Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1–July 26, 1956, Volume XV

112. Message to the Central Intelligence Agency¹

No. 89

Cairo, February 22, 1956.

1. Session 21 February opened by Nasr, Zacharia participating, on subject of arms to Israel; his remarks cabled separately in Message No. 88.² Rest of meeting devoted to Anderson operation and allied matters.

2. I asked Nasr what he thought of the … Ali Sabri talks.³ He replied that he considered the discussions at this level to be of primary importance in that they are subsidiary to the “Big Problem”. Nonetheless, he supposed that these conversations have been going well and affirmed that it was his intention to live by whatever is worked out. I then asked Nasr if he were prepared to resume discussions with Anderson. To this he replied that he would be happy to see Anderson at any time but that the question really is whether or not Anderson is now prepared to resume the discussions. This I took to be a reference to the “Big Problem” for Nasr appeared to believe that he made his thinking clear and that it is now up to us to indicate our acceptance or rejection of his position with respect to the basis on which peace with Israel can be obtained. I replied I did not think his position in certain respects was all that clear and that in Washington moreover there were very serious doubts at his sincerity in the op. I then adverted to the topics of Egyptian propaganda recent border incidents, etc and stated that these were part of a long list of indications that he was only stalling for time in the Anderson operation. Nasr did not appear to be upset by this turn of the conversation but he replied he had two thoughts to offer. He wishes to assert, in the first place, that he has in fact been trying conscientiously to take the steps required of him and has been endeavoring to reduce anti-Israeli propaganda to a minimum and to increase the discipline of his troops in the Gaza area. As for the incidents which seemed to have displeased us, he thought we were making mountains out of molehills. In the second place he wanted us to understand that much of the difficulty he is encountering is directly traceable to the atmosphere that we and the British persist in maintaining with respect to the politics of the area. He then recounted lengthily the points he usually makes in this connection all simmering down to the proposition that the British and American activities in support of the Bagh Pact were creating internecine warfare among the Arab States and cited numerous instances real and imaginary where propaganda drives conducted against him (mostly he feels British inspired) are compelling him more and more to soft pedal or abandon what he would consider “Constructive” conduct in the area.

3. I then made the point that we on our part were puzzled as to what he would consider “Constructive” conduct in the area. I added that many of the difficulties he complained of do not spring from any deliberate actions aimed at him but from simple misunderstandings as to what it takes to please him. We were, to put it bluntly, somewhat confused. Here he interrupted to say that he shared my feeling. “We think you have been conducting a comic opera in the Middle East during the past two weeks”. He went on to claim that we had issued four contradictory statements with regards to arms policy in the Middle East in a period of 48 hours,⁴ and if the consequences were not so serious it would be a laughing matter indeed. I went on to reiterate that not knowing exactly what Nasr wanted in the area was an important factor in keeping us from clarifying our policy. After I labored this point for a while he finally agreed that this might be the source of the trouble. (?)⁵ He suggested that although he and Ambassador Byroade have had many profitable discussions (in)? main view of the immediate relevance to the Anderson operation it would be good idea for he (Nasr) and I … to get busy at formulating a statement of common Egyptian-American objectives. He warmed to this idea the more he talked about it and emerged with the apparent conviction that this would represent real progress. I indicated that I thought so too but appealed to him not to expect too much of us and that in the friendliest of relationships the parties concerned can never be in 100% agreement. I allowed that we could go on all night matching examples of how each of us had done things which apparently betrayed the interests of the other and that, instead, we should take this opportunity to make a conscientious effort to magnify our points of common interest and minimize our differences.

4. One “Constructive” idea for the area which appears to be of increasing interest to Nasr is the possibility of our granting economic aid to the Arab States on a regional basis. Nasr has apparently given this matter considerable thought and intends at the proper time to take up the question of a Western sponsored economic survey with the Arab League. He doesn’t think anything can be done at the moment, however, due to the “Internecine warfare” referred to above.

5. Towards the close of the meeting I had a full scale argument with Nasr on the question of a direct meeting with the Israelis at a suitable high level. Nasr never budged from his negative position on this, but indicated that he was willing to argue about it some more in the next day or two. I think his willingness to talk about it is slightly encouraging and we may have as much as one out of five chances of changing his mind.

6. … is going to get in touch with Ali Sabri today preliminary to our holding the discussions called for in Paragraph 3 above. We will probably both meet with Nasr Thursday⁶ night.

1. Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part I. Secret.
2. Supra.
3. See Documents 85, 96, and 107.
4. These statements are not identified. Presumably Nasser is referring to the circumstances surrounding the shipment of American tanks to Saudi Arabia. See footnote 6, Document 106.
5. This and the subsequent question mark appear in the source text.
6. February 23.