Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII

221. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, November 27, 1957

SUBJECT

• U.S. and Moroccan Positions on Interim Agreement for Bases

Discussion

Late yesterday afternoon we discussed with Mr. Balafrej the text which you had given to the King for study earlier in the day. Mr. Balafrej made clear that this text did not meet the basic Moroccan objective, which was (1) to eliminate the French-United States Agreements as a basis for present arrangements for our military presence in Morocco and (2) to avoid creating precedents embodied in permanent agreements before the Moroccans had finished negotiating new military arrangements with Spain and France. A modified version of the joint declaration which made clear that pending a definite agreement, we would also resolve current problems in a manner compatible with Moroccan sovereignty did not turn the trick either; Mr. Balafrej said this still left a hangover from the Protectorate as the basis of our presence in Morocco and would lead to no practical results in the course the Moroccans desire. He spoke with some impatience of the continuing role of French intermediaries in United States operations in Morocco, and the continued French status of the bases and the French flag flying over them.

Mr. Balafrej pressed us hard to say that we would negotiate a provisional agreement. He mentioned three years as a possible period for its duration, and produced a draft which is attached. (Tab A)² (In connection with jurisdiction and customs and tax matters, we know from our negotiations in Rabat that the standard United States provisions on these matters are not satisfactory to the Moroccans.)

Mr. Balafrej finally produced a suggested text for the paragraph on bases in the Joint Communiqué, a translation of which is attached. (Tab B)³

It seems clear that we shall have to reach an understanding with the Moroccans which, while endeavoring to avoid anything which could be interpreted as a denunciation of the United States-French Agreements, will give satisfaction to Moroccan public opinion and open the way to a more direct Moroccan role in the base agreements. Such an understanding would have to provide in effect for interim agreements on the subjects indicated in the draft submitted by Mr. Balafrej, as well as any other which it may be in our interest to work out concretely at this time.

Mr. Balafrej’s proposal to fix a limited duration (e.g., three years) for the interim agreement poses serious difficulties. It would create uncertainty for our long-term military planning and cause the greatest difficulty with F.Y. budgeting and financing when reasonable tenure is a condition precedent to approval and release of funds. Moreover, the Free World must be able to count on continued availability of important facilities necessary to our deterrent posture, whereas short-term arrangements would lead Soviet planners to discount our defensive strength. Short-term arrangements would run counter to our other agreements and create a difficult precedent for other negotiations (e.g., with the Philippines). Finally adoption of a provisional agreement of a limited short term period, besides further weakening our legal position that the 1950 Agreements with France are valid, would greatly strengthen the Moroccan bargaining position with respect to the terms of any permanent arrangements, and to economic aid.

Against this background, however, we must realize that in agreeing to work out interim arrangements we may well be putting ourselves in a position where we will have to agree ultimately to some time limit. In this connection, it cannot be forgotten that our chief asset in retaining our bases will be the strength and good will of the present Moroccan Government, whose wishes we should go as far as we can to respect.

In any event, it does appear that possibilities exist for reaching new arrangements with Morocco in the fields mentioned by Balafrej (customs, taxes, jurisdiction, entry and departure of personnel, currency) since the present French position on these matters now allows us to enter into more direct relations with the Moroccan Government without upsetting any major French interest in Morocco. On certain other subjects, however, (e.g., responsibilities for the air and ground defense of Morocco, and title to the land on which the bases are located) we cannot reach interim agreement with the Moroccans without destroying what the French regard as their vital interests. Settlement of these matters would have to await the outcome of Franco-Moroccan negotiations.

Recommendations

It is therefore recommended that we inform the King and Mr. Balafrej as follows:

a. We are prepared to undertake to negotiate interim working arrangements to include the subjects proposed yesterday:

(1) Moroccan authorization for stationing of U.S. forces and U.S. military operations.

(2) Conditions governing future entries and departures of U.S. personnel.

(3) Customs and tax provisions.

(4) Currency provisions.

(5) Jurisdiction provisions and such other details as we may agree later in Rabat to be in our mutual interest to include.

b. We would have great difficulty with a definite period of three years as has been proposed since this poses serious obstacles in terms of our own operations, planning and funding and serious problems with regard to the long-term strength of the collective security to which Morocco like the U.S. is devoted.

c. We would agree, however, to consider these interim agreements as governing until the conclusion of a definitive agreement. Moreover, we would hope that they could ultimately be embodied in the definitive agreement and would like them to be drafted with this in mind. However, the interim character of these arrangements would enable Morocco to reply to demands from Spain and France by saying that nothing definitive had been concluded with the United States.

d. We propose the attached paragraph for inclusion in the final joint communiqué. (Tab C)⁴

1. Source: Department of State, AFN Files: Lot 63 D 250, Base Negotiations (1957) M–12. Secret. Drafted by Bovey.
2. Not printed.
3. Not printed.
4. Not printed. The final joint statement was worked out in a meeting between the King and the Secretary at 4:30 p.m. on November 27. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957, p. 827.