Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, South Asia, Volume VIII

55. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the Indian Ambassador (Mehta), Department of State, Washington, April 25, 1957¹

Washington, April 25, 1957

SUBJECT

• Kashmir and Other Indo-Pakistan Problems

The Ambassador said that he had been impressed during his stay in India with the strong feelings of the Indian people on the Kashmir issue. He had found that the Indians were very pleased with the Prime Minister’s visit. During the course of the visit an Indo-American Friendship Society had been established by members of both Houses of the Indian Parliament.

Unfortunately there had been some diminution in the friendly feelings of the Indian people for the US in the period which had elapsed since the Prime Minister’s visit. The Ambassador was asked during his stay in India why the President’s “Middle East” doctrine had not been discussed with the Prime Minister during the talks that the Prime Minister had had with the President. The Ambassador said that he had replied that at the time of the Prime Minister’s visit the doctrine was in its early stages, and had very suddenly been developed.

The consideration by the Security Council of the Kashmir problem, which had taken place during the Indian elections, had also had an adverse effect upon the friendly spirit engendered by the Prime Minister’s visit. The Ambassador said that he did not wish to go into the merits of the Kashmir case. General public feeling in India, at least among the educated classes, had become rather embittered against the West as the result of the Security Council action on Kashmir. Indians felt as the result of this action that only the USSR was with India; other countries were against her. This feeling had been intensified by the statements of the Pakistan Prime Minister to the effect that Pakistan’s friends had “paid off” for Pakistan’s alignment with the West through standing with Pakistan on the Kashmir problem. Indian public opinion felt that the position which the Western countries had taken on the problem had not been based on the merits of the case.

The Ambassador added that he had also found during his stay in India that the Indian people were greatly concerned over the increase in Pakistan’s military potential. He himself had seen the reply of an ex-governor of an Indian state to a letter claiming that there were atomic bases in Pakistan. The Ambassador said that he told the ex-governor that he should take no notice of the claim. There was a real fear among the Indian people that Pakistan might take “hasty action”, or let the tribesmen do it as had been the case in 1947 in Kashmir. The Pakistanis had later admitted that their troops had entered Kashmir. There was some apprehension in India that the Pakistanis might again create such a situation. The Prime Minister himself was concerned, particularly in view of the wild claims made in Pakistan about declaring a “holy war” against India.

When he was queried in India on this question, the Ambassador said that he had pointed to the Secretary’s statement during the latter’s visit to New Delhi that in case of aggression by Pakistan the United States would not support that country. The Ambassador feared, however, that it might be difficult to determine exactly who the aggressor was in any future trouble; that there might develop a confused situation. It would be much better to prevent any aggression at all, rather than attempting to determine who was the aggressor after trouble began.

Reverting to the Prime Minister’s visit to the United States, the Ambassador reiterated that the effects of the visit had been good in India. In the electoral campaign the Prime Minister on several occasions paid tribute to President Eisenhower as a “man of peace”.

The Secretary said that when an issue divided two countries as sharply and bitterly as the Kashmir issue had divided India and Pakistan, it made it difficult for other countries. It was the general impression in the US, he thought, that India was in the wrong in the Kashmir dispute. This feeling was not related to the fact that Pakistan was allied with the US in SEATO. Most people did not connect Pakistan’s membership in SEATO with the Kashmir problem. It was probably over-simplification, but the popular feeling here was that the UN had proposed that a plebiscite be held to determine the future of Kashmir, and that India refused to proceed with the plebiscite. The Secretary wondered if the report soon to be submitted by Mr. Jarring would be a helpful factor in the situation.² He did not know whether it would be.

So far as the Secretary knew, there was no basis for the talk about giving atomic training to the Pakistanis but that if the Ambassador wished, he would look into it. There was certainly no question of our supplying Pakistan with atomic weapons. It would be illegal to do so. We are not able to do so for the British and French in NATO.

The Ambassador remarked that it was very easy for reports about nuclear weapons to become exaggerated. When the question of supplying nuclear weapons to the Western European allies of the United States was discussed in the press, reports inevitably appeared that Pakistan would also obtain such weapons. Incidentally, the writer of the letter to the ex-governor of the Indian state, to which he had referred earlier, was a Communist.

Reverting to the Kashmir issue, the Ambassador said that he understood that Prime Minister Nehru had discussed with the President the inadvisability of upsetting a settled situation. To agitate the Kashmir issue would have a bad effect upon the communal situation in India. The idea of establishing national states on the basis of religion was absurd. There were 42 million Muslims in India. It was the third largest Muslim state in the world. There was no doubt that Prime Minister Nehru was sincere in his desire to build up a secular state in India. Gandhi had died for this principle.

There was another aspect of the Kashmir question to be considered. If the situation should be upset, disturbed conditions might result. If this should be the case it was well known that the Chinese and Russians liked to fish in troubled waters.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/4–2557. Confidential. Drafted by Jones.
2. Jarring submitted his report to the Security Council on April 29. (U.N. doc. S/3821) On May 2, Jones sent an evaluation of the report to Rountree and Berry. This assessment, drafted by Collins, concluded that the Jarring report represented yet another failure of the United Nations to effect a settlement of the longstanding Kashmir dispute. (Department of State, SOA Files: Lot 60 D 545, Kashmir 1957)