Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1–July 26, 1956, Volume XV

310. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt¹

Washington, April 26, 1956—9:44 a.m.

2598. We appreciate careful analysis provided by Embtel 2087² which very useful in connection our continuous review course of action described Deptel 2404.³ We are maintaining utmost flexibility and keeping constantly in mind objective present endeavors, i.e. induce reorientation Nasser’s policies toward cooperation with Free World and lessen harmful Egyptian influence in other countries of ME. We are prepared respond quickly to real change on Nasser’s part. However we think acts of substance publicly recognizable as such throughout area are needed and that we must exercise caution to avoid misinterpreting superficial maneuvers by Nasser as indicating genuine change.

Tactically we believe it preferable wait until Nasser concludes relations with US not proceeding smoothly and raises matter with US officials. He has undoubtedly noted press reports US re-evaluating its policy toward Egypt and may have become aware of certain pressures …. We believe your first reply to approach by Nasser should be to give what is ostensibly your personal reaction. Our tentative view is that following line might be taken:

1. You might point out to Nasser necessity for reciprocity in international relations emphasizing that US belief in his desire to cooperate severely shaken by Egyptian actions since Suez Base agreement, where we worked hard to bring about early British evacuation sought by Egypt but success did not lead to realization high expectations held out by Egypt during those negotiations.

2. US has not “turned against” him and does not wish pursue policies detrimental to him. However our attitude toward cooperation with him and our ability take those positive steps he would like are inevitably affected by his own activities. Without assuring Nasser of any specific response on our part you might suggest he consider means of demonstrating desire for friendly relations perhaps by steps such as following: a) Public statement by Nasser broadcast to Egypt and Arab world expressing his determination to maintain Egyptian independence and recognizing desirability friendly⁴ cooperation with Free World to achieve this end; b) Cessation anti-West press and radio attacks and attacks directed against Baghdad Pact; c) Full support in UN and outside to Hammarskjold’s efforts to improve situation and relieve tensions re Arab-Israel problem, including acceptance various practical steps proposed by Hammarskjold; d) Dispatch of high ranking official in whom Nasser has confidence, perhaps member of RCC, to attend SC discussion Hammarskjold report (this would evidence Egyptian intention work with UN, and visit could serve as opportunity for US officials Washington to have frank talks with Egyptian in whom Nasser has confidence); e) Suggest to Syria, Lebanon and Jordan they invite Johnston return to resume discussions Jordan Valley Plan on unified basis.

3. In addition foregoing, broader question is Egyptian attitude toward British as reflected in strong anti-British propaganda and activity throughout Near East area. US policies are, of course, directed toward achievement mutually beneficial relationships between US itself and states of the area, independence and progress of which we stoutly support. We cannot, however, be indifferent to developments which tend to undermine interests of Free World in general and efforts of UK to maintain its legitimate interests and mutually beneficial relations with countries and peoples of Near East. These make an essential contribution to Western security and well-being.⁵ We have not given British “blank check” in support their NE policies; indeed we have often used our influence to help bring about new relationships between UK and Near Eastern countries (as in cases of Suez Agreement with Egypt, Sudan Agreement, and Iranian oil settlement, and endeavors to settle Buraimi issue with Saudi Arabia). By same token we cannot be expected support broadside attacks against British particularly when such attacks involve general undermining Western position and interests in area including those of US. We would expect other responsible governments similarly recognize dangers such actions and refrain from resorting to them.

4. We aware that in this matter, as in all others affecting international relations, cooperation is two-way proposition. If Egyptians prepared moderate their position re British and cease inflammatory activities against them, US prepared exert influence upon British to pursue similar policies vis-à-vis Egypt.

5. As Nasser aware US has given clear evidence its support Baghdad Pact as instrument collective security against communist threat aggression and economic and psychological offensive. We have never regarded Pact as instrument to build up one Arab state at expense of others or to disrupt Arab unity. We would not associate ourselves in any Pact activities involving intra-Arab politics or in machinations against Egypt. We aware Nasser has had misgivings re objective of Pact but we are unable agree any present⁶ validity his fears it directed against Egypt. His acceptance sincerity US position will render it easier for US work toward confining Pact to its basic purpose.

Department would appreciate receiving soonest precise formulation you would suggest re remarks to Nasser and views re timing.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/4–1956. Top Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution; Omega Handling. Drafted by Rountree and Burdett; cleared by Hoover, MacArthur, and Howe; and approved and signed by Dulles.
2. Document 294.
3. Document 238.
4. The Secretary substituted the word “friendly” for “close”.
5. The Secretary added this sentence.
6. The Secretary added the words “any present”