107. Message to Washington1
No. 83
Caira, February 20,
1956.
- 1.
- In businesslike meeting this morning Ali Sabri … discussed Steps 2 and 3 of timetable (Paragraph 3, Message No. 79).2 This was first meeting at which Sabri proceeded to business at hand without sounding note of gloom and stressing extent of problems and generally unfavorable situation.
- 2.
- On Step 2 Sabri made point that part of this step must be discussion between Anderson and PriMin of Egyptian-U.S. policy as part of “Package”.
- 3.
- Sabri saw no reason why we cannot proceed immediately to implementation Step 3 following successful completion Step 2.
- 4.
- A paper … called “Plan for Step 3 of Timetable” was discussed in
detail and agreement reached to use this paper as working document
at time of second Anderson
visit. Paper being pouched.3 Following is
summary main points:
- A.
-
Step 3 to consist of two parallel programs:
- (1)
- Program to reduce Arab-Israeli tensions, and
- (2)
- Program to reduce tensions in Arab area.
(This carries out suggestion referred to in Paragraph 3 of Message No. 81.)4
- B.
- Programs cannot be expected eliminate tensions. Parties to agreement on Step 3 must understand this effort produce best possible situation for negotiation and announcement settlement but that perfect situation impossible. (This point has been repeatedly stressed in conversation in order counter Egyptian tendency hold back from practical work on plea atmosphere not right.)
- C.
- Program for easing Arab-Israeli tensions to consist of
following elements:
- (1)
- Initiation by SecGen of U.N. of program for discussion means easing border tensions.
- (2)
- Discussions to utilize machinery. General Burns to confer with Egyptian and Israeli foreign ministers separately as necessary.
- (3)
- Discussions to explore all measures relieve border tensions.
- (4)
- Egypt and Israel to take all feasible steps at home to reduce border problems.
- (5)
- Effort to be made to devise means improving conditions refugees during this stage and other means prepare them for ultimate acceptance settlement. (Sabri thought this good idea and willing explore further).
- (6)
- Parties to agreement on plan for Step 3 to give U.N. program most favorable propaganda treatment in order encourage attitude in area favorable settlement.
- D.
- Program for easing area tensions. Parties agreeing to plan
for Step 3 to review factors contributing area tensions and
to take steps eliminate such factors:
- (1)
- Parties to agree to moratorium all efforts change alignment of states in area. U.S. to seek influence Baghdad Pact nations against pressing other Arab States join Pact or otherwise change present pattern relationship area states. Egypt to give equivalent assurances on its side. (Sabri made point that essential problem here is U.K. policy which disturbing calm of area.)
- (2)
- Parties to plan will make efforts stop all public statements and actions which contribute to sense of emergency and feeling there danger war in area.
- (3)
- Parties to plan must stop public statements on plans for action, particularly military action in event of Arab Israeli war.
- 5.
- … representative and Sabri meeting on 21 February to discuss prospects for improving refugee situation in advance of settlement and formula on refugee issue for settlement.
- Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part I. Secret.↩
- Document 85.↩
- See Document 109.↩
- Document 96.↩