Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1–July 26, 1956, Volume XV

113. Message From the Ambassador in Egypt (Byroade) to the Acting Secretary of State¹

No. 92

Cairo, February 22, 1956.

1. Since receiving your message dated 20 February 1956² have given most careful consideration as to how operation in question could best be handled in event it appears to be necessary. Have been able to feel even at this distance situation at home you refer to, and unfortunately so have Arabs. There is here, I believe, a growing feeling that decision in favor of Israel may soon be reached.

2. While addressing myself to the question of method which you pose, please forgive one more statement from me that this action, however carried out or announced, is certain to have the most grave effect upon the U.S. position in the Middle East. Altho many cables have been sent by this Embassy on this subj believe Embtel 1124 sent Dec 12³ best summarizes our views. Would hope that msg, which seems to me as valid now as when written, could be available on highest level at time decision reached. You might wish review also Ambassador Moose’s 582.⁴

3. Situation seems to defy thinking up any new “Device” to reduce damage in Arab World. Regardless of how matter is handled, it will be the subj of such wide press treatment that skill of handling on our part will be completely ignored and lost. Am sorry I have to report that I believe it would be the end of the Anderson mission. I also believe that the feeling that war is inevitable will become accepted by the mass of Arabs.

4. In considering how problem can be handled believe you should attempt divide it in your thinking into two parts. One is the question of convincing Nasser and other Arab leaders privately that “No threat is being created to their security”. The other is the question of the political and psychological effect in the area of sending arms to Israel.

5. Under certain conditions first part of problem might be handled. The work of the Anderson mission should first proceed to point of secret agreement between Egypt and Israel on a program for arriving at a settlement (or on a scheduled meeting between two sides for discussion of settlement). If this state achieved there is some slight chance that problem would be manageable from the security viewpoint alone. Nasser might provide us with info as to his actual strength and agree to obtain no more above levels of equipment now on order. We might be able to convince him personally that we could not carry out our part of deal without provision of some arms to Israel which could be used to quiet their populace and help us with our problem at home. In such case Pentagon could advise as to types of equipment for Israel to that which could be best labeled “Defensive”, although this fairly difficult when one goes beyond such things as fixed anti-aircraft artillery, radar warning systems, etc.

6. It is the second, and to us most important, part of problem that we can see no way to meet. I think we agree with Nasser that a period of preparation in the area is necessary before any Arab leader could make peace with Israel. There is no single act I can think of on our part that would run so violently counter to the creation of the required atmosphere than the publicity involved in arms for Israel. However the move might be received within U.S., there is no doubt in my mind how it will be received here. It will eliminate a substantial body of Arab opinion that the present U.S. administration is much better on the Arab-Israel issue than its predecessor and will destroy all remaining belief in its policy of impartiality. I have considered for some time before committing to writing my belief it will wipe out the gains of three years of effort by Eisenhower team and in view of Sov support to Arabs will set us back farther than we were in 48. Am sorry to be so negative but wish make it crystal clear that in my opinion this part of problem completely overrules any suggestion made above as to how straight security aspects of problem might be met.

7. As to how decision should be relayed to Nasser, suppose I should do it and perhaps it would be best to do so couple of days prior to announcement. Will of course attempt reason with him in best manner possible, but details of presentation will be relatively unimportant.

1. Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part I. Secret.
2. A footnote in the source text refers to the enclosure to Document 106.
3. Vol. XIV, p. 851.
4. Ibid., p 866.