Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII

210. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

Washington, April 22, 1957—7:29 p.m.

7A9. Joint State Defense msg.

• Part I. Following summarizes current thinking on US position during forthcoming bases discussions, for which detailed negotiating instructions will be forwarded soonest. In interim would appreciate Rabat and Paris comments.

  Believe ultimate US objective is conclusion bilateral agreement under which US will be able carry on necessary military activities. With this goal in mind, it may be useful consider matters we will be discussing in forthcoming talks:

  1. It should be reiterated to GOM US has no intention prejudice French rights and interests Morocco. In absence Franco-Moroccan military arrangements we believe conversations should not be concerned those aspects Morocco’s over-all defense or foreign base arrangements which would require Franco-Moroccan agreement. Recognize that negotiation new military arrangements will impinge on number matters special concern to French and in certain areas US rights cannot be conclusively defined this time because of French interests. However in areas where ultimate definition US rights must await Franco-Moroccan agreement (e.g. title to land, air defense, etc.) it may prove necessary seek from GOM, at least on informal basis and with French concurrence or acquiescence, interim understandings which will ensure continuity US operations. French will be kept informed as talks proceed and consulted if conflicts with existing Agreements arise. Moroccans should be apprised our intention this regard. Moreover US interests must be taken into account in any Franco-Moroccan discussions.

  2. Generally speaking, US position is that 1950–51 Agreements were concluded by France acting on own behalf and on behalf Morocco. Consequently they were and remain valid. However while maintaining this position we do not wish make it issue on which negotiations might founder. Rather, as we have already made clear to GOM, we prepared discuss those areas where readjustment present arrangements might be required in light changed situation in Morocco. However we believe we should leave it to Morocco to suggest such areas in first instance.

  In addition, changed situation in Morocco may also provide basis for US to propose changes in existing arrangements as discussions progress (e.g. supplanting liaison mission by direct handling local procurement and contracts).

  Specific instructions on tactics re 1950–51 Agreements will follow.

  3. Tactically we feel US should not start out with detailed or concrete proposals, both so as to avoid danger widening scope of discussions beyond what Moroccans may have in mind and to establish with French that initiative for changes comes from Moroccans. On other hand in inviting Moroccan initiative in raising matters which concern them, we should make every effort avoid eliciting extensive list Moroccan complaints and detailed extravagant proposals for solution, articulation of which may unduly harden their thinking. Desirable middle course would appear be to ask Moroccans indicate what areas adjustment they wish include in discussions and then take prompt initiative in offering concrete US proposals to meet their problems and in making clear which matters cannot in our view be definitively settled bilaterally this time.

  4. Generally speaking US position on such problems as may arise will probably be based on substance 1954 Libyan agreement except provision on payments for privately-owned land (Article VII) and criminal jurisdiction. On latter point our position, at least initially, must be seek exclusive criminal jurisdiction.

  5. One purpose during discussions will be determine whether agreement might take form short unclassified covering agreement couched in general terms, which we would strongly prefer, plus such annexes or subsidiary technical agreements as might be necessary.

  6. Re economic aid, we should continue be guided by view assistance not regarded as payment for base rights and will be geared primarily Moroccan needs and capacities in so far as US legislative and budgetary limitations permit and in light aid provided Morocco by France. Nevertheless we should again make clear as necessary our ability develop and carry out economic assistance programs will inevitably bear relation to Moroccan attitude toward our strategic interests Morocco. US economic aid plans which go beyond commitments already made should therefore be coordinated with progress base talks.

  Embassy should also bear in mind current domestic and congressional attitudes re foreign aid.

  7. Policy on military assistance programs has not changed, i.e. we do not intend institute such programs this time.

• Part II.

  Rabat 749.² Secretary has authorized Ambassador Cannon to negotiate with GOM. Composition negotiating team which will assist you will be cabled soonest. Meantime would appreciate Rabat view as to date GOM desires begin talks. If possible would prefer not take initiative in pressing GOM for date since would appreciate maximum time for preparation without appearing stall.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.56371/4–2257. Secret. Repeated to Paris; CINCNELM, London; and CINCUSAFE, Weisbaden; sent to Paris to be passed to CINCEUR. Drafted by Bovey and cleared with L, WE, RA, and the Department of Defense.
2. Telegram 749, April 12, proposed that the negotiating team be largely made up of civilian and military personnel on the scene with such help as required. (Ibid., 711.56371/4–1257)