Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII

209. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France¹

Washington, April 3, 1957—8:15 p.m.

3962. Rabat 550, 656–658, 689. Paris 4845, 4936.²

A) Embassy Rabat should make following oral reply GOM following our informing French as indicated B) below:

1) US prepared in principle open conversations re Moroccan base problem and suggests talks start following Ramadan (i.e. at beginning May as suggested Rabat 677).³

2) US would have preferred Franco-Moroccan negotiations precede US-Moroccan talks because of important bearing former may have on arrangements which may be discussed between US and Morocco.

3) US believes GOM will agree that US-Moroccan talks at this time could most profitably center on questions of particular interest to the two governments alone. In absence definitive Franco-Moroccan military arrangements we believe conversations should not be concerned with those aspects Morocco’s over-all defense or foreign-base arrangements which would require French-Moroccan agreement.

4) While US considers its forces present in Morocco under legally valid agreements, at same time US recognizes changed situation created by Moroccan independence and accordingly prepared accept GOM invitation discuss means adapting thereto arrangements for US military operations Morocco. USG therefore appreciates opportunity exchange views with GOM on above.

5) USG intends keep French Government informed US-Moroccan discussions.

B) For Paris

1) Embassy should at once inform FonOff orally our decision along lines suggested Embtel 4845 with exception second sentence subparagraph one.⁴ (FYI. We consider 1950–1951 Agreements validly executed by France on own behalf and on Morocco’s behalf in exercise Protectorate powers.)

2) Embassy may also wish recall our previous discussions with Faure in December (following receipt notes addressed to both France and US by GOM) and again in March connection air defense and Sultan’s talk with Vice President, when we made clear growing difficulties US military position Morocco and said we might have proceed discuss matter with GOM before definitive Franco-Moroccan military settlement. You may emphasize our primary preoccupation is still to assure continuity of basis for US military operations Morocco which are vital to Western defense interests.

3) Embassy should give French substance our initial reply to GOM as indicated A) above.

4) Re timing we had of course planned inform French our decision this matter before entering into discussion with GOM but do not feel we could delay replying GOM until we have reached any detailed understanding with GOF re our respective positions in talks with Moroccans. We believe our initial reply to GOM sufficiently general and flexible permit talks with French as we proceed. Moreover if Moroccans accept suggestion paragraph A-l above we should have more time discuss matter with French. FYI We would prefer avoid exchange position papers. (Paris 4936) End FYI.

Accordingly Embassy should make clear to French that while we welcome their comments and will take them into account as we proceed we must make reply indicated in A) above immediately. We would then be glad discuss matter further with French both before and after opening of talks with GOM May.

5) Inform Rabat when above approach made.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.56371/3–2657. Secret. Passed to CINCEUR. Also sent to Rabat and repeated to CINCUSAFE in Wiesbaden and CINCNELM. Drafted by Bovey and cleared with G, NEA, WE, EUR, L/EUR, RA, OSD, and the Department of Defense.
2. None printed. Telegrams 550, 658, 689, and 4936 are Ibid., Central File 711.56371. Telegrams 656 and 657 are Ibid. 511.714. Regarding telegram 4845, see footnote 5, supra.
3. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.56371/3–2257)
4. The sentence to be excluded reads: “Without going into historical fact that much of difficulty stems from refusal French Government at time agreements signed to inform Sultan of Morocco of base agreement, it is undeniable that Moroccans have no legal basis on which to recognize validity our presence on their soil.”