Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1–July 26, 1956, Volume XV

353. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, May 17, 1956, 2 p.m.¹

Washington, May 17, 1956, 2 p.m.

SUBJECT

• U.S.-Egyptian Relations

PARTICIPANTS

• Dr. Ahmed Hussein, Egyptian Ambassador
• The Secretary
• Mr. Rountree, NEA
• Mr. Burdett, NE

Ambassador Hussein called at his request prior to his departure on May 18 for consultations in Cairo. He referred to a recent telephone conversation with Nasser which, he stated, left him convinced that Nasser wants good relations with the United States and that the existing misunderstandings which had arisen in U.S.-Egyptian relations could be resolved. He was seeking an open talk with the Secretary in order that he might report to Nasser what the United States might be able to do and what the United States expected Egypt to do.

The Secretary responded as follows: We appreciate the Ambassador’s concern regarding U.S.-Egyptian relations. There is no use of our shutting our eyes to the fact that a deterioration has occurred. The Ambassador will be performing a high duty in attempting now to clarify misunderstandings and reduce the differences to those relatively minor points which always exist. The Secretary said he had been looking over a message sent to Nasser in September, 1955 at the time of the Soviet Bloc-Egyptian arms transaction, and he read to the Ambassador the following portions:

“I wish to bring to you most urgently my deep concern over reports of the conclusion of an agreement by the Egyptian Government for the purchase of arms from the Soviet Union. It is possible that you may not have realized fully the seriousness with which such a transaction will be viewed in the United States and the consequent difficulty of preventing it from marring the existing good relations between our two peoples.

“Since the establishment of the present Government in Egypt, the United States has worked with it in the expectation that a solid basis would evolve for cooperation between Egypt and the nations of the West. We have placed full confidence in your repeated assurances regarding Egypt’s identification with the West. We extended assistance during the negotiations of the Anglo-Egyptian agreement on the Sudan and the Suez Base agreement in the belief that they would make possible close Egyptian cooperation with the West. Our economic assistance programs, Atomic Energy Program, approval of arms purchases, and my statement of August 26 on the Arab-Israel situation are all based on the same general thought. We have tried to handle our cotton surplus in ways which will not prejudice Egypt’s economy and have otherwise sought to support that economy. I am convinced that the economic and social progress you so deeply desire for the Egyptian people can come best through continued association with the West.

“The proposed agreement with the Soviet Union inevitably undermines the basic premise upon which we have worked in the past and sets Egypt upon a course which may well separate her progressively from her natural and long-term friends. The agreement cannot be considered a simple commercial transaction. It has deep political meaning. The record of the Soviet Union in this respect is clear. Initial, supposedly friendly gestures, lead quickly to subversion, inextricable involvement in the Communist orbit, and loss of that independence of action which Egypt rightly values so highly.”²

Predictions made at the time had been to some extent confirmed by events. The Ambassador could appreciate the efforts of the President and the Secretary in withstanding the extraordinarily hard pressures to support Israel against Egypt. However, the only consequence of their stand seemed to be that in addition to alienating the Zionists and Israel, Egypt was turning against the United States. The Secretary said he did not know how long the United States could continue to follow a policy condemned by both sides. Egypt was stirring up the area against the United States. The latest example was the recognition of Communist China.³ This event coming on top of the publicity on shipment of arms to Saudi Arabia⁴ had evoked a most violent reaction in Congress.

The Secretary continued that allegations that the United States was trying to induce other countries to ship arms to Israel were untrue. To expect the United States not to ship itself and to use its influence to impose a world-wide embargo on Israel is totally unreasonable. Israel has received less military equipment during the last six months than during any other six-month period. The United States, at France’s request, concurred in the interruption of an OSP contract to make possible the shipment of 24 Mystere planes.⁵ This number is less than 10 percent of what we understand Egypt has received. The Secretary stated he could not see how we could hope to maintain good relations with Egypt if our policy on arms to Israel was made the basis of attacks upon us. What does Egypt expect the United States to do? Nasser must be aware of the tremendous pressures from Zionist groups which are increased by the Soviet shipments to Egypt. Everything Egypt says and does is a slap in the face of the United States.

Ambassador Hussein said he understood and appreciated the United States policy on arms shipments. However, press stories regarding the Mysteres had indicated the United States was urging its allies to arm Israel. These stories, in the Ambassador’s opinion, were responsible for the recognition of Communist China. The Secretary replied that the Ambassador should know that the press stories were inspired by persons attempting to goad Egypt into exactly what it had done, persons bent on disrupting U.S.-Egyptian relations. In Paris he explained why the United States was not shipping major military items to Israel. He did not ask other countries to cut off supplies to Israel, but pointed out that every nation was free to do what it wished. The United States was not trying by dubious means to do what it did not wish to do directly. He had expected questions at his last press conference⁶ regarding U.S. policy toward arms shipments to Israel. If he was queried next week, he would reply in the above sense.⁷

Ambassador Hussein requested suggestions regarding what could be done to improve relations. The Secretary commented that the present situation, like most similar ones, was caused by misunderstandings and loss of confidence. Many persons in the U.S., in addition to Israel’s usual supporters, honestly believed Nasser had made a bargain with the Devil with the hope of developing his own power and establishing an empire stretching from the Persian Gulf to the Atlantic Ocean. He did not believe this. Still, the United States had yet to see Nasser do anything in the last six to nine months designed to preserve any vestige of friendship with the United States. The United States had tried its best to keep Egyptian friendship despite the effects of its Israel policy on the domestic political situation. Nasser had followed exactly the opposite course. Whenever he saw that popularity could be gained thereby, he had shown no restraint in leading the mob against the West. If Nasser attaches importance to U.S.-Egyptian friendship, as we do, he must be willing to pay a domestic political price for such friendship. Recognition of Communist China has brought about an almost impossible situation. The Ambassador interjected that it was commonly thought that the United States itself would recognize Communist China in a year or so and that the UK, France and other countries had already done so. The Secretary emphasized the way in which Egypt had extended recognition, without any advance warning whatsoever. Nasser seemed to be deliberately going about making U.S.-Egyptian friendship difficult. He could hardly have found anything that would make it harder for us to continue good relations with Egypt. Now, an American had only to be anti-Communist to condemn our policy toward Egypt. Nasser had touched a point on which the United States was most sensitive. Does Nasser really want to force the United States to support Israel? When the Ambassador mentioned Nasser’s internal problems, the Secretary inquired whether there was any internal demand in Egypt for the recognition of Communist China.

The Ambassador said that he would not be returning to Egypt if he were not one hundred percent certain that Nasser wished good relations with the United States. He inquired whether something might be done with respect to the Aswan High Dam. The Secretary said that assistance toward the Dam was about as unpopular a thing as could be done in the United States. Every time he had appeared before Congress the matter of the Dam was thrown at him. Egypt was not doing the United States a favor by accepting assistance toward the Dam. Should the matter arise today, he did not think it would be possible to get authorization from Congress for the Dam. He hoped the situation would calm down. Congress could easily attach to the Mutual Security Act a prohibition on expenditures of funds for the Dam. The situation in the Congress was boiling over the combination of arms to Saudi Arabia, no arms to Israel, and Egyptian recognition of Communist China. The Ambassador stated he had discussed with Mr. Rountree pending cotton legislation.⁸ He was being asked whether the new bill was intended as an economic warfare measure against Egypt. The Secretary replied that the Administration was trying very hard to secure elimination of the objectionable features but that Egypt was making this most difficult. Congress would not be moved by the argument that Egypt would be hurt.

The Ambassador requested the Secretary to try to find a positive approach to U.S.-Egyptian relations and not to decide to drop Egypt. He said that if he felt such a positive approach was not possible, he would resign. With respect to arms shipments, he inquired regarding the feasibility of suggesting to Nasser that Egypt, once it had sufficient defensive arms, refrain from further purchases, provided Israel did the same. The Ambassador emphasized the psychological problem posed by Israel. He said that Egypt was a weak power with great need for economic development and that it had no desire to establish an empire. The Secretary recalled his hope that the Soviet bloc arms transaction would be a one-shot deal. Instead it was still going on and there was no way of knowing when it would end. He thought that the situation might be frozen on some reasonable basis involving no great imbalance and accompanied by positive United Nations guarantees against aggression. The President already had made clear the United States position on aggression.⁹ The Secretary had recently told Ambassador Eban that if Israel aggressed it would be confronted with United States economic sanctions.¹⁰

Ambassador Hussein raised the matter of the Baghdad Pact. He inquired whether an agreement could be worked out limiting the Pact to the “northern tier” countries with the understanding that no other nation would join. The Secretary replied that we had never pressured any country to adhere to the Pact. We recognized the danger of its becoming mixed up in Arab politics and were interested only in a cooperative grouping against Soviet aggression or penetration. We had always regarded Egypt as a leader of the Arab States. Whether we would continue to do so depended a little on which way Egypt was leading. All the matters raised by the Ambassador were discussable and the Secretary thought solvable in an atmosphere in which the United States thought Nasser wanted its friendship. In addition, Egypt should not involve itself in active hostility to the U.K. The U.K. had big stakes in the Arab world, including oil in Iraq and Kuwait. The British would not stand idly by and see their position jeopardized, nor would the United States. We will support a legitimate British economic position in the area. This did not mean we would support British political dominance.

The Ambassador remarked that a solution of specific problems would lead to the creation of a better atmosphere. He mentioned the extreme nationalist feeling in the Arab world regarding the U.K. and suggested an understanding under which the U.K. would abandon its “eighteenth century colonialism” in the Persian Gulf in return for an end to Arab attacks against vital British interests in the area. The Ambassador inquired whether he could inform Nasser that the United States would support a “compromise” with the U.K. such as he had mentioned. The Secretary replied that he was in no position to negotiate with Nasser at this stage through the Ambassador or anyone else. There was too much danger of misunderstanding. He thought that he understood the real aspirations of the Egyptian people and had amply demonstrated this fact: If Nasser wanted the friendship of the United States and if he was prepared to keep Egypt independent from the USSR, all these problems could be worked out consistent with the normal aspirations of the Egyptian people. Without this basic desire, negotiations would be folly. Nasser’s actions were causing the great body of opinion in the United States to doubt his intention on this matter. The Secretary re-emphasized that he could not deplore too greatly the recognition of Communist China.

Ambassador Hussein pointed to the restraint which Nasser had used regarding the last Israeli attack which had cost him prestige at home and in the area. The Secretary rejoined that he had been trying hard to think of something good that could be said about Nasser, and could say his attitude toward the Secretary General had been good, better than that of Israel.

In conclusion, the Secretary assured the Ambassador of his personal regard and of his confidence in the Ambassador’s sincere desire to bring about an improvement in U.S.-Egyptian relations. He was glad the Ambassador was undertaking his present mission. While the Ambassador could not say he was charged by the Secretary with negotiating with Nasser, he could say he had explored these various problems and that if Nasser showed a real desire to have friendly relations, all could be settled. The heart of the matter was set forth in his letter to Nasser of last September. However, he would not say that there was already a certain price that Egypt would have to pay because of actions she had already taken.¹¹

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.74/5–1756. Top Secret. Drafted on May 18 by Burdett. The time of the meeting is from Secretary Dulles’ Appointment Book. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)
2. The complete text of the letter is printed in telegram 1167, vol. XIV, p. 504.
3. See supra.
4. On March 28, a squadron of Egyptian jet combat aircraft was delivered to Saudi Arabia under the terms of the bilateral defense treaty of October 17, 1955.
5. See footnote 6, Document 336.
6. For the transcript of Dulles’ news conference, May 15 see Department of State Bulletin, May 28, 1956, p. 881.
7. For the transcript of Dulles’ news conference, May 22 see ibid., June 4, 1956, p. 920.
8. Reference is to the Agricultural Act of 1956, which President Eisenhower signed into law on May 28, 1956, as Public Law 540. For text, see 70 Stat. 188.
9. See footnote 2, Document 258.
10. No record has been found in Department of State files of the Secretary’s having made such a statement to Ambassador Eban. See, however, Documents 151 and 221.
11. On May 21, the Department transmitted, in telegram 2780, a summary of this conversation with Ambassador Hussein to the Embassy in Cairo. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.74/5–2156)