Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1–July 26, 1956, Volume XV

360. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, May 23, 1956.

SUBJECT

• Courses of Action in Egypt

The attached staff study reviews recent developments in Egypt and sets forth possible courses of action. I believe that decisions which should be made with the least possible delay lie in the following fields:

a. The extent to which our present policies toward Egypt should be modified, taking into account the continued deterioration in the Egyptian situation;

b. The extent to which our approach to other countries designed to minimize Egyptian influence and enhance the Western position should be extended ….

c. Whether, before proceeding with stronger measures vis-à-vis Egypt, we should, through a special emissary or normal diplomatic channels, have another frank talk with Nasser;

d. If such a talk is advisable, who should be charged with the responsibility; and

e. Whether there should be any parallel discussions either through diplomatic channels or a special emissary to Saudi Arabia or other Arab countries;

f. What line should be taken in the talks with Nasser.

My comments upon these matters follow:

a. Modification of Present Policies Toward Egypt—It is important to note that even though we might wish to adhere to our present policies … , to some extent our freedom of action has already been limited by the course of events… . Also, because of public and Congressional reaction to Nasser’s recent anti-Western actions, and because of basic opposition from Congressional representatives from cotton-growing areas, it is possible that the Administration’s hands will be tied in the implementation of the High Aswan Dam project. Aside from these factors, it appears evident that continuation of our present relatively soft attitude toward Nasser will not result in a change in his basic attitude toward Western interests in the Near East, and that further measures will be required.

b. Operations Outside Egypt—We propose certain further measures in other countries; however the timing of the actual implementation of these measures would depend upon whether it is decided to send an emissary to Egypt. If so, action would be deferred until after the results can be appraised. The measures contemplated are the following:

. . . . . . .

2. Sudan—Assuming that we will not proceed in the foreseeable future either under the original proposals made to the Egyptian Government or modifications of that proposal to implement the High Aswan Dam project, it is possible or probable that the Egyptians will accept Soviet assistance. Present indications are that the Egyptian-Sudanese talks leading to an agreement upon the division of the Nile Waters are proceeding with some degree of success. If the agreement should be concluded there would be no obstacle to a Soviet-Egyptian contract for the Dam project. … a possible course is for us to suggest that a meeting of all the riparian states be called to discuss the unified development of the Nile Valley. In this connection, the Sudanese are known to oppose the Dam in its present form and the Ethiopians have repeatedly emphasized to us their interest in the Nile and concern that they have not been consulted in connection with the Egyptian project. The British likewise have an interest deriving from the flow of the waters from British East Africa.

3. Other Countries—The actions contemplated in other countries include: … expansion of radio activities intended to counter Egyptian state broadcasting system (this would include acceleration of the program in Iraq); assistance to the Turks in establishing a medium wave station carrying Arab programs; … advice to certain friendly governments of our concern over the policies Nasser has been following, pointing out that regardless of his motives he is abetting Soviet penetration of the Near East, and that the US consequently is taking a less forthcoming attitude toward Egypt.

c. Special Emissary—The question of whether … we should have a further talk with Nasser is a difficult one. We believe that such a talk would be fruitful only if the American official charged with the responsibility is fully conversant with all the considerations involved, going considerably beyond US-Egyptian relations per se, and is fully aware of the thinking which has gone into the matter in Washington. It would be extremely difficult therefore, to handle the matter adequately through normal diplomatic channels. It would thus appear that any such mission should be performed by a special emissary, following full consultation in Washington.

The principal advantage of having an emissary talk with Nasser is that it would provide an opportunity to review the full scope of recent developments and to gauge Nasser’s attitude and intentions… .

The disadvantages include the following: Nasser might gain the impression that the dispatch of an emissary resulted from alarm or fear on the part of the US and encourage him to believe that his recent actions, obviously designed to disquiet the US, had had their desired results. If in the course of conversations with Nasser it should develop that he would make certain concessions on the basis of quid pro quo, we would in fact have relatively little to offer him in present circumstances. We could not, for example, guarantee to proceed with the Aswan Dam, although we might give hopeful indications regarding the possibility of financing the project in FY 1957 subject to Congressional appropriations. We are in no position to assure him that our cotton policies will not be detrimental to Egyptian interests; we cannot assure him that we or our friends will indefinitely not supply arms to Israel; we cannot entertain any notion of undermining the Baghdad Pact. The most we can do regarding these matters would be to assure him that if his attitude and actions should be modified, we would do all in our power to reciprocate in carrying out policies consistent with legitimate Egyptian interests.

In balance, I am inclined to believe that we should nevertheless send someone to talk with Nasser.

d. Choice of Emissary—As to the choice of the emissary, it would be unwise in my judgment to send a high-ranking Departmental officer since it would be impossible to keep his presence in Egypt a secret and knowledge of his mission would create many difficulties and would militate against his success. It should, therefore, be someone thoroughly knowledgeable of the entire situation, capable of conducting extraordinarily difficult and complex discussions with Nasser, and whose presence in Egypt would not attract undue attention or at least would not be associated in the public view with a mission of the nature contemplated. This obviously imposes a severe limitation upon the choice of the individual; in fact, it appears that the only logical person would be Bob Anderson. If he should be unable to go Eric Johnston might present a possibility although his association with the Jordan Valley Plan presents a great difficulty in light of the current Arab opposition to the plan and Hammarskjold’s expressed view that the project should not be pushed at this time.

It is of course recognized that such a mission undertaken by Anderson poses certain difficulties which should be taken into account. Among these are the following:

1. Nasser might expect that Anderson would be prepared to continue previous discussions concerning an Arab-Israeli settlement, whereas the current status regarding Hammarskjold’s role and the latter’s attitude render this inadvisable at this stage. It might appear that the US had decided not to rely upon the Secretary General but to embark upon a new peace-making mission of its own. Nasser should be made to understand that Anderson is not prepared to go into this matter.

2. If Hammarskjold should learn of Anderson’s mission and be led to believe that it was related to the Arab-Israeli dispute it might serve as an excuse for him to withdraw from active participation in the matter. Hammarskjold might be told by the Secretary that the latter was sending a special representative to talk with Nasser about the Aswan Dam and other matters relating entirely to US-Egyptian relations and inform him that questions relating to the Palestine problem will not be discussed. If it is possible to do so tactfully, it might be well not to mention Anderson by name and Hammarskjold should be requested to treat the matter in utmost confidence. While Hammarskjold should be informed by the Secretary that the official has assisted him on previous missions to the Near East, he should not be informed that the emissary has had discussions with Nasser regarding an Arab-Israeli settlement.

3. It must be assumed that the Israeli would learn of Anderson’s presence in Cairo and would be greatly concerned if they concluded that his visit was related to the Arab-Israeli question and he was not visiting Israel. For this reason the Israeli Ambassador should be told in utmost confidence that Anderson was visiting Cairo to talk about matters affecting purely US-Egyptian relations and that he would not discuss subjects affecting Israel.

4. The British likewise would probably learn of the visit… . since any step of this nature without informing them would be highly resented, we should perhaps inform them of the general purposes of Anderson’s mission.

e. Parallel Talks with Other Countries—We believe that Anderson’s present mission should be confined to discussions with Nasser, and that he should not at this juncture undertake visits to Saudi Arabia or to other countries.

f. Line of Discussion with Nasser—The context of the discussions with Nasser should be on the basis of the emissary visiting Egypt at the request of Nasser to discuss broad aspects of US-Egyptian relations. In this connection, there have been some indications that Nasser would like to have a representative come to Egypt; however, a request in this regard has not been formalized. … we believe that this should be done before definite arrangements are made for the visit.

In general, the line to be taken with Nasser should be that followed by the Secretary in his conversation on May 17 with Ambassador Hussein,² a memorandum of conversation which is attached. Detailed briefings upon the various subjects which might arise will, of course, be prepared. The subjects will probably include the Aswan Dam, American cotton policy, the Baghdad Pact, arms for Israel, the British position in the Persian Gulf, the United States attitude toward the French position in North Africa, the United States attitude toward Egyptian recognition of Red China, Soviet arms shipments to Egypt and Egyptian efforts to induce other Arab states to obtain arms from the Soviet bloc; and Egyptian broadside attacks against Western interests in Africa and the Near East.

It is important that in the conversation with Nasser a relatively detached attitude should be maintained, although it should be made clear that the US sincerely desires good relations with Egypt but that Nasser’s policies and actions have raised great impediments to such a relationship. The object should be to appraise Nasser’s attitude and estimate his willingness to change his policies in all essential respects necessary for cooperation with him, even though such changes might entail some political sacrifices on his part. An important element of the evaluation is his attitude toward the Soviets and the extent to which he would go in working with them.

In essence, the exercise would be more one of evaluation and appraisal than of negotiation. It is not intended that the emissary would be empowered to undertake any agreements upon specific issues such as the Aswan Dam, the Baghdad Pact, etc. If the results of the conversations should be such as to indicate an earnest desire on the part of Nasser to collaborate with the US and the West and he should inquire what we want him to do, the various points made in the Department’s Telegram 2598 of April 26³ would provide a useful guide for such further discussions. As the Secretary told Ambassador Hussein, if there is a basic desire on the part of Nasser to collaborate with the US, most of the outstanding problems are negotiable.

[Attachment]⁴

STAFF STUDY—U.S.-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS

Problem

To determine in the light of current developments what policy should be followed with respect to Egypt.

Recent Developments

On February [March] 28 the President approved the … operation.⁵ On April 23 a memorandum was submitted to the Secretary reviewing developments to that date and recommending … that we should preserve the utmost flexibility and be prepared to respond appropriately to any overtures from Nasser.⁶

The Tripartite meeting at the NATO Conference was followed by a spate of press stories regarding the shipment of arms to Israel. The allegation was made in the press that the United States, while refraining itself from sending arms, was encouraging its allies to do so. A violent Egyptian reaction ensued with an unbridled campaign in the Government-controlled press and radio, including charges of hypocrisy hurled at the United States.

Nasser paid a series of visits to Army posts in the Gaza and El Auja areas the weekend of May 12. The main theme of his speeches was that the West had reached a decision in Paris to arm Israel and that the Arab states must unite against Western imperialism. He asserted that Egypt would receive from its friends many more arms than Israel.

Egypt recognized Communist China without warning on May 16.⁷ It became the first country to do so, except for Nepal, since the Korean war and the only Arab country to take this step. (Israel recognized Communist China on January 9, 1950.) Embassy Cairo believes the action was precipitated by the news of Western arms shipments to Israel, but that press stories of a United States re-evaluation of its policy toward Egypt, together with British public attacks on Egypt … played an important part in the decision.

Embassy Tripoli reports that the Egyptian and Soviet Embassies cooperated in fomenting riots in Tripoli the latter part of April, and are working to overthrow the present government and eliminate U.S. and U.K. influence in Libya.⁸

The situation in Jordan has continued to deteriorate with the strongly anti-Western Colonel Nuwar assuming a controlling position in the Arab Legion. Following a period of several weeks during which the civilian government lost authority, the King announced on May 20 the appointment of Said Mufti as Prime Minister. Said Mufti was in power during the abortive attempt in December, 1955 to induce Jordan to join the Baghdad Pact, and personally favored adherence… . Egypt and Syria are stepping up their efforts to bring Jordan definitely into the ESS camp.

Nuri so far has been slow in responding to urgings on our part that Iraq take steps to improve its relations with Jordan and Saudi Arabia. We are preparing a new message stressing the need for a more forthcoming attitude.⁹

Following a visit to Cairo by Prime Minister Azhari, Egyptian relations with the governing NUP party in the Sudan have improved.¹⁰ An agreement between Egypt and the Sudan on the division of Nile waters, paving the way for the Aswan Dam, is now more likely and could occur suddenly. Egyptian prospects of building up its position in the Sudan have been considerably enhanced.

The British have now submitted an agenda to Saudi Arabia, which should prove acceptable, for continuation of their talks, but they appear still reluctant to accept our view on the essentiality of improving the Western position in Saudi Arabia. We have made numerous representations on the subject.

Ambassador Wadsworth is returning to Jidda to open negotiations on renewal of the Dhahran Airfield Agreement. He has been authorized to promise that the United States will supply the military equipment required for Saudi Arabia’s Five-Year Expansion Plan, but not to commit the United States to delivery of F–86s or M–47 tanks at any specific time. He is carrying a letter from the President to King Saud, and we are seeking authority to invite King Saud to visit this country.¹¹

Although the UN Secretary General obtained cease-fire agreements in principle from Israel and its neighbors, UNTSO has made little progress in securing implementation of the agreements. There is real danger that we will lose whatever momentum Hammarskjold’s mission had developed. From a recent conversation with him it is clear he believes that, while the Israelis will not recommence work at Banat Ya’qub during the next six months, no direct efforts to solve the water problem should be taken until the political climate in the area has improved.¹²

Possible Courses of Action

(1) … endeavor to appease Nasser by outbidding the Soviets. This course would involve acceptance of Egyptian terms on the Aswan Dam, an understanding limiting the Baghdad Pact and support for Egyptian leadership in the Arab world. It should be rejected for the following, among others, reasons: The effect upon our friends in the area and upon the UK; impetus would be given the game of playing off the United States against the USSR; the results in Israel; United States domestic repercussions; the encouragement which would be given to recognition of Communist China and other Soviet bloc states by additional Arab-Asian countries. In any event, … is unlikely to succeed in bringing about a reversal in Nasser’s policies as long as his desire continues for arms in substantial quantities which can only be provided by the Soviet bloc.

(2) Continue … This would involve a prolongation of the courses we have followed since February [March] 28. Over a long period of time such measures might convince Nasser that he should alter his policies and cooperate with the West. However, one of the difficulties in continuing along the present course is that to some extent our freedom of action has already been limited by the course of events. For example, our ability to pursue policies not detrimental to Egypt’s cotton exports will be severely impeded by the pending cotton legislation which is likely to pass. Under present circumstances, we are unable to use effectively with the Congress or American public opinion, the argument that the legislation will harm Egypt. Another factor is the strength of Nasser’s own reactions shown most lately in his recognition of Communist China, which may of themselves force us to respond ….

(3) … precipitate a head-on public clash with Nasser, who would attempt to damage the West in every way. Tactically, we have little to gain from publicity and telegraphing our moves in advance. First, we should complete our preparation and endeavor to cut back Nasser’s strength.

Recommendations

Before determining finally upon a course of action, it may be desirable to probe once more Nasser’s intentions to see whether there is any prospect of adjustments leading to long-term cooperation. In his discussion with Ambassador Hussein on May 17, the Secretary made clear repeatedly that it would be impossible to solve problems outstanding unless there was a basic and fundamental desire on Nasser’s part for cooperation with the West. While the evidence to date indicates that the possibility of agreement is remote, it may be useful to assess whether even a slight chance remains ….

Under the conditions existing in Cairo, the only practical means of obtaining an independent assessment of Nasser’s intentions is by sending a high level official on a special mission. There are marked disadvantages in sending such an emissary, foremost among which is the strong probability that Nasser, as in a similar case in the past, might construe it as a sign of weakness and anxiety on the part of the U.S. In weighing the advantages and disadvantages, the following two principal factors should be borne in mind: (1) to remain … without incisive urgent action … is to run the grave risk of placing Egypt in a position to conclude immediately thereafter an agreement on the Dam with the Soviet bloc. … (2) to embark on measures … which would inevitably come to Nasser’s notice would obviously create new and grave problems in our relations with Egypt. …

If, despite the obvious and serious risks of misinterpretation, it is determined, on balance, that a high official should proceed, the emissary should depart in the immediate future. The official should work on the basis of a carefully developed plan designed to minimize the danger of Nasser’s concluding that the United States is seeking to appease him. If at all possible, matters should be arranged so that the initiative towards high level talks would come from Nasser. It is not inconceivable that Nasser will request such talks on the basis of Ambassador Hussein’s report of his discussion with the Secretary. If the official proceeds to Cairo, he should in general parallel the presentation of the Secretary to Ambassador Hussein. He should endeavor to create the impression of relative detachment and merely of a desire to know what we may expect from Nasser in order that we may act accordingly.

1. Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #5. Top Secret; Omega. Drafted by Rountree, Wilkins, and Burdett. The source text bears a notation that Secretary Dulles saw the memorandum. A covering memorandum from Howe to Dulles indicates that the memorandum and its attachment were prepared in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs and reviewed by the Middle East Policy Planning Group for use at the Secretary’s meeting on the Middle East scheduled for 3:30 p.m. that day (see infra).
2. See Document 353.
3. Document 310.
4. Top Secret; Omega. Drafted by Burdett on May 23. Further documentation concerning the drafting of the staff study and its review by the Middle East Policy Planning Group is in Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #5; Ibid., NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Omega—Meetings of MEPPG (agenda, memos of conv., etc.), 4/9/56 to 6/30/56; and Ibid., Omega—Memos, etc. fr April 24, 1956 to June 30, 1956.
5. See Document 223.
6. The memorandum, entitled “U.S. Policy in the Near East”, is not printed. (Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Omega. NE—Mr. Burdett 1956)
7. See Document 352.
8. No record of such reports has been found in Department of State files.
9. Telegram 980 to Baghdad, May 23, instructed Ambassador Gallman to this effect. (Department of State, Central Files, 786.00/5–656)
10. Sudanese Prime Minister Azhari visited Cairo April 12–23.
11. For text of President Eisenhower’s letter of May 14 to King Saud, see vol. XIII, p. 372.
12. See Document 338.