Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, South Asia, Volume VIII

41. Telegram From the United States Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, January 11, 1957—10 p.m.

536. Re Kashmir. Menon (India) called on me yesterday to discuss several questions, including Kashmir. Other subjects reported in separate telegrams.

Menon thought best action for SC to take on Kashmir would be no action. He hoped there would be only general round of discussions presenting views on various sides and that no member SC would present resolution. He said India could not accept any resolution SC might adopt and thought that less question was stirred up the better. He said Kashmir was not coming before SC as result anything India had done but probably stemmed from necessity weak Pakistani Govt to seek external emotional issue to bolster its position. Menon said India had thought of introducing second item into SC focusing on Pakistan aggression but had decided this would be too tendentious. He would of course make aggression case in his speech.

Menon said India was not prepared to give up any of its legal position on Kashmir. Entire state had acceded formally to India in proper form provided for at time partition by agreement between UK, India and Pakistan. Indian constitution, like US, had no provision for secession and there was no possibility India allowing this to happen.

If Kashmir were allowed to secede this might disrupt unity of Indian state inasmuch as over 500 other states and principalities had acceded to India in same fashion as Kashmir. India’s legal position pertained to entire state and meant that Pakistan should withdraw from areas they illegally control as result aggression. However, India had no military intentions re areas they did not control. On other hand, if Pakistanis by some miscalculation attacked Indian-held areas of Kashmir, India would have to defend itself and would then feel released from its undertaking not to attempt to take Pakistan-held areas by force. Lall (India) added that in such circumstances India might have to go through Punjab as this was natural military approach to Kashmir. Menon said best indication of lack Indian military intentions was fact it had done nothing about East Bengal and Goa. He said East Bengal would fall to India if India blew hard and Goa could be taken by six policemen.

Menon said Indian position was based on two fundamental points—its legal position on Kashmir accession and problem military security. He said he obviously could not make public argument on various security aspects related to Kashmir. India was concerned about stability of Pakistan Govt. There was much leftist tendency in Pakistan and Moslems were very susceptible to Communist doctrines. Pakistan had conservative leftist govt now, but it was questionable how long it would last. Next year govt might be leftist and following year Communist. This would cause great concern in India and India had to take special precautions for its security. He reiterated arguments on possibility of Ladakh going to Tibet (see Delga 467)² and similar argument about Baluchistan. He said Moslems in Baluchistan were more similar to Moslems of USSR than those of Pakistan and said that British had never been able to govern northwest provinces adequately and neither would Pakistanis.

On plebiscite Menon said that if India were ever foolish enough to agree it would produce communal riots in India and upset Indian efforts to be secular state. He also stressed great economic progress made in Kashmir, number of visitors there every year, and extent to which it has been economically integrated into India.

He also referred to fact that military aid to Pakistan had changed balance between India and Pakistan which had been at 5–2 ratio at partition. This altered security position had to be taken into consideration by India. He said he did not mean US had intended to arm Pakistan against India, but that Pakistan had accepted US military aid in order strengthen itself against India. He said Indian position would be clear on this in debate. He mentioned fact that center Pakistan power was closer to Kashmir than was that of India and that buildup Pakistan Air Force with American help augmented Pakistan’s strategic position. He also referred to airport in Gilgit which he or Lall said was used by American planes on way to Asia.

Menon also said India was not anxious to rely on Soviet veto in SC for protection. With internal elections coming in India shortly, Communist Party would utilize such veto as electioneering weapon to persuade voters of strength Soviet support of India. Congress Party would not like to see this happen. Neither were they anxious to have such result in view their international position. However, it would be difficult for them to reject support on issue on which they thought they were right.

We made no attempt to delineate fully US policy as expressed Deptel 492.³ We referred to question existing resolutions. Pointing out that on Palestine, UN had always found it necessary to reiterate previous resolutions. We asked if Menon had given any thought to procedure which might open up new approaches on Kashmir such as another UNRep to visit area. Menon said he worked under strict instructions on this question and would report this possibility to Delhi. We pointed out last position of UN was that parties should negotiate bilaterally. With respect to someone coming to area, he commented India had never accepted resolution on UN Commission but, as loyal UN member, it had not refused to talk to Commission members when they asked to come to India. If UN now asked some American, for example, to go to subcontinent, India might say they would be glad receive him in some other capacity. I said I thought it unlikely they would see another American coming out on this question. Menon said they could hardly accept someone like a Latin American. As there was no telling what an LA might come up with. I said we were not really thinking about Latin Americans. (Today Lall inquired whether we could advise UNRep as to kind of report he might make. We replied we certainly could not. But if India felt its case was as good as they said, they would undoubtedly have no fear of reports he might make.)

Menon ended conversation with remark he understood general consensus Nehru–Eisenhower conversation was that Kashmir question should not be stirred up and he therefore hoped idea of no resolution in SC might be amenable to US. Lall made same point again today.

Would appreciate any available information on discussion President and Nehru may have had on this question.⁴

Lodge

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/1–1157. Secret.
2. Supra.
3. In telegram 492, January 7, the Department of State outlined its strategy for the upcoming Security Council meeting on Kashmir. The United States, the United Kingdom, and other interested nations would sponsor a draft resolution which would: (1) recall previous Security Council and UNCIP resolutions; (2) note the position of the parties and Graham’s reports; (3) reaffirm the plebiscite principle; (4) decide, in view of the lapse of time since the previous Kashmir debate in the Security Council and the continued conflicting views of the two parties, to request the Representative of Sweden and President of the Security Council, Gunnar V. Jarring, to submit a report to the Council as soon as possible regarding steps which the Council might usefully take in resolving the dispute, bearing in mind previous resolutions and the positions set forth by the parties; (5) authorize him to visit the subcontinent to undertake such discussions and surveys as he might believe useful in the preparation of such a report; and (6) request Graham and the Secretary-General to render such assistance as Jarring might request. This proposed course, the Department believed, was the most constructive action the Security Council could take while minimizing the chance of a Soviet veto. The Department was prepared to make clear either through a consensus procedure or, if feasible, by resolution that the projected Indian incorporation of Kashmir on January 26, in the absence of the Council’s concurrence or agreement between Pakistan and India, was inconsistent with the Security Council resolution of March 30, 1951. (Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/12–3156)
4. In telegram 1938 from New Delhi, January 12, Bartlett reported that in a recent conversation Pillai had informed him again that he was apprehensive regarding the effect which Security Council action on Kashmir might have on U.S.-Indian relations. Bartlett called the Department’s attention to the Embassy’s analysis of the Kashmir question contained in Document 32. “In addition,” the Chargé pointed out, “we must bear in mind that Nehru’s frame of mind over development and positions re Kashmir case will inevitably condition his reaction (so far held in abeyance) to US proposal for Middle East” i.e., the economic and military aid program requested in the President’s Special Message to Congress on January 5, 1957, known as the American Doctrine for the Middle East, or Eisenhower Doctrine. Bartlett explained that the Embassy was not sympathetic to the proposed incorporation of Kashmir into India, but noted that in the context of present world conditions, especially in west Asia, “US must obviously very carefully weigh pros and cons of alienating Nehru and GOI, wherefore our interest in face-saving and tension-easing package deal.” (Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/1–1257)