179. Editorial Note
On October 22, Ambassador Tappin and British Ambassador W.G.C. Graham called on Libyan Prime Minister Ku’bar, in accordance with Tappin’s instructions in telegram 319, supra, to discuss future United States and British military aid to Libya. Also present were British First Secretary Patrick Desmond Stobart, who served as interpreter, and Edwin L. Smith, First Secretary at the United States Embassy office in Benghazi.
Tappin reported the conversation in telegram 76 from Benghazi, October 22. The British Ambassador began the interview with a presentation which Tappin described as follows:
“Skipping amenities, British Ambassador launched into discussions of changed British strategic position in Mediterranean and necessity for British economies in operation their armed services. Careful examination of Britain’s fiscal position had convinced HMG that it would be unable continue commitments previously entered into concerning equipping and training Libyan Army. However, desiring to continue to be helpful to Libya in every way possible, HMG had consulted USG, knowing of latter’s deep interest in Libya and hoping that latter would be able assume some of burden of responsibility for Libyan Army previously borne by Britain. He was glad to inform Prime Minister that USG, also in spirit of helpfulness, had agreed to give careful consideration to problem. He understood [Page 505] that, since HMG no longer could assume responsibility for equipping Libyan Army, USG had agreed to discuss equipment with Libyan Government. He felt that, if Libyan Army was to have US equipment, it was natural that USG should assume responsibility for training.”
Tappin then invited the Prime Minister to comment. His report continues:
“As was predictable, Prime Minister immediately interposed strenuous objection to having Libya handed back and forth on basis ‘invariably coordinated British-American plans’. He stated angrily that British commitments based on Anglo-Libyan treaty and that what British were proposing would be violation of treaty. Prime Minister added that Libya should have been consulted on any decision affecting so vitally her security and sovereignty.”
Tappin then presented the United States position. His report of the conversation continues:
“Following exactly Department’s instructions, I stated that I was authorized to say that US was prepared take over from British role of training Libyan Army. Secondly, I stated that American military experts would be prepared discuss with Libyan counterparts Libyan Army requirements for equipment. Feeling it necessary to do so, I went back to my original and consistent position of past several years that discussions should begin with attempt define mission of Libyan Army and, on basis defined and agreed mission, establishment of appropriate level and type equipment. I carefully avoided any discussion of size. Finally, I referred to equipment for 1000 men which USG was making every attempt deliver by December 1. Fortunately I had in hand material list furnished by MAAG chief and reading of this list saved day.
“Prime Minister obviously impressed and pleased with generous scale of equipment, but stated that this gift was separate consideration. Libya could not accept offhand British proposal without careful review of Anglo-Libyan commitments under treaty. He opined that it would require considerable amendment of treaty.
“Addressing himself to me, Prime Minister then inquired as to whether or not US commitments to arm Libyans would be subject to annual appropriations procedure. … lacking authority make any statement beyond saying that US prepared discuss problem on frank and friendly bases, I saw no possible course of action other than to confirm that US military aid commitments, like US economic aid commitments, were subject to congressional decision. Since it was obviously necessary to do so, I went into detailed explanation of US record as dependable ally. I declared that USG took seriously its commitments to assist its friends in preserving their essential sovereignty. I moralized concerning great expense of maintaining army.
“By this time Prime Minister appeared mollified and said Libya wanted a strong army and wanted it equipped and trained by the UK or US. Prime Minister said, however, he could not accept British position without its being given detailed study by appropriate Ministries. [Page 506] Also, he said, there obviously would have to be discussions between Libya, UK and US at technical level.
“At this point I felt it necessary emphatically disclaim any US commitment based on Anglo-Libyan agreements of June 1956 in London. Prime Minister raised question of air force and navy and British Ambassador back-pedaled rapidly. Prime Minister finally agreed no program drawn up at London talks but said there was agreement on principle of expanding army and studying possibility creating naval force. I stayed out of this phase of discussion. Since talks then appeared to be bogging down, I informed group that US MAAG chief was coming to Benghazi October 23 and would be available to begin preliminary discussions with Libyan army chiefs and British military mission.”
The discussion concluded at this point in a “cordial” atmosphere, Tappin reported. He predicted, however, that the Prime Minister would “become increasingly annoyed as he reflects on conversation” and that “reactions of some members of Council of Ministers will force him adopt stiff attitude.” He concluded by reiterating his earlier recommendation of a separate approach to the Libyans concerning economic aid, declaring that such an approach on military aid would have “placed US in stronger position both as individual country and as potential caretaker Western prestige in Libya.” (Department of State, Central Files, 773.5/10–2257)