Office of the Historian

56. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India1

Washington, May 6, 1957—7:14 p.m.

2906. Embtels 2753 April 6,2 2910 and 2911 April 26.3 Fully appreciate difficult situation arising from continued GOI complaints [Page 134] on US military aid to Pakistan. Such protests and public criticism will probably increase in future with each reported delivery of US equipment to Pakistan and whenever GOI believes these may strengthen its position Kashmir dispute or other international problems.

Basic issue involves fundamental divergence US and GOI views on collective security against Soviet aggression on which no rapprochement to be expected at this time. US action to diminish scope of military aid Pakistan because of Indian pressures unrealistic because of repercussions our entire collective security structure.

We should continue attempts impress on Indians our firm belief that military aid to Pakistan essential to increase its ability resist Communist aggression and also as effective contribution to Free World collective defense efforts. Such efforts clearly benefit India despite its inability or refusal recognize Communist threat to world peace. You may wish in future conversations with GOI officials pursue following arguments:

1)
US assurances on defensive purpose military aid Pakistan and US support India in event Pakistan aggression repeatedly given Nehru, other officials and publicly since February 1954 when President sent Nehru letter explaining program and offering extend to India.4 President also discussed with Nehru December 1956 and further assurances given by Secretary, your predecessors and yourself. Fact that highest level USG assurances already given should be impressed on GOI officials. We fail understand why they appear disregard such assurances which publicly acknowledged by Nehru.
2)
While unable release figures we can state that estimates added Pakistan military strength resulting from US aid contained April 16 memorandum given you by Krishna Menon are greatly exaggerated.
3)
US has demonstrated willingness help India acquire modern military material by approving sale of over $34,000,000 worth of equipment since July 1951, of which $29,000,000 already shipped. Additional pending requests over $14,000,000. US will continue give sympathetic consideration to all reasonable future requests,

Herter
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/4–2657. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Robert W. Adams, Officer in Charge of India, Ceylon, and Nepal Affairs, SOA; cleared with Stevens of NEA, William H. Dodderidge of U/MSA, and Admiral Bergin of the Department of Defense; and approved by Berry.↩
  2. In telegram 2753, Ambassador Bunker reported that, in a recent conversation with Indian Foreign Secretary Subimal Dutt and Commonwealth Secretary Manilal Jagdish Desai, they informed him that the Indian Government was gravely concerned over the effect on India of the U.S. provision of arms to Pakistan. They emphasized that since India could not afford to gamble with its very existence it had been attempting to counter Pakistan’s arms buildup by stepping up its own purchases of arms from abroad, using the United Kingdom and France as its chief suppliers. Should Pakistani armament keep increasing, the Indian officials pointed out, India might have to purchase equivalent arms from “other sources.” (Ibid., 690D.91/4–557)↩
  3. Both dated April 26, neither printed. (Ibid., 690D.91/4–2657)↩
  4. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. XI, Part 2, p. 1735.↩