54. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State1
2726. Re Deptel 2560.2 Embassy believes approach to GOI re Kashmir at this time … would probably harden rather than soften GOI position for following reasons:
- (1)
- … Nehru would probably believe … Western countries “ganging up” against him, particularly if no similar approach made to Pakistan.
- (2)
- … Embassy believes approach by Canada or by Colombo powers might be more productive, although Embassy understands Canada reluctant jeopardize its present high standing with Nehru by intruding itself into Kashmir tangle.
- (3)
- With present Indo-Pakistan tension so high almost impossible for either country make any “constructive and realistic proposal looking toward solution” for fear of losing face with its own people and because any proposal by one country would presumably be automatically reviewed with deep suspicion by the other.
In this respect, it would appear to be better have constructive proposal submitted by impartial third party at same time to both protagonists, which is presumably purpose of Jarring mission.
Embassy feels maximum breathing space desirable allow tempers subside. At present time perhaps best approach might be for Canada plus US and UK separately suggest both India and Pakistan that ultimate solution under peaceful conditions dependent upon development less emotional attitudes and therefore, if Jarring so asks, both governments should be willing extend period within which he [Page 130] is required report to SC. SC would presumably assent. In meanwhile situation would be helped if both sides refrained from intemperate statements. If return to relative calm is brought about by such passage of time, it is possible realization by GOI that it has not convinced world of Tightness its position and that its prestige is consequently suffering may induce somewhat more conciliatory attitude toward some solution other than by plebiscite.
I should like to state my personal conviction, after my first 6 weeks in India, that no solution based upon a UN plebiscite can be considered either constructive or realistic. Nehru and the GOI are deeply and sincerely convinced that such a plebiscite under present conditions would not only not be a peaceful solution, but would also prejudice the stability and vital interests of their nation. Their feeling that plebiscite would lead to violent communal strife which would gravely affect large Muslim population in India and shake the foundations of the secular state they are attempting to build is deeply and, I believe sincerely, held. It is a risk which GOI unwilling to take. It is an awkward position for them to explain, of course, and they have instead attempted to rely upon legalistic and moral arguments, on whose latter grounds Pakistan’s case can be presented in a much simpler and more persuasive fashion. I am not yet prepared to say whether Nehru and his government’s conviction that the maintenance of at least the status quo in Kashmir is of vital national interest is sound or not, but I do believe it is what Nehru and his colleagues deeply feel and that this fact constitutes a reality which foreign governments have to face.
Although the origins are obviously different I am impressed with certain similarities between Kashmir situation and that existing formerly in Trieste. There it was necessary to allow tempers to cool off, to wait until Italian elections had taken place so that there would be in existence a government able to agree to a settlement (similar situation might apply in Pakistan) and then to undertake behind-the-scenes private and confidential negotiations. In Trieste neither side renounced its claims but I believe settlement is now accepted as final and fair. Perhaps something similar may be indicated here with possible approach to overall settlements of Indo-Pakistan problems.