the afternoon with Mr. Rountree. Accordingly, the text which the Secretary had suggested was handed to His Majesty.

  1. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Bovey.
  2. The President was unable to attend because of illness.
  3. Reference is apparently to the King’s remarks at the State dinner the previous evening.