Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII

181. Telegram From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State¹

Benghazi, December 29, 1957—9 p.m.

108. British and American Ambassadors yesterday discussed with Prime Minister and Foreign Minister² approach to problems arising from cutback British economic aid to Libya. Libyans took strong exception to US–UK suggestion that tripartite fact-finding committee determine Libya’s economic needs before UK and GOL bilaterally decide future level aid under UK-Libyan treaty. After three hours thirty-five minutes discussion impasse broken by two Ambassadors’ combined arguments and British Ambassador Graham’s impromptu proposal that bilateral (HMG and GOL) and trilateral (HMG, GOL and USG) committees begin meeting at approximately same date but that former mark time until latter determines needs. This proposal must be approved by HMG and Libyan Council Ministers. Decision from latter expected tomorrow.

Ambassador Graham opened discussion by noting that time at hand to consult re Libya’s economic needs according Anglo-Libyan treaty. Said new factor now present is US presence Libya which not nearly so important when treaty negotiated. Therefore, HMG, with concurrence USG, believes forthcoming talks determine future economic needs should include USG experts.

Prime Minster and Foreign Minister staunchly resisted from first suggestion that UK–GOL negotiations as provided by treaty should be affected in any way by results tripartite examination Libya’s economic needs. Principal arguments adduced by Libyans with US–UK counter-arguments were as follows:

(1) Prime Minster contended most British aid has been applied to budget support; American aid cannot be applied to budget support. Therefore, he reasoned, two problems are separate. Graham agreed this largely true but said that, since US aid largest single factor in estimating Libya’s needs, US should participate discussions. Ambassador Tappin suggested that in practice budgetary and extra-budgetary items can be interchanged, e.g. military expenditures. But Prime Minister replied that regulations make interchangeability budget items extremely difficult. Prime Minister took special exception to example of military expenditures; he said placing these expenditures under extraordinary budget with external controls this implies would infringe sovereignty. Ambassador Tappin pointed out that many countries, e.g. Turkey, maintain forces beyond their capacity to pay under such arrangements without suffering infringement sovereignty.

(2) Prime Minister and Foreign Minister adduced two historical arguments:

(a) When Anglo-Libyan treaty negotiated US not taken into consideration, why introduce US into Libyan-UK relations now? After protesting that this occurred before his time, Graham said Libya new in 1953 and that guesses as to level aid were approximate; now more precise examination needed.

(b) Foreign Minister referred several times to upward revision UK budget aid negotiated 1956 by Ben Halim. At that time US aid at peak according Foreign Minister, ergo there is no relation between UK and US aid levels. Graham replied that in fact UK did take US aid level into consideration; Libya’s needs had simply reached peak at that time. Graham continued we now enter a new five-year period and face new situation.

(3) Repeated allusions made by Libyans to fact that Anglo-Libyan treaty bilateral and that bilateral not trilateral consultations contemplated by its provisions. Graham’s reply was to repeat that any reasonable estimate Libyan needs must take American factor into account and that this best done by including US in committee to estimate needs. Ambassador Tappin assured Libyans US would not participate in tripartite discussion of purely UK–GOL matters, that tripartite discussion would be for purpose handling problem important to all, namely determination Libyan economic needs, and that it would be a fact-finding group, not prejudicial to future bilateral negotiations.

(4) In effort keep one up on British, Libyans presented repeatedly variations of two “how shabbily you treat us” arguments:

(a) Foreign Minister Buri complained Graham had misled him by optimistic generalities. (British ConGen³ here agrees Buri’s plaint justified.) Graham attempted pass this off but not very successful.

(b) British failure to reply to GOL request for year’s delay in consultation on Libya’s economic needs. For this Graham apologized and said that the suggestions being presented now by US–UK Governments were answer to this request. Buri not mollified.

(5) About middle of discussion sense of urgency introduced by Libyans. They said GOL budget must be presented in January, thus no time for extended tripartite examinations; UK–GOL negotiations must begin immediately, and not await tripartite examination. Ambassadors Graham and Tappin protested that no basis for UK–GOL negotiations without authoritative estimate from tripartite committee and that this estimate could be forthcoming within two to three weeks after its first meeting early January. Prime Minister’s reluctance tie work of bilateral committee to trilateral committee finally overcome by Graham’s compromise proposal described first paragraph.⁴

At no time did Prime Minister object to tripartite examination Libya’s needs; his objection (and he carried bulk of Libyan side of discussion) was linking work of committees. Brunt of Libyan reaction fell on British with whom they alternately professed shock, anger, and indignation, but with whom they were always courteous. With US they especially courteous and made special efforts several times explain they did not wish exclude us because they do not like us.

Other noteworthy points:

(1) Prime Minister said that Libya has 10,000 unemployed; GOL has plan for dealing with problem and that when American Ambassador sees plans he will “explode”. Implication seems clear US will be asked provide large chunk aid for unemployment relief.

(2) After two hours forty minutes Prime Minister finally asked whether UK contemplates reducing aid level. When Graham replied in affirmative Prime Minister said he could not “accept” aid reductions decided unilaterally.

(3) In closing Prime Minister reminded Ambassadors that US and UK, in their relations with Libya, must always keep in mind activities of those intriguing against Libya.

Stackhouse

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 841.0073/12–2957. Confidential; Noforn. Sent to Tripoli and repeated to London and the Department of State, which is the source text.
2. Wahbi Al-Buri.
3. Stobart was the Acting Consul General.
4. Telegram 110 from Benghazi, December 30, indicated that the Libyans informed the British that they rejected the idea of a tripartite examination of their economic needs and that they were calling for immediate bilateral negotiations with the United Kingdom. (Department of State, Central Files, 841.0073/12–3057)