Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, South Asia, Volume VIII

39. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State¹

Karachi, January 2, 1957—8 p.m.

1818. Summoned January 2 to 50-minute meeting with Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and Prime Minister’s political secretary Aftab Ahmed, who will accompany Noon to UN on Kashmir issue. It was devoted almost entirely to Kashmir issue with considerable discussion and even disagreement among Pakistani participants in reviewing past and outlining future.

Heart of matter can be summarized as follows:

1. GOP will ask SC to take over Kashmir dispute replacing Pakistani and Indian troops with UN troops and request UN to settle issue by already agreed plebiscite.

2. If UN will not go that far, which they clearly suspect it will not, then wish UN to proceed with implementing the plebiscite previously approved by UN. GOP is distressed to learn (Comment: Certainly from sources other than Embassy) that US is thinking of supporting mere fact-finding mission. GOP and people of Pakistan would be outraged by such a proposal and would consider US support of such proposal as an outright betrayal of GOP. Clearly implied that whether justified or not any such retrogression in US support of plebiscite would be viewed by GOP and public as result of Nehru’s visit. Anything less than staunch reaffirmation of support of plebiscite would be shattering to Pakistani-US relations. If support of plebiscite reaffirmed and made clear that any group coming to Kashmir was to recommend steps for implementing plebiscite this would be acceptable though Pakistani preference set forth in (1) above. If US support not consistent with this paragraph, Prime Minister “would not dare show his face”. Prime Minister said public would say “you have put all your faith in USG and now they are going back on their support.” I felt Prime Minister implied this would affect whole foreign policy of GOP.

Prime Minister and Foreign Minister asked me to transmit above to Department and obviously would welcome assurances that US position remains as set forth SEATO Council March 1956.

Embassy comment: Embassy believes Prime Minister has set forth with considerable accuracy GOP and public reaction to be expected from a fact-finding mission, without instructions to recommend action to settle matter, which would be construed as a stall. Suhrawardy has gone very far in his pro-west policies and has most recently taken US line in his dealings with Chou En-Lai. Suhrawardy not exaggerating GOP prospective difficulties, which government will probably magnify if disappointed in UN action. US attitude on Kashmir will be a test of US support of the “committed nations”, just as UN effectiveness Kashmir will be an acid test of UN in eyes of entire world.

Hildreth

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/1–257. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London, New Delhi, Dacca, and Lahore; passed to USUN.