Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII

113. National Security Council Report¹

NSC 5615/1

Washington, November 19, 1956.

U.S. POLICY TOWARD ETHIOPIA

Note by the Executive Secretary to the National Security Council

REFERENCES

• A. NSC 5615²
• B. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated November 6, 1956³
• C. NSC Action No. 1634⁴

The National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament, and the Director, Bureau of the Budget, at the 304th Council meeting on November 15, 1956, adopted the statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 5615, subject to the amendments thereto which are set forth in NSC Action No. 1634–b.

The President has this date approved the statement of policy in NSC 5615, as amended and adopted by the Council and enclosed herewith as NSC 5615/1; directs its implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government; and designates the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency.

James S. Lay, Jr.⁵

[Enclosure]

STATEMENT OF POLICY ON ETHIOPIA

General Considerations

1. Ethiopia’s importance to the United States transcends the country’s limited power and somewhat isolated position. Current developments in the Near East increase the value to the United States of a friendly, stable government in this region of Africa. Moreover, the benefits of cooperation with the West are being carefully watched in the rest of Africa. Finally, Ethiopia is one of the few states in the Afro-Asian group which has given the United States valuable support on such matters as the UN action in Korea and the Suez Canal controversy. From a political point of view, it is of value to maintain close relations with an African state which has become a symbol of resistance to aggression and a champion of collective security.

2. In 1953, Ethiopia concluded a base agreement with the United States under which we maintain a U.S. Army radio station at Asmara, which is now being expanded and which forms a major link in the Army’s world-wide communication system. The U.S. Navy maintains a petroleum storage and a communication unit in Ethiopia and has established requirements for post-D-Day facilities. The U.S. Air Force has a requirement for a signal communications base in Eritrea in lieu of Aden. Ethiopia could also serve as a base of operations to protect the shipping lanes to the Far East, Europe and the Middle East.

3. At present Ethiopia is oriented toward the West. Under the Emperor’s guidance, Ethiopia provided a battalion of combat troops in Korea; has generally supported the U.S. position in the United Nations; has urged the expansion of U.S. military facilities in Ethiopia; has expressed willingness to join with the United States in a defensive alliance in the area; and has given support to the U.S. position in the Suez crisis. The Emperor attaches particular importance to close cooperation with the United States, as a counterpoise to unfriendly foreign influences. If Ethiopia’s pro-Western attitude were to change, Western and U.S. prestige would suffer in Africa and the non-Communist world.

4. Of the major Western nations, the United States is the only country whose prestige and influence in Ethiopia remain high. The high regard in which the British were held after their liberation of Ethiopia has now been largely dissipated as a result of recurring differences with the Ethiopians over the Somali problem. The French, whose prestige has never been high, are distrusted because of their control over Ethiopia’s access to the sea through Djibouti and the high freight rates on the French-owned railway. While Ethiopia maintains close relations with certain of the smaller Western European countries (particularly Sweden), only the United States is in a position to influence Ethiopia’s continued Western orientation.

5. Although Communism has as yet made few inroads on the population at large, the USSR and other Communist countries have expanded and strengthened their activities in Ethiopia, thus increasing their capability for infiltration and subversion. The Soviet Legation has been elevated to Embassy status, enlarged and the caliber of its personnel improved. A trade agreement was recently signed with the Czechs, who, along with the East Germans, Bulgarians and Soviets, have also made offers for the construction of processing and semi-industrial enterprises. Yugoslavia and Ethiopia recently exchanged state visits; the Yugoslav Embassy has been strengthened, and the Yugoslavs have begun to show an interest in commercial enterprise in Ethiopia.

6. Egyptian activities hostile to Ethiopia have also increased. Egyptian officials have carried out propaganda and political action programs in Ethiopia and Eritrea designed to organize the large Moslem minorities against the ruling Christian Amharic dynasty. Egyptian officials have stated that a breakup of the Ethiopian Empire is inevitable unless these minorities are given political privileges. Other broadcasts in the hitherto-neglected Somali tongue appeal to Somali nationalism. Recent signs of Egyptian efforts to cultivate Ethiopian friendship are probably merely short-run tactics designed to weaken Ethiopian ties with the West, particularly over the Suez Canal issue, and do not forecast a basic change in Egyptian policy toward Ethiopia.

7. These external threats are aggravating the inherent weaknesses of the Ethiopian Government, which does not exercise effective control over the outlying areas and faces considerable discontent in Eritrea and other predominantly Moslem areas. Moreover, while Ethiopia is stable under the Emperor’s rule, his death might usher in a period of marked political instability, which may be accompanied by extensive disorders and civil strife.

8. The Somali problem is also likely to create instability over the next few years. Egyptian agitation of this question will increase Ethiopia’s fears of the creation of a “Greater Somaliland” (including a large part of Ethiopia) and may stimulate Ethiopia’s already strong expansionist aims toward this area. These Ethiopian aims could lead to friction with the UK, France, and Italy.

9. Even though Ethiopia remains oriented toward the West, it feels that the benefits of cooperation with the West have been small. Some Ethiopian leaders contend that the United States considers Ethiopia’s cooperation less valuable than that of less friendly governments. This alleged U.S. indifference has increased the influence of the elements in Ethiopia which are suspicious of foreign influence and advocate isolationist or neutralist policies. Any increase in the influence of these elements, with a decrease in the influence of the pro-U.S. Emperor, will adversely affect U.S. interests in Ethiopia.

10. Ethiopia has been granted $12.4 million in technical assistance and $12 million in military assistance by the United States since 1952. The Export-Import Bank has authorized $27 million in credits to Ethiopia since 1946, $24 million of which was authorized in 1955. In addition, the United States has supported Ethiopia in the United Nations on various political issues such as its position with respect to the settlement of the Ethiopian-Somaliland boundary question.

11. Ethiopia is characterized by generally low standards of living, the under-utilization of its human and material resources and a shortage of administrative and technical skills. Nevertheless, it has maintained financial stability in recent years with a consistent balance of payments surplus and only a minor budgetary deficit. The Ethiopian Government’s economic development expenditures are expected to total approximately $36 million per year over the next few years. A substantial part of these development expenditures will be financed with external credits.

Policy Conclusions

12. It is in the U.S. interest to counteract the forces that are threatening U.S. influence in Ethiopia, to strengthen the U.S. position in Northeast Africa generally, and to prevent further penetration of Africa by unfriendly forces. U.S. interests are now threatened by the expanding Soviet bloc influence in Ethiopia, Egyptian agitation in the area, and xenophobia among Ethiopian leaders.

13. It is important to the United States to provide evidence of long-term interest in a strong Ethiopia by programs of military and economic assistance. Although there are military reasons for U.S. interest in Ethiopia, the justification for providing U.S. military equipment and training to that country continues to be primarily political. Technical assistance projects should be supplemented by selected economic development assistance projects as a contribution to the realization of Ethiopia’s economic potential. U.S. economic aid will achieve its maximum effect if it is designed to help Ethiopia increase its ability to finance more of its own development. Some economic aid may, however, be required to supplement Ethiopia’s capacity to support the planned reorganization of its armed forces.

14. U.S. political action should try to ease the fears and frustrations of the Ethiopians with respect to their own future and the events in nearby areas through consultation on (a) Near East and African developments, (b) international development of the Nile, and (c) the Somali problem.

Objectives

15. To strengthen Ethiopia’s alignment with the United States and to maintain its support of free world collective security actions.

16. To assist Ethiopia to maintain political stability and make progress toward economic well-being, thereby helping demonstrate to the rest of Africa the benefits of friendly cooperation with the United States.

17. To assure the continued use of existing military facilities and to obtain additional military rights as required.

18. To check and reduce Communist and Egyptian influence in Ethiopia and the rest of Africa.

Courses of Action

19. For the achievement of political objectives, provide the Ethiopian Armed Forces with limited military equipment and training of a kind suitable for maintaining internal security and offering resistance to local aggression. Make every effort to avoid a military build-up which would seriously strain the Ethiopian economy or lead to commitments for indefinite U.S. support.

20. Provide assistance, as appropriate, to enable Ethiopia to strengthen its internal security forces (under the NSC Action No. 1290–d program⁶).

21. Continue the U.S. technical assistance program.

22. Provide limited economic assistance, recognizing the desirability of concentrating on key development projects and the possible need for supplementing Ethiopia’s capacity to support the planned reorganization of its armed forces.

23. Give support as appropriate to Ethiopia’s requests for loans to finance economically sound projects within Ethiopia’s capacity to service such financing.

24. Support Ethiopian participation in any international development of the Nile valley.

25. Arrange for a survey of the Ethiopian portion of the Blue Nile basin.

26. Encourage the carrying out of a general economic survey of Ethiopia by the IBRD.

27. Consult with Ethiopia on Middle East and African matters of concern to it.

28. Strengthen cultural and informational activities in Ethiopia.

29. Encourage visits of high-ranking U.S. officials to Ethiopia.

1. Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5615 Series. Secret. A Financial Appendix, Department of Defense Comments on Military Assistance, ICA Comments on Economic and Technical Assistance Programs, and Department of State Comments are not printed.
2. See footnote 2, Supra.
3. See footnote 3, Supra.
4. See footnote 7, Supra.
5. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature
6. Dated December 21, 1954, it “requested the Operations Coordinating Board to present to the Council a report on the status and adequacy of the current program to develop constabulary forces to maintain internal security and to destroy the effectiveness of the Communist apparatus in free world countries vulnerable to Communist subversion.” (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95) For text, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. ii, Part 1, p. 844.