Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII

208. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State ¹

Washington , March 31, 1957.

SUBJECT

• Moroccan Bases

Discussion

You will recall that on June 18, 1956, you told Foreign Minister Pineau that the U.S. would prefer to straighten out in tripartite negotiations the status of the five bases from which the U.S. operates in Morocco under Agreements concluded in 1950-51 with the French. (The U.S. considers these Agreements to have been validly concluded by the French in the exercise of their Protectorate powers.) You added, however, that tripartite negotiations might not prove possible because of the Moroccan attitude. In that event you said we would reserve our position and consult the French government.

In November 1956, during conversations in Washington, the Moroccan Foreign Minister, Ahmed Balafrej, made clear that his government wished to discuss this question directly with the U.S. and that while the U.S. and France might have to settle bilateral problems arising out of French-U.S. Agreements, Morocco did not recognize the validity of the Agreements and would expect to deal with us on a strictly bilateral basis. Shortly thereafter the Moroccan government handed in a note, stating its desire that the base question be re-examined by the two governments.

In December Ambassador Dillon, on instructions from the Department, informed the Foreign Office of the Moroccan position and made clear that despite our best efforts, the Moroccan government was firm in its opposition to tripartite discussion of the base problems. The best alternative procedure, he stated, would therefore be three sets of bilateral negotiations, with the French and Moroccans leading off with a negotiated settlement of Morocco’s military and defense arrangements, which would clarify France’s military position and therefore the status of the bases from which we operate. The Ambassador also said, however, that should this prove impossible, we might have to discuss the bases directly with Morocco before France and Morocco negotiated.

In February the Foreign Office replied that France could make no definite settlement of her military status in Morocco without a prior solution of the Algerian problem, which was the basic factor governing the presence and status of French troops in Morocco. The Foreign Office asked that we therefore postpone any attempt at bilateral settlement with the Moroccans.² More recently, however, there have been indications that Franco-Moroccan military talks may begin shortly.

In the interim, the French have proposed strengthening their military position in Morocco by integrating French personnel into the AC&W ³ system presently run by the U.S. as a temporary measure under the 1951 Technical Agreement. (The French have based their proposal on a provision in the 1951 Technical Agreement which specifically recognized the then French over-all responsibility for the air defense of Morocco under the Protectorate regime.) On March 6, 1957, we informed the French that we could not, at this late date, agree to any changes such as those proposed without Moroccan concurrence.⁴

On February 16, 1957, Mr. Balafrej reiterated to Ambassador Cannon the anxiety of the Moroccan government to proceed as soon as possible to negotiate with the U.S. and asked for an immediate indication of what steps we proposed to take. On March 2, the Sultan himself raised the question directly with the Vice President and made clear he considered the matter one of great urgency. The Moroccans have also asked for our comments on a proposal to impose duties and taxes on the automobiles of military personnel and in various other ways have raised the issue of the status of our forces.

On March 13 the Moroccan government informed our Embassy it would be impossible to conclude any final agreement on the status of the VOA relay base at Tangier until we indicate readiness at least to open conversations on the bases. This means that unless we respond positively, VOA operations also will remain in uncertain status and a $5 million expansion program will have to be postponed.

In the meantime the U.S. has been conducting negotiations with Morocco for a bilateral agreement under which we would furnish economic and technical aid, starting with about $20 million in FY 1957. Although NSC-approved policy avoids treating economic aid to Morocco as a direct quid pro quo for base rights, nevertheless at the time we responded favorably in principle to the Moroccan request in November, we said that our ability to implement aid programs would necessarily bear some relation to the continuing favorable attitude of the Moroccan government toward U.S. strategic and other interests in Morocco. The Embassy believes, however, that delays in concluding an economic aid agreement may have some connection with Moroccan anxiety to make progress with us on the base question.

The Moroccan attitude, while as yet basically not unfriendly, has thus hardened considerably toward American interests. It is perfectly clear that the primary reason is that after a full year of independence we have not yet taken concrete steps to sit down with the Moroccans and re-examine the bases arrangements in light of the new context of Moroccan sovereignty. It is also clear that all our interests will be seriously threatened if we do not take steps to do so at once. The Moroccan government is also undoubtedly anxious to start talks with the U.S. so as to increase its leverage on the French government in forthcoming military talks.

Embassy Paris (telegram 4845,⁵ attached as Tab B) agrees with Embassy Rabat that this matter is now urgent and suggests we inform the French we cannot delay further the opening of U.S.-Moroccan talks.

While we should not, of course, try in our discussions with the Moroccans to conclude final arrangements on matters in which the French have a fundamental interest, I believe that we should try if possible to work out arrangements concerning our operations, while by-passing for the time being the fundamental question of Morocco’s defense arrangements and the related question of possible French use of the bases as distinct from our use of them. A suggested approach to this problem vis-à-vis both France and Morocco is contained in the attached telegram.⁶

The important thing is that we should at least indicate to the Moroccans—and do so immediately—that we are ready to discuss the base question directly with them.

Recommendation

That you sign the attached telegram, (Tab A) authorizing Ambassador Cannon to enter into discussions with the Moroccan government regarding the bases and authorizing Embassy Paris to inform the French of our decision.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.56371/3–3157. Secret. Drafted by Bovey and concurred in by L, WE, EUR, G, OSD, and RA.
2. Charles W. Yost reported from Paris in telegram 4054, February 13, that he had met with Maurice Faure to ascertain whether there was any change in the status of defense negotiations with Morocco since he had taken up the question with Ambassador Dillon on December 26. Faure confessed that he had been overly optimistic on that occasion. (Ibid., 711.56371/12–1357)
3. Air Control and Warning system. [Footnote in the source text.]
4. Yost summarized the Moroccan air defense problem in a letter to William R. Tyler on January 24. The French felt entitled to an increase in the number of their personnel on radar sites for having permitted a higher U.S. Air Force ceiling. The French refused the use of Boulhout Air Base for U.S. F–100 squadrons unless the United States agreed to changes in the 1951 Technical Agreement, changes which the Moroccans need not be told about. (Department of State, AF/AFN Files: Lot 63 D 250, Base Negotiations (1957) M–12) On March 2, in telegram 3391 to Paris, the Embassy was informed that the United States was willing to enter into technical discussions with the understanding that the Moroccan Government would be fully informed and would have to approve any changes directly affecting it. (Ibid., Central Files, 711.56371/2–1857) The Embassy reported in telegram 4554, March 7, that the French Foreign Ministry expected to resume military negotiations with Morocco in the near future. France still insisted, however, upon a greater air defense role. (Ibid., 711.56371/3–757)
5. Telegram 4845 from Paris, March 20, concluded that further delay in getting bilateral base negotiations started would be to the detriment of the West. (Ibid., 711.56371/3–2057)
6. Infra.