207. Memorandum of a Conversation, Rabat, March 2, 19571

SUBJECT

  • Visit of Vice President Richard M. Nixon

PARTICIPANTS

  • Moroccan:
    • His Majesty Mohamed V, Sultan of Morocco
    • His Royal Highness Moulay Hassan, Crown Prince of Morocco
    • His Excellency Si M’Barek Bekkai, Prime Minister of Morocco
    • His Excellency Ahmed Balafrej, Minister of Foreign Affairs
  • American:
    • The Vice President of the United States, Richard M. Nixon
    • The Honorable Cavendish W. Cannon, U.S. Ambassador to Morocco

Following a luncheon given by the Sultan at the Palace, the Sultan withdrew with the Vice President for a personal conversation [Page 562] which lasted about an hour and a quarter. The Sultan began with a fifteen minute discussion of Morocco’s problems. The first topic was the particular situation and series of problems of newly independent Morocco and the difficulties which the Government of Morocco faces in consolidating its position at a time when the general world situation is so tense. The Sultan spoke of Morocco’s economic difficulties and the element of urgency in facing up to the unemployment problem as well as the necessity for general social programs in order to satisfy a people feeling its way to independent status. The Sultan referred to the particular relations between Morocco and the U.S. as being conditioned by the question of the air bases and pointed out that it was quite urgent that this matter be adjusted. The Sultan stated that he desires this to be done in a spirit of friendship and cooperation and with a realization of the common problems affecting both of our countries.

As regards the American attitude toward Morocco and toward the Arab states of the Middle East, the Sultan seemed to find great comfort in the position taken by the U.S. He referred to the recent visit of King Saud who had explained to him in full detail much of the background of the President’s policy towards that area which the Sultan said he could fully endorse. He felt that the President’s Doctrine,2 and American policy in general, is such that Morocco could generally give its support because, as a result of its geographical position and previous history, Morocco is not so intricately engaged in local problems as are the countries of the Middle East.

As for Communism, the Sultan said he was not disturbed at the present time but realized it was necessary to keep up a common front against agitators who would take every advantage of stress or uncertainty in Morocco in order to promote political ends which would not be to the advantage of the Moroccan people.

Speaking of Africa generally, he observed that we must expect a great development in the next few years and expressed the hope that Morocco would be able to exert its good influences for an orderly evolution of nationalist tendencies in North Africa and, perhaps, the continent in general.

The Vice President replied on each of the topics raised by the Sultan in a frank and straightforward manner which obviously pleased both the Sultan and his Foreign Minister. The Vice President said he would report His Majesty’s views directly to the President as was his custom. Concerning U.S. bases, the Vice President said that he realizes very well that conditions under which the American bases were established in Morocco have been considerably changed and it is perfectly evident that our situation should be regularized. [Page 563] The Vice President continued by saying that we wanted this done in such a way as to be fully compatible with Moroccan interests and that Moroccan interests would determine the basis on which we would maintain our establishments in Morocco. The Vice President expressed confidence that this matter could be worked out in a spirit of good will and friendship. The Vice President also pointed out that the maintenance of these bases is not only to the interest of the U.S. but very definitely in the interest of Morocco and the free world in general.

As regards economic aid, the Vice President discerned two aspects: (1) Our definite interest in the welfare and progress of Morocco, (2) The practical relationship between a sound economic situation here and our military position. The Vice President went into some detail regarding the legislative requirements of U.S. aid programs, pointing out that we are answerable to Congress, that we have programs with many countries, with Congress having control over the funds and that the President himself cannot always do as much as he would like or as quickly as he desires.

Notwithstanding this, the Vice President said that he felt sure that Moroccan requirements would receive very sympathetic consideration, adding that we should get the program into operation as soon as possible and that the various elements of the program could be worked out as time goes on. The Vice President added that we expect Morocco to take advantage of aid from other sources, including France.

The Vice President then asked the Sultan what he thought might be done about the Algerian problem, emphasizing that it would be better, in our view, to seek a peaceful and evolutionary solution rather than to allow violent events to provide the basis for the outcome. The Sultan said that Moroccans are naturally very deeply concerned about the Algerian question. They feel that the nationalist trend must be taken into account and that eventually there must be an acknowledgment of Algerian aspirations to independence. The Sultan agreed, however, that we should seek every means for a peaceful solution. He said that he had tried very hard to bring that about, but unfortunately had failed in his efforts up to now. The Sultan expressed the thought that the best procedure now would be to proceed toward elections which would be controlled by the U.N. and said he hoped this could be done in such a way that there would not be a period of violence in Algeria.

During the course of the audience, the Sultan indicated obliquely his strong desire to visit the U.S. In view of the history of this [Page 564] problem, including the Sultan’s plans for a visit last fall,3 and the Sultan’s evident desire in the matter, the Vice President resorted to a general expression of hope that the visit could be arranged for some time in the future, adding that he hoped he would still be in the Vice Presidential office at the time and that he would consequently have the pleasure of seeing the Sultan in the U.S. Despite the efforts of the Vice President to project the visit somewhat indefinitely into the future, the reaction of the Sultan and the members of his government were such as to indicate that he would expect this matter to be followed up in the very near future.

  1. Source: Department of State, S/PNSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, North Africa (Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, NSC 5614, 5614/1). Secret. Attached to Document 19.
  2. The Eisenhower Doctrine for the Middle East was proclaimed on January 5.
  3. The Sultan expected to come to the United States for the admission of Morocco to the United Nations on November 12, 1956. Although this would not have been an official State visit, the Secretary had proposed to the President that he meet with the Sultan briefly on November 19. (Memorandum from Dulles to Eisenhower, September 28, 1956; Department of State, Central Files, 033.7111/9–2856) Mohammed V was unable to make the trip on that occasion.