Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII

214. Despatch From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

No. 30

Rabat, July 25, 1957.

SUBJECT

• Analysis of US-Moroccan Base Negotiations to Date

It is interesting to pause at this point to assess the results to date of our negotiations with Morocco for military base rights. They tell little, in fact, about the terms Morocco may be prepared to grant. They are significant mainly for what they reveal of Morocco’s concern for the overall policy which is to govern US-Moroccan relations.

The sequence of events has been as follows:

1. The negotiations were formally opened on May 8th in a plenary meeting of the two delegations. The Moroccans were led by Crown Prince Moulay Hassan and Foreign Minister Balafrej, and the U.S. delegation by the Ambassador. Following general statements by the Prince and the Ambassador (Embtel 860),² it was agreed that the technical experts on the two sides should meet to discuss the details of an agreement.

2. During the ensuing technical level meetings the American delegation followed the Department’s instructions in setting forth U.S. requirements for a base agreement. By and large, despite occasional questions, the Moroccans gave little indication of their reaction to the American proposals. They did point out that these proposals seemed to them to deal mainly with “technicalities”, which in their view were secondary in point of time and importance to the establishment of the “framework” within which the stationing of U.S. forces in Morocco would be authorized.

3. There then followed, from May 21 to July 17, a period in which no meetings were held. The reason for this hiatus was the preoccupation of the Foreign Ministry with French and Spanish negotiations in other fields and with local ceremonials, but government officials no doubt used the time to examine the American proposals.

4. Promptings from the Embassy led to the resumption of technical level negotiations on July 17, at which time the U.S. delegation elaborated on the theme that the mutuality of free world defense against Communism seemed to us to be the appropriate foundation for a base agreement. The Moroccans readily recognized the Communist threat to the free world but seized on our statement to stress the importance of economic and military assistance to free world defense. This was the Moroccan Government’s first clear bid for economic and military assistance as a quid pro quo for military base rights. Negotiations are to be continued later this week against this background.

One of the most salient facts to be noted is the Moroccan Government’s interest in the possibility of tying all aspects of the US-Moroccan relationship to one overall policy, perhaps but not necessarily to find its expression in a general covering accord. We for our part have been trying to get agreement on the various operating rights and privileges normally included in a base agreement. But the Moroccans continue to argue that the two governments should first define their relationship in matters of general policy and defense, after which the “details” of base operations can, they say, be worked out easily and rapidly.

It is not easy to reduce to practical terms what the Moroccans have in mind. We have advanced the view that language in our base agreement will adequately express general goals and principles, while the various separate agreements on bases, VOA, FCN, economic aid, etc., will form an “ensemble” clearly describing the US-Moroccan relationship.

Probably the Moroccans do not yet know themselves precisely what they want or expect. Nevertheless, behind their polite demurs that the U.S. delegation has been dealing with technicalities and not the broader underlying principles some fairly definite objectives undoubtedly lurk. For example:

1. The Crown Prince in the opening session made a forceful statement of the Moroccan position that the 1950–51 agreements negotiated by the U.S. and France are and always have been invalid. There have been other clear signs that the Moroccans have no intention of succeeding to the whole or any part of those agreements, but wish to establish an entirely new understanding on the bases. It is quite possible, in this connection, that the Moroccan Government may wish to expunge the past with some formula as juridically neat and psychologically effective as that applied in the declarations abolishing the French and Spanish protectorates and the Tangier international regime.

2. This concern with liquidating the past is tied up with the fact that the U.S. and France still collaborate in the use of the bases. There is little chance that Morocco will leave this collaboration untouched and it may well insist on French withdrawal from the bases. While we have not yet come to grips with such questions as title to land, base security and defense and the eventual possession of fixed installations, the Embassy believes it will be difficult to persuade the Moroccan Government that these are problems for Morocco to work out with France.

3. The Moroccans have shown a great interest in the political framework into which U.S. base operations are to fit. They have not been very specific, but their concern probably revolves around such questions as whether the agreement is to be bilateral or multilateral (we have already stated that, in our view, a bilateral agreement between the U.S. and Morocco would seem to be indicated in the present circumstances), whether it is to form part of a mutual defense alliance, and whether Morocco is considered to fall within the sphere of NATO defense. A Western Mediterranean grouping, such as the Sultan himself has suggested,³ seems to be one form of multilateral association which strikes the Moroccan fancy. Recently the Foreign Minister mentioned this possibility to the Ambassador as perhaps offering a framework for French and Spanish military interests in Morocco, as well as our own. There was no suggestion, however, of how a Western Mediterranean bloc could be organized while the conflict in Algeria continues.

4. The most recent conversations show unmistakably that Morocco is entertaining hopes of substantial U.S. economy and military assistance.⁴ The Moroccan negotiators have argued that the former is necessary to persuade the Moroccan people that cooperation with the U.S. is a two-way street and that U.S. bases are not a new form of military occupation, while military aid is essential to Moroccan self-defense. It is clearly going to be difficult to avoid a substantial quid pro quo when, as it appears, Morocco knows a good deal about our arrangements in such countries as Spain and Saudi Arabia and is conscious of the help we give our friends in NATO, etc.

One final observation that is pertinent has to do with the political climate here. It is worth keeping in mind that, while the Palace and the Government have given every indication of being anxious to reach a satisfactory agreement on the U.S. bases, there is a public opinion here which neither can ignore. It is not surprising that Morocco, in these early stages of its independence, should be tempted by the attractions of neutralism and Arab solidarity. Perhaps more than most new countries, because it belongs both to the East and to the West and at the same time to neither, Morocco has a split political personality. We are fortunate to have in power a moderate and realistic Sultan and government which want close and fruitful relations with the United States, but goodwill to such a degree does not exist everywhere. There is in Morocco a detectable undercurrent of suspicion and reserve towards the United States and this is reinforced by any sign read as our unwillingness to help Morocco throw off the French yoke, as support of France against Algeria, as support of anyone against any Arabs, or as an effort to embroil Morocco in our conflict with the Communist world. This factor is bound to make its weight felt during the course of the negotiations.

Alfred T. Wellborn

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.56371/7–2557. Secret.
2. Telegram 860, May 11, indicated the tenor of the opening remarks. (Ibid., 711.56371/5–1157)
3. As indicated in despatch 128, October 21, the Sultan and Balafrej seemed to desire a regional pact, but only on their own terms. (Ibid., 711.5/10–2157)
4. Consequent to the Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement concluded by Morocco and the United States on April 2, 1957, the Export-Import Bank gave the Government of Morocco a $20 million line of credit on June 28, 1957. (8 UST 459; TIAS 3799) On July 13, Morocco expressed an interest in a 4-year P.L. 480 program in the sum of $114 million. (Telegram 40 from Rabat, July 13; Ibid., 411.7141/7–1357) Four days later, the Moroccan negotiators raised the question of both economic and military assistance with specific reference to the U.S. arms aid to Saudi Arabia. (Telegram 58 from Rabat, July 18; Ibid., 711.56371/7–1857)