111. Message to the Central Intelligence Agency1

No. 88
1.
Nasr opened conversation of 21 Feb by stating that he was most alarmed by Lincoln White announcement, which he takes to mean that a U.S. grant to Israel is in the immediate offing.2 I admitted that this had become a serious possibility, but did not [Page 204] pursue the point beyond asserting that we were now under extreme pressures not only from the Zionists but from other elements of American opinion motivated by the traditional “American sense of fair play”. This brought forth an outburst which almost broke up the meeting. “If the Americans were all that motivated by a sense of fair play there would have been no Israel in the first place”. Nasr then went on to enumerate what he considers instances wherein fair play has been notably lacking (e.g. the mild American reaction to the numerous Israeli “Pearl Harbor attacks” on the Arab States at various times and places). He questioned with particular emphasis our idea of fair play as manifested in our conception of the “Balance of Power” between Israelis and Arabs which had enabled Israel to launch “Pearl Harbors” with impunity.
2.
Since he appeared to be determined to dwell longer on the Israeli arms question, I asked him what effect a grant to Israel of a relatively small quantity of “Defensive Arms” would have on the Anderson operation. Nasr replied emphatically that this would put an end not only to the Anderson operation but to “Everything”. (He added that “Everything” included the career of Nuri Said inasmuch as George Allen’s recent statement on the VOA3 had made it clear to the Arabs that we linked the Baghdad Pact with the question of Israeli security).
3.
I then pursued Nasr with questions as to his precise course of conduct in the event of an announcement of arms to Israel. He replied that immediately upon receiving confirmation of such a grant, Egypt and Syria will request a similar quantity of arms from the U.S., and that he thought Lebanon and Jordan might do likewise. He said this would be done in full expectation of having the requests turned down. “After that we shall see what happens”.
4.
I have never seen Nasr and Zacharia so upset about anything. I unhesitatingly predict that an arms grant to Israel will produce a fearsome reaction and one which will be beyond our power to avert or soften. An hour or so later, and after discussing a number of subjects, I took my leave. At the door Nasr grabbed me by the arm and said he hoped there was “some mistake” involved in the Lincoln White announcement and that a catastrophe like this will not intervene to shatter all the hope we have been nursing along over the past three years.
  1. Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part I. Secret.
  2. The announcement has not been further identified.
  3. Not further identified.