Office of the Historian

212. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France1

Washington, May 2, 1957—7:31 p.m.

4408. Paris 5516,2 5564,3 Rabat 805.4 Department understands French concern for effects base negotiations their interests Morocco and believes we have given fullest possible consideration thereto in drafting general instructions for Embassy Rabat. Department cannot however accept Beaumarchais view we must submit proposals in advance to Paris as it would be impossible conduct negotiations on basis prior approval both Paris and Washington. This particularly applicable to status forces matters5 mentioned Paris 5516 which are either inadequately covered or not covered at all by existing agreements and where we believe we are relatively free of obligation do more than keep French currently informed. Thus we do not interpret our aide-mémoire April 26 as committing us to prior French concurrence US proposals although we will of course keep French currently informed as talks proceed and will consult with them at appropriate moments wherever Moroccan viewpoint and our own appear require readjustments in those arrangements embodied 1950-51 agreements which still involve French interests. We must however be free discuss these matters freely with Moroccans and cannot undertake outline our positions on any given subject until we have exchanged views thereon with GOM and know what type arrangements we might be able reach with GOM.

We believe above should be made clear to French in order avoid misunderstandings and tie hands negotiators at Rabat, but leave handling to Embassy’s discretion.

FYI. Our thinking as embodied in draft instructions6 now en route is that negotiators will find three areas under discussion.

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A)
Areas where U.S.-Moroccan settlement must await Franco-Moroccan settlement, e.g. title to land, mutual defense Military Assistance Programs, French responsibilities on bases, joint French-US use of bases.
B)
Areas of French interest where we consult with French (but not necessarily prior to discussion with GOM) with view obtaining their concurrence but where we would be prepared tell French we must conclude new arrangements, e.g. authorization use and occupy agreed areas and movements thereto and therefrom, traffic control aircraft, vessels and vehicles, pipelines and communication, intermediary functions French Liaison Mission, employment local labor.
C)
Areas where French interest is marginal and where we would merely keep French currently informed, e.g. taxes and customs, criminal and civil jurisdiction, entry and departure personnel, post offices, etc. End FYI.
Herter
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.56371/4–3057. Secret. Passed to CINCEUR. Also sent to Rabat. Repeated to Madrid and to CINCNELM, London. Drafted by Bovey and cleared with OSD, WE, L, and RA.↩
  2. Telegram 5516, April 26, noted that the French wanted prior knowledge of any changes which might affect their military presence and the right to be consulted on any modifications of the 1950–1951 agreements. (Ibid., 711.56371/4–2657)↩
  3. Telegram 5564, April 30, stressed the need to accede to the French wishes for information. The Embassy called for a formal channel of communication in Paris and informal contacts in Rabat. (Ibid., 711.56371/4–3057)↩
  4. Telegram 805, April 29, strongly opposed giving the French veto power over the conduct of the negotiations and rejected the idea of formal contacts in Rabat. (Ibid., 711.56371/4–2957)↩
  5. The draft status of forces agreement which France and the United States had concluded on November 30, 1956, had not been signed.↩
  6. Instruction CA–9187, May 3. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.56371/5–357)↩