Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII

112. Memorandum of Discussion at the 304th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, November 15, 1956¹

Washington, November 15, 1956

Present at the 304th Council meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Acting Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (participating in Item 2); the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Special Assistant to the President for Atomic Energy; the Federal Civil Defense Administrator; the Director, International Cooperation Administration; the Acting Director, U.S. Information Agency; Assistant Secretary of Defense Gray; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; The Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; Special Assistants to the President Jackson and Randall; the White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

[Here follows discussion of items 1 and 2.]

3. U.S. Policy Toward Ethiopia (NSC 5615;² Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated November 6, 1956³)

Mr. Jackson briefed the Council on the contents of the reference report, and explained the split views in paragraph 19, which read as follows:

“19. For the achievement of political objectives, provide the Ethiopian Armed Forces with limited military equipment and training of a kind suitable for maintaining internal security and offering resistance to local aggression [without establishing a U.S. requirement for the support of any particular mission for the Ethiopian Armed Forces].⁴ Make every effort to avoid a military build-up which would seriously strain the Ethiopian economy or lead to commitments for indefinite U.S. support.”

He then invited Mr. Brundage to enlarge on the reasons why the Budget wished to include the bracketed language. Mr. Brundage explained that he was far from clear as to the meaning of “local aggression”, and that he hoped this would not prove to be the basis for introducing new programs of assistance to Ethiopia.

The President stated very firmly his great anxiety to be assured of the friendship of Ethiopia. This might well mean new programs, though he hoped that they would be kept as small as possible. He added that he had recently had a message from the Emperor of Ethiopia, who expressed his unhappiness over our alleged failures to keep our engagements to assist Ethiopia.⁵ From other sources, said the President, had come an implied threat that Ethiopia would have to get arms “elsewhere” if the Ethiopians could not get them from the United States.

Secretary Wilson expressed some skepticism over a stepped-up military aid program for Ethiopia …. Mr. Jackson explained why the Planning Board had felt it desirable to define the kind of equipment that should be given to Ethiopia, even though it was agreed that this aid program was fundamentally political rather than military in purpose. …

The Council then engaged in a discussion of the problem, raised initially by Secretary Hoover, of providing an aircraft to be sold to Haile Selassie.⁶ The President, after first stating that he disapproved of the Budget proposal for including a portion of paragraph 19, turned to the matter of the aircraft and suggested that if the Air Force was to take one of our normal size Constellation aircraft out of MATS, how much would it cost to rehabilitate the plane and send it to the Emperor of Ethiopia? Admiral Radford said he couldn’t precisely say, but the plane would probably be worth $1 million. Admiral Radford went on to say that he thought he could make a deal by which such a plane could be secured for sale at perhaps $700,000 to Haile Selassie. Secretary Hoover said he earnestly hoped that this would be the case. The President then said that we could readily reduce the special mission squadron by one aircraft. Secretary Wilson and Admiral Radford agreed to this proposal.

Mr. Allen Dulles said that he had one last suggestion to make apropos of Ethiopia, namely, that the NSC Planning Board be directed to take a look at the whole area of tropical Africa. He added that the …. Secretary Wilson expressed extreme skepticism about action which would lead to the United States taking on further obligations in such an area. The President, however, agreed that tropical Africa could suddenly become very important to the United States. In this view he was strongly supported by Secretary Hoover, on the ground that the Communists were very hard at work building up nationalism in Africa. The State Department was expanding its facilities in these areas and its program for training specialists in African affairs. Secretary Wilson said that he remained unconvinced. He expressed anxiety lest we proceed to kick the colonial powers out of Central Africa and then leave a power vacuum for the Soviets to fill. He said he was convinced that we had urged the British, for example, to get out of Suez much too soon. He did not wish us to repeat our error with respect to the Belgians and the Portuguese.

The National Security Council:⁷

a. Noted and discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject (NSC 5615) prepared by the NSC Planning Board, in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted by the reference memorandum of November 6, 1956.

b. Adopted the statement of policy in NSC 5615, subject to the following amendments:

(1) Page 1, paragraph 2, second sentence: Revise to read as follows: “The U.S. Navy maintains a petroleum storage and a communication unit in Ethiopia and has established requirements for post-D-Day facilities.”

(2) Page 7, paragraph 19: Delete the bracketed section and the footnote relating thereto.

c. Noted the President’s directive that the Department of Defense make available promptly, from current inventory, an appropriate aircraft for sale to the Ethiopian Government, in accordance with the Emperor’s request.

Note: NSC 5615, as amended and approved by the President, subsequently circulated as NSC 5615/1⁸ for implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, and referred to the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency designated by the President.

The action in c above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for implementation. [Here follows discussion of items 4–6.]

S. Everett Gleason

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on November 16.
2. NSC 5615, October 23, was a draft statement of policy on Ethiopia. It was transmitted to the members of the National Security Council under cover of a note by Executive Secretary James S. Lay, Jr. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5615 Series)
3. This memorandum by Lay transmitted to the NSC a memorandum dated October 30 by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense submitting JCS comments and recommendations on NSC 5615. (Ibid.)
4. Budget proposal. [Footnote and brackets in the source text.]
5. Senator Green met with the President on November 12 to pass on the aide-mémoire presented to him in Ethiopia. (Memorandum from the President to Hoover, November 12; Department of State, Central Files, 775.5–MSP/11–1256)
6. The Ethiopian Government preferred a Constellation so the Emperor could overfly neighboring countries. When Dulles and Aklilou discussed this subject in London on September 21, the Secretary remarked that the U.S. Government had only nine planes suitable for the Emperor’s purpose and it was difficult to take any of them out of service. However, the President personally asked that one be made available on loan for 2 months until another plane could be converted. Aklilou asked if it would be possible to order a commercial plane and have it made over. Dulles promised to look into this matter upon his return home. (Memorandum of conversation by Tyler, September 21; ibid., Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199) On November 12 the President told Acting Secretary Hoover that “you have your ‘best drag’ in that country when you do something for the Emperor.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries) The Department of Defense, subsequent to the November 15 NSC meeting, was prepared to make SACEUR’S Constellation 749 available, but it required reimbursement above the $700,000 Ethiopia could afford to pay. Since Ethiopian Air Lines arranged the purchase of two Douglas DC–6–B’s for its own purposes, the Emperor asked if, instead of a Constellation, the same plane could be provided for his use. (Telegram 408 from Addis Ababa, December 10; Department of State, Central Files, 775.5622/12–1056) Hoover notified Simonson that this was not possible because the Constellation came from the U.S. Air Force inventory and could be offered at a price far below market value. (Telegram 360 to Addis Ababa, December 12; ibid.) On January 28, 1957, the Emperor’s appreciation was conveyed to the United States for having agreed to supply him with a Constellation. He planned to finance the purchase out of the funds provided by the Export-Import Bank for civil aviation development. (Telegram 543 from Addis Ababa, January 28; ibid., 775.5622/1–2857) The plane crashed and burned in late June 2 weeks after its delivery.
7. The following paragraphs and Note constitute NSC Action No. 1634. (Ibid., S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95)
8. Infra.