338. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State1

931. Re report of SYG on trip to Middle East. Wadsworth had lunch with SYG, Dixon (UK) and Alphand (France) today, and Lodge saw Hammarskjold alone later in day. Following is report from Wadsworth:

SYG feels he has achieved two to six months’ respite from hostilities in area including some vague commitment from Ben Gurion to effect Israelis will defer digging at Banat Yaacov (SYG pointed out if they don’t dig by June, they can’t dig for year). Since he has been successful in establishing this respite, he believes 3 powers and later Soviets in “unilateral coordinated steps” must exert diplomatic pressure on “countries concerned” to resolve problems involved in this order:

1. El Auja–Sinai; 2. Suez Canal; 3. water; 4. refugees. As Alphand put it, “il nous a passe le bebe.” Furthermore, SYG, while apparently pleased with his temporary success but basically pessimistic, does not care to return to area nor wish for SC meeting. If one is to be called, he suggests not before May 22. He said Soviets do not want one. He will confer with other SC members Thursday and press Friday, having consulted with Brilej (Yugo) and US today.

Other info evolving from luncheon today:

1.
SYG has achieved agreement on stringent orders forbidding firing along armistice lines.
2.
He reached agreement on increase in observers but not in number, probably 20.
3.
He received complete agreement on patroling in Gaza area.
4.
El Auja—he had managed to extract some sort of agreement on quid pro quo between Egyptians and Israelis. This was vague and involved some verbal commitment on Fawzi’s part to consider lifting Suez Canal restrictions in return for Israeli withdrawal in El Auja zone.
5.
He specifically avoided commenting on arms balance question.
6.
His “eyes had been opened” on Nasser, but liked Fawzi, got along splendidly with Ben Gurion.
7.
He reported Nasser had said he could “beat the Israelis on Egyptian soil”.
8.
He continued believe political agent or “agent general” as contemplated earlier by US would not be desirable.

Following is result of Lodge’s conversation:

[Page 622]

Hammarskjold told Lodge he had obtained unconditional assurance from Egypt to pull back troops. Israel had agreed but subject to their reserving right to send patrols into area only “for security purposes”. Both sides agreed to establishment of 12 posts and of mobile ground patrols. The Israelis, entirely for juridical reasons, rejected Hammarskjold’s proposal for UN boat on Tiberias Lake but accepted ground observers.

Lodge asked direct question: “What future action do you desire?” Hammarskjold replied that under no circumstances should there be meeting of SC before fortnight; maybe there should not be one then; if meeting were held it should be very carefully prepared; there should be no great debate and we should follow policy of wait and see.

He felt Suez Canal and El Auja questions “could be worked out diplomatically” outside SC with Govt of Egypt. He pointed out this did not mean outside UN. He suggested France, UK, US and SYG could all take part.

He did not think Israelis would start digging at Banat Yaacov and said idea being advanced in US Govt of not making loan to Israel without agreement to postpone digging “was very wise”.

He said he had been very close to an agreement on blockade and on ending troop concentrations.

He had great confidence in Fawzi and said one could go far with him.

Lodge
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/5–756. Confidential. Received at 12:52 a.m., May 8.