213. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State1
844. From Richards. Report on visit to Morocco.2
I found Sultan, who is final authority on all matters of substance, preoccupied with negotiations re US military bases due to start immediately. He was unwilling to take any public position further committing Morocco to cooperate with US pending results base talks. Presumably he had very much in mind possible effect upon his bargaining position. However he asked me in private talk to tell President of his support for principles and moral spirit of ME proposals, his recognition of threat of international communism to all nations and his determination wipe out few seeds of communism existing in Morocco.
Moroccans made no request for aid from my mission and I made no commitment, although in preliminary discussions between experts figure of up to $5 million for agreed projects was mentioned. [Page 575] Question of US military aid to Morocco not raised. Communiqué couched in general terms transmitted separately.
Only fleeting references were made by Moroccans to relations with France and question of Algeria not brought up.
Talks opened May 6 by meeting of mission with Foreign Minister Balafrej. After explaining principles of doctrine I said overt attack by international communism did not appear to be immediate danger here but that economic problems Morocco offered opportunity to international Communist subversion. I recalled that in discussions during the trip msn had stressed offer to use US Armed Forces in case of need with thought that this assurance would permit countries to concentrate on economic rather than military development. I suggested mission experts study local situation to see what economic assistance could be rendered although any aid could only be modest. I pointed out any assistance authorized would be distinct from normal aid program. Balafrej was most cordial in his remarks. He expressed thanks for offer saying that any aid no matter how modest would help. Although France had extended assistance in past year its budget situation difficult and many unresolved problems now existed between France and Morocco. He commented on difficulties of passing from colonial to free status adding that Morocco counts on help and advice from its friends during process. Balafrej recalled that Sultan and VP had discussed American doctrine and Sultan had stated his great interest in doctrine and its aim to help ME avoid subversion and revolutions. He reaffirmed great interest of GOM in doctrine. I inquired re official public attitude of Morocco towards doctrine. Balafrej replied that although it had been discussed in general terms with VP Nixon no public declaration had been made as situation not clear. He added possibly declaration could be made now. Balafrej said Cabinet meeting re doctrine scheduled begin at once. At conclusion of meeting it was agreed economic experts would commence discussions immediately.
Economic discussions held with second level Moroccan officials. Meeting was brief. Moroccans displayed singular lack enthusiasm discuss possible projects which they explained was due to shortness notice our arrival. Asked for time consider overnight. Met with same group morning May 7. Then became clear they had instructions from highest level avoid discussion any economic aid in context Richardsmsn. They pointed out that despite cultural ties Morocco was not clearly part of ME. Although they supported aims US ME policy they unwilling to conclude agreement with US on interim aid which might be interpreted as bringing Morocco into association with US in appreciation our ME policy. They went on to say that negotiations about to begin re base rights which they hoped would be conducted in favorable atmosphere and lead to mutually satisfactory [Page 576] result. In brief allusions to magnitude interim aid that might be extended if suitable project suggested we stated we might consider up to $5 million. Possible desirable projects were discussed, in secondary and tertiary road construction and possibly telecommunications. However, this part discussion was more conversational than serious.
Meeting with Sultan late morning May 7 confirmed intimation received from talks secondary level officials. His Majesty was most cordial throughout and stressed his friendship for US and desire for cooperation. He said many high American officials now passed through but only briefly. He hoped they could come, stay longer and become better acquainted with Morocco’s problems. Talks re US bases were due commence shortly, he was anxious for favorable outcome and was sure US shared this view. Results of negotiations would of themselves make Moroccan position re doctrine clear. Sultan said matters raised in talks re American doctrine were weighty and should be carefully pondered. While affirming Moroccan support for doctrine as reported above he indicated clearly reluctance to take public position now. Sultan said he supported principles of doctrine because it was intended build up internal strength of area states and because it made clear US had no aspirations to establish itself in area. Sultan referred to Morocco as bridge between West and ME but did not seek to determine whether we consider country included in ME area. (Our conversation with other officials indicated they considered Morocco not part of ME.) In my remarks I apologized for short notice and briefness of mission’s visit. I said I would be able present his views immediately to President and called attention to meeting May 9 with congressional leaders to discuss FY 58 program. I stressed that mission’s visit just prior recommence base negotiations purely coincidental and arose from factors beyond mission’s control. I called attention to desirability public statement, but I did not believe it advisable to push strongly for public stand at this time.
Afternoon May 7 further discussions held, first at secondary level and then with Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. Moroccans proposed brief general press statement substantially same as final text but completely non-committal. After considerable talk, we succeeded in getting inclusion of reference to “spirit of mutual understanding”, fact that I had been “welcomed with great regard” and statement that position of Morocco remained same as time VP Nixon visit. I proposed this last sentence, after failing get clear statement of approval of doctrine, in order avoid any interpretation that Moroccans were less favorably disposed at present than they had indicated themselves to be then.
[Page 577]During discussion, Prime Minister repeatedly emphasized that there was no doubt where Morocco stood with regard communism and that this would be made even clearer by facts and actions following base negotiations. Reiterated Sultan’s remarks to effect that Morocco’s participation in doctrine would in fact develop out of those negotiations. He added that even though Morocco did not accept juridically presence of American bases, existence those bases was fact and showed where Morocco stood. Otherwise it would be demanding their immediate relinquishment.
I concurred that actions were more important than statements and said I was encouraged to hear his affirmation that Moroccans fully expected successful outcome negotiations.
I do not believe Sultan has decided alter policy of cooperation with west but anticipate he will use base negotiations to extract maximum advantage for Morocco. He is well aware military importance our installations and their importance in carrying out military assurances doctrine, and therefore unwilling jeopardize his bargaining position re bases on eve of negotiations. I think complete concentration on bases and failure discuss such matters as Algeria and relations with France is significant. I fear we must anticipate monetary cost of retaining bases will be heavy.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/5–857. Secret. Repeated to Paris, Tunis, London, Tripoli, New Delhi, Rome, Kabul, Athens, Ankara, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Amman, Jidda, Addis Ababa, Khartoum, Karachi, Tehran, Baghdad, and Tel Aviv.↩
- Regarding the Richards Mission, see Document 17.↩