Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII

178. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya¹

Washington, October 18, 1957—5:45 p.m.

319. Deptel 309.² Tripoli’s 244,³ 247,⁴ 249,⁵ 255.⁶ In line with understanding reached between Secretary and FonSec Lloyd October 15 you should join with your British colleague in making joint approach to Libyan Government on questions future UK and US military and economic aid to Libya. We would leave to you and Ambassador Graham to decide whether both these subjects should be raised at initial meeting with Libyans October 21 or 22.

Re military problem we understand that at initial meeting British Ambassador will inform GOL that in view reduction UK troop strength in Libya and fact that US is equipping and training additional 1,000 men for Libyan Army, HMG believes it more convenient and appropriate if US would assume training role heretofore held by British vis-à-vis Libyan Army. You would then implement instructions Deptel 230⁷ and tell Libyans that provided such plan agreeable to Libyans, US Government prepared take over training responsibilities from British and that US furthermore is prepared discuss with Libyans their military equipment requirements. FYI. Although we contemplate US Government will be prepared equip as well as train over a period of years Libyan Army of approximately 4,500 we cannot commit ourselves to such program in advance Congressional appropriations. Also you should make no commitment re military academy. End FYI.

Re economic aid which we understand you and Graham prefer discuss at subsequent meeting, we anticipate that British Ambassador would explain HMG must reduce its aid level to Libya beginning next fiscal year and reiterate reasons why such reduction necessary. In light Lloyd’s undertaking to Secretary to ask HMG review future aid level British Ambassador would not mention any figures. You would then explain to Libyans that US appreciates problem this presents for Libyan Government, and as you previously explained to GOL (Ben Halim) consonant with the spirit of mutual interest which has characterized US-Libyan relationship in recent years, US is prepared review with Libyan Government economic and financial situation created by impending UK action. Moreover on basis of financial and economic review which would be undertaken US would consider Libya’s needs for assistance, subject Congressional appropriation of funds and taking into account contribution of British Government (Deptel 769).⁸ As mentioned Deptel 309 you and Ambassador Graham would propose to Libyans that we conduct tripartite examination Libyan needs over period next few months. FYI. Meanwhile British would reconsider their views on future level UK aid to Libya with view raising their aid level if at all possible. While we realize there inevitably some risk Libyans will threaten turn to Soviets or possibly Egyptians for aid if US fails give ironclad assurances of long-term budgetary support, you should make every effort, using authority already available to you to deter Libyans from using such tactics. End FYI.

Appropriate portions this telegram have been conveyed to British Embassy here. It is expected that FonOff will shortly be instructing Graham along similar lines.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 773.5–MSP/10–1757. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London and Paris.
2. Supra.
3. Document 176.
4. Telegram 247 from Tripoli, October 12, summarized the proposed tactics of the British Ambassador in broaching the troop withdrawal matter with the Libyans. Tappin thought the British would thereby give themselves too much credit in getting the United States to take over their responsibilities. (Department of State, Central Files, 773.5–MSP/10–1257)
5. Telegram 249 from Tripoli, October 12, described the intended British strategy in dealing with the Libyan Government regarding their reduction of economic assistance. Tappin considered the plan deficient in that the United States could not make any commitments as yet and particularly could not cite a specific sum. He opposed as premature a joint approach with the British. (Ibid.)
6. Telegram 255 from Tripoli, October 17, reported that the British Ambassador was seeking to arrange a joint meeting with the Libyan Prime Minister on October 21 or 22 to discuss military problems. (Ibid., 773.5–MSP/10–1757)
7. See footnote 8, Document 175.
8. Document 171.