Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, South Asia, Volume VIII

40. Telegram From the United States Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, January 10, 1957—5 p.m.

Delga 467. Re Kashmir.

I. Khan Noon visit. Khan Noon (Pakistan) called on me yesterday afternoon to discuss Pakistani case on Kashmir. He reviewed Pakistani position on historical origins of situation, laying entire blame on India and UK, especially Mountbatten. The most important substantive points he made are reported below:

Suhrawardy and himself had fully committed themselves to Free World and would stand or fall on basis this firm Pakistani alignment. Khan Noon said he would resign if US did not give Pakistan firm support on Kashmir issue. He said he had not told this to anyone else. He pointed out that UN had had responsibility for seeking some solution for Kashmir problem for 9 years and that Pakistan had been put off during this entire period of time without any definitive action. There could be no peace between India and Pakistan, and hence none in southern Asia until Kashmir situation settled. Pakistani population was very much excited over problem and this was last chance for positive action by SC. Nominal action would not suffice. He could not predict what might happen with Pakistani population if UN again failed them. He said reaction would not necessarily be against US because Pakistanis would continue to be grateful for US aid and support, but it might mean a move toward a non-alignment and better relations with Communist China and the USSR and also to sentiment for the use of force in connection with Kashmir.

There was considerable leftist sentiment in Pakistan against firm policy of Pakistani leaders in alignment with West. There were many who thought that those who were uncommitted were likely to be better treated than those who were committed. Failure of UN to take positive action, which possible only with vigorous US leadership, would undoubtedly result in strengthening leftist tendencies in Pakistan.

On resolution Khan Noon said Pakistan wanted two actions—an order from SC to India not to implement new constitutional provisions for Kashmir, and the establishment of a UN force to take over responsibilities for military security in Kashmir replacing Pakistani and Indian forces. Mir Khan added that they also wanted plebiscite administrator inducted into office. Khan Noon said this would flow from previous points. Khan Noon felt that troops would be available for UN force from ME states such as Iran, Iraq, and Jordan, and that forces from such states should be acceptable politically to India as well as to Pakistan. If India unwilling to allow UN forces into its part of occupied Kashmir, Pakistanis would still be prepared to admit forces on their side of line as replacement for Pakistani troops. We suggested that before going on with idea they check with other UN members on their willingness to provide troops for such forces. Khan Noon thought it would only take three or four thousand troops. He said he had talked to Eden and Lloyd while in London, and they were interested in his proposals on UN forces.

Khan Noon displayed touchy and bellicose attitude throughout conversation. He referred to possibility of Kashmir settlement by force, to superiority of Moslems over Hindus as fighting people, and to Hindu haste in making compromises and concessions when they felt pressure was sufficiently determined. He said that if UN were determined on sending police force to Kashmir, as it had been to Near East, Indians would fold up quickly. If Indians would not accept UN forces, he said, give us a few hundred UN troops and together we will push Indians out. These comments reported as reflection of belligerency of his attitude rather than an indication of intent, as he stressed Pakistan did not have power not [sic] to fight India and had no territorial or aggressive ambitions.

He was also clearly laying major responsibility on UN and specifically US to support them because of their political and military alignment with US.

Khan Noon also mentioned visit Chou En-Lai to Pakistan several times in the course of the conversation.² He said Suhrawardy and he had emphasized to Chou En-Lai that Pakistan had made its choice to stand with West but that they hoped Communist China would move toward more friendly relations with them and US. He said they had raised question of ten US prisoners with Chou En-Lai who had given angry reaction that he was always expected to make first move. Chou En-Lai had been very much interested when told of extent US economic aid to Pakistan and had asked for and been given Pakistani white paper on this point. He also said he had discussed Kashmir with Chou En-Lai and seemed to think that Chou En-Lai intended to discuss it with Nehru in terms of having Nehru taking more conciliatory attitude.

II. Previous indications Pakistani attitude.

Mir Khan (Pakistan) before arrival Khan Noon told Barco³ Pakistan would express willingness in SC to have UN force take over responsibility of policing only Pakistani held areas, even if Indians unwilling to agree UN force on its side of line. He thought this would be difficult position Indians to meet. He did not seem to expect SC to take any action along this line and was still thinking in terms visit by SYG to areas to implement plebiscite.

III. Indian attitudes.

Lall (India) has spoken to Barco at some length about Indian attitude on Kashmir case in SC and indicated Indian desire for further consultations. Main points made by Lall were:

1. With improvement US-Indian relations as result Nehru visit he hoped US might be useful mediator on Kashmir dispute.

2. Settlement Kashmir question might be found by (a) acceptance present cease-fire lines as boundaries with border adjustments to meet special problems, and (b) reasonable agreement on water resource utilization between India and Pakistan. Lall laid considerable stress on latter point. Lall noted India had agreed to IBRD proposals for water agreement,⁴ and he thought personally that India might even be willing to give Pakistan somewhat more favorable commitments on water than IBRD suggestions as part general settlement. Lall characterized river problem as more one of India–Pakistan relations than of Kashmir and went into some detail to show India could not adversely affect Pakistan water rights because of its control of Kashmir even if it wanted to.

3. On plebiscite Lall maintained only way Pakistan could win would be on religious issue and this would fan religious tensions among Moslems in India and could produce another round communal riots. He also said important security considerations arose about Ladakh which had indicated it would never agree to go to Pakistan as result general plebiscite and would secede to Tibet and to Communist China. This might result in other Buddhist areas in northern India wanting to secede, and would move Communist China strategically into South Asia. Lall said test of real feelings of Kashmiri people would come with election of assembly in summer, which would be democratic and which could be freely observed. He said people would have electoral choice which would include pro-Pakistani parties.

4. He hoped SC resolution might be limited to calling for negotiations between parties concerned. When Barco observed it had been difficult in such cases as Palestine to avoid reiteration previous resolutions and inquired about Indian attitude on that, Lall said he thought it would be better not to do this but did not react strongly. Lall also indicated that India would probably want few days for preparation after presentation Pakistani case. Rajan⁵ subsequently indicated same thing to Pedersen,⁶ suggesting Menon would make short reply on 16th and ask for adjournment until 21st or 22nd, with probability second round between Pakistan and India before SC members speak and total consideration over two or three weeks. (Indians may hope push decision past January 26th date.)

IV. Romulo (Philippines) has asked that we keep him informed of our plans. We said we would. Menon has already been talking to him, but we have been given no indication about what he said.

Lodge

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/1–1057. Secret.
2. Chou En-Lai visited Pakistan December 20–22.
3. James W. Barco, Counselor, U.S. Delegation at the United Nations.
4. Reference is to proposals made by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development for solving the Indus River canal waters dispute between India and Pakistan. Extensive documentation on this subject is in Department of State, Central File 690D.91322.
5. Balachandra Rajan, Indian Alternate Representative on the U.N. Peace Observation Commission.
6. Richard A. Pedersen, Adviser on Political and Security Affairs, USUN.