96. Message to Washington1
No. 81
Cairo, February 16,
1956.
- 1.
- Ali Sabri opened conversation … yesterday with usual gloomy note before settling down to discussion details of agreement. Sabri asked when Anderson returning. Said it important he come quickly as possible because present situation in area as whole most [Page 174] unfavorable and required modification before progress towards settlement possible.
- 2.
- When asked explain his reference bad area situation Sabri said
this due two principal factors:
- A.
- Constant emphasis by Western officials and press on emergency situation, danger war in Near East and talk of use of force in area by Western Powers. He cited press treatment of Eden-Eisenhower conversations, Eden’s public statements since conference and Tripartite conversations.
- B.
- Continuation British efforts push other Arab States into Baghdad Pact. When asked for evidence this Sabri said that both he and Nasr convinced that visit of Jordan P.M. Rifai to Arab States in effort get meeting revive Arab League Security Pact with Iraq in Pact and also in Bagh Pact was “British-inspired” effort employ other means expand Baghdad Pact. Said he and P.M. convinced Rifai would have done this only under British pressure.
- 3.
- … took hour to go over all the old arguments and explain again impossibility actually changing policy until there further agreement on ends and means. Suggested that Step 3 of timetable (Message No. 79)2 should include program for modification area activity of all parties concerned in reaching settlement as well as plan under U.N. auspices for easing tensions along armistice lines.
- 4.
- Sabri accepted suggestion and agreed cooperate in working out detailed plan Step 3 with above mentioned two elements. At this meeting Sabri reported he had studied our proposal for U.N. administered program on borders and come to conclusion it was only means solving this problem. However, at this meeting he preoccupied with what he called area tensions to extent he willing say problem relaxation of Arab-Israeli tensions easy of solution.
- 5.
- … feels Egyptians are continuing attribute very great importance to Anderson mission. Their natural tendency, however is to devote majority their thought on subject to problems and dangers involved rather than positive forward steps. He believes detailed plan Step 3 can soon be worked out with Sabri, which he hopes will provide practical means going beyond present stage of indecision and hesitation. This step of course dependent upon outcome Anderson second visit.
- Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part I. Secret.↩
- Document 85.↩