Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII

180. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

Washington, November 21, 1957—6:02 p.m.

3738. For Ambassador from Secretary. Deliver following message to Lloyd from me:

“November 21, 1957.

“The exemplary cooperation of our two countries on the Tunisian arms problem since our talks on October 15² prompts me to return once more to the question of Libya which we discussed at that time and which is becoming increasingly urgent. As you will recall, you agreed to review again with your government the level of your future aid to Libya with a view toward ascertaining whether it could not be increased substantially above the figure of 1.25 million pounds which you mentioned at that time.

“As I believe you know, we have always attached the greatest importance to the maintenance of the British position in Libya. We believe that you have evolved with that country a relationship which constitutes a great asset for the West in a strategically important area. I appreciate the financial and military considerations which have led you to review your level of assistance towards that country, but I am deeply concerned, as I know you also are, at any possible weakening of the Western position in the vital North African area. It would be a great pity if the gains recently made in Tunisia were lost as the result of events in Libya.

“All our reports emphasize the fact that the Libyans will react most adversely to a substantial decrease in your aid level. Since you have much more flexibility than we in making long-term commitments, you are able to ensure a sense of certainty and continuity which we, with our annual appropriations process, find most difficult. This is particularly important in a case such as Libya where a deficit in the ordinary budget is involved. From our contacts with the Libyans on this subject, we gather that they are disturbed about this factor as well. I am requesting our Embassy in London to discuss with the Foreign Office the specific problems we face in Libya.³

“In the light of the foregoing factors, I would hope that you would find it possible to maintain your aid at its present level. If this is not, for any reason, possible, I would at least urge that you continue to assume responsibility for supporting the ordinary budget as in the past and we will do our best to maintain an adequate level of economic development.

“I wish also to mention the fact that our Ambassador in Tripoli has grave doubts about the wisdom of a joint approach to the Libyans on this subject, such as you and I discussed when you were here. He and his advisors strongly believe that such a joint approach would be resented by the Libyans, who would regard it as evidence that we are deciding among ourselves matters of vital interest to Libya and presenting that government with accomplished facts. In the light of these considerations, I would like to obtain your views whether coordinated separate approaches, such as we used so effectively on the Tunisian problem, might not be preferable.”⁴

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 773.5–MSP/11–2157. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Tripoli.
2. See Document 177.
3. Memorandum of conversation not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 773.5–MSP/11–1457)
4. Lloyd responded on November 25 in favor of a joint approach. He discounted the possibility of Libyan resentment and contended that it would not lead the Libyans to believe that the United States was supplanting the United Kingdom. (Ibid., 773.00/11–2557) On December 9, Dulles informed Lloyd that the United States would abide by its previous agreement to a joint approach and emphasized the need not to mention specific aid levels at any such meeting. (Telegram 4224 to London, December 9; ibid., 773.5–MSP/12–957) Tappin was instructed in telegram 462, December 9, that the dangers of joint approach did not outweigh the risk of prejudicing Lloyd’s ability to secure a favorable review (which Lloyd did not anticipate) of the level of British assistance. If no aid levels were mentioned, the Department concluded that its freedom of action could be maintained. (Ibid.)