Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, American Republics: Multilateral; Mexico; Caribbean, Volume VI

34. Memorandum From Robert Sayre of the Office of Regional American Affairs to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Lyon)¹

Washington, April 18, 1956.

SUBJECT

• United States Military Relations with Latin America

In Mr. Holland’s memorandum to you of April 13² he questions whether we in ARA have our objectives in the military field clearly in mind or whether we have not, in a proposed letter to Mr. Gray, discussed the programs in support of our objectives before defining our objectives.

Our proposed letter to Defense was based on the assumption, possibly mistaken, that our objectives in the military field are those indicated in NSC 5432/1 and that what is required is a clear statement of what is needed to attain these objectives and how we propose to go about it. I would agree that they are not too clearly stated in NSC 5432/1, and maybe in the process of reviewing NSC 5432/1, as the OCB recommended to the NSC in its latest progress report, we could get a clearer, statement. Based on NSC 5432/1, our military objectives are:

1. To have each Latin American Government maintain a military establishment (Army, Navy and Air Force) adequate to maintain internal security and to protect sea lines of communication running through its territorial waters. (paragraph 13 a)

a. It is our policy, in support of this objective, to provide military equipment on a reimbursable basis and, where necessary, to offer credit terms. (paragraph 20 e)

b. As a matter of policy, we have been unwilling to furnish grant military assistance in support of this objective. The Latin American governments, and particularly Colombia, have been insistent that we do so. Under the 1290d program, we are considering providing military assistance on a grant basis to countries which are financially incapable of maintaining the minimum forces required for internal security. Bolivia is the only country in Latin America presently considered in that category.

c. We have been unable to achieve this objective, or even to know how close we are coming to it, because:

(1) We do not know what forces the Latin American Governments require for internal security.

(2) We do not make equipment available on reasonable terms and in a prompt manner.

(3) We have no way of financing credit except on an ad hoc and haphazard basis.

2. To have the Latin American Governments that are capable, furnish sufficient military units, in addition to those they need for internal security, for hemispheric defense to relieve the United States of the necessity of using its own forces. (paragraph 13 b)

a. The United States stationed over 130,000 of its military personnel in Latin America during World War II to guard convoys, hunt submarines and protect strategic installations. It is our policy to equip and train Latin American units to assume this responsibility.

b. The Department of Defense considers, with certain exceptions, that the minimum forces required to achieve this objective are being supported under the grant military assistance program.

(1) This program was developed over four years ago and it should be reviewed to determine whether we are making progress toward our objective. Defense is making such a review.

(2) Defense desires to have Argentina and Mexico included in the program. Defense also desires to insure that Venezuela is taking adequate action to protect important strategic installations in that country and that was the purpose of staff talks with that country. Assistance to Venezuela would not, however, be on a grant basis.

(3) Defense did not at the time, and as far as can be determined informally, still does not consider that there is any military requirement for programs in Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and most of the program in Ecuador. It will be recalled that the first three programs were started at our initiative and that Army and Navy programs were added in Ecuador, also as a result of our initiative.

c. In your conversation with Mr. McGuire, he indicated that Defense might be willing to consider whether it would be desirable to have any additional hemispheric defense units that would be financed on a credit and not a grant basis.

3. To get the Latin American Governments to contribute forces to allied defense efforts outside the hemisphere. (paragraph 13 c)

Our experience in attempting to get forces for the United Nations effort in Korea, and with the Colombian contribution, indicate that this objective can not be achieved unless we are prepared to provide grant assistance for Latin American units. We should recognize that fact. We have this objective as a corollary to our general objective of supporting the United Nations. Our experience with the Korean effort indicates that domestic political considerations dictate that we make every effort to get Latin American participation in collective actions by the United Nations. Such participation is also desirable if, in fact, the collective effort is to be truly a United Nations effort.

4. To keep foreign military influence out of Latin America, Western as well as Eastern European. (paragraph 20 e)

a. We have this as an objective because we desire to keep Latin America oriented toward the United States and, in many cases, this comes down to keeping the Latin American military oriented toward the United States.

(1) The following governments in Latin America are now run by military officers, who in most cases came in as the result of a military coup, and remain in office because they have the support of the military:

Argentina, Colombia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela (11).

(2) The following governments are in office because the military is willing to let them stay in office:

Brazil, Ecuador, Honduras and Panama (4).

(3) The following governments may not depend on the military for their tenure in office:

Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico and Uruguay (5).

Admittedly the foregoing tabulation may be an over-simplification but it indicates that to a great extent, our ability to achieve our political and economic objectives, as well as our military objectives, depends in no small part on how the military feel about it. How the military feel about the United States and its economic and political policies depends to no small extent on how cooperative we have been in getting them military hardware. Indeed, it may be more proper to state that this should be one of our primary political objectives instead of just a military objective.

b. In pursuance of this fourth objective, we carry out the following programs:

(1) Sale of military equipment for cash and credit. (paragraph 20 e)

If the Latin Americans buy their military equipment in Europe, they will also obtain their technical advice there, and we will have little opportunity to influence them and to keep them oriented toward the United States.

(2) Providing Army, Navy and Air Force missions to the exclusion of all foreign missions. (paragraph 20 a and b)

It will be recalled that German and Italian missions had a great deal to do with the unenthusiastic support some Latin American Governments gave us during World War II. The German mission to Argentina may have been responsible for Argentina staying out of the war until it was over.

(3) Providing training in the United States Military, Air Force and Naval Academies, and at United States service schools in the Canal Zone and continental United States. (paragraph 20 c and d)

5. To obtain necessary base and other military rights in Latin America. (paragraph 16)

a. We are seeking certain Army and Air Force base rights in Brazil essential to the security of the United States. We may have to give Brazil grant assistance to get them and such assistance may be unrelated to any objective but this one.

b. We seek multilateral support through the Inter-American Defense Board for the military rights we desire to obtain on a bilateral basis, e.g., the IADB has given the United States primary responsibility for organizing the defense of the Atlantic, Pacific and Caribbean. (paragraph 15)

c. We seek to secure and maintain the cooperation of all the Latin American Governments in the geodetic and mapping program of the United States Army which program is designed to secure adequate data for the production of aerial and other military maps.

6. To obtain strategic materials necessary for the United States defense effort. (paragraph 18)

The grant military assistance program, under objective 2 above, is directly related to this objective, e.g., the entire Navy program is based upon the need to develop the anti-submarine warfare capability of Latin American navies.

I have not heard any responsible comment by Department of Defense officials which would disagree with the above objectives. The divergence of opinion on what is required to achieve these objectives, or how we should go about, is however, so great that it sometimes raises questions as to whether there is really any intent to pursue the objectives we have set up for ourselves. Several things contribute to this situation, not the least of which is that Defense officials, including the JCS, are so preoccupied with putting out fires in other areas in the world that are in more immediate danger that they apparently cannot take the time necessary to tidy up the military situation in Latin America. Also, as you are aware, we have been unable to get agreement within the Department on what we should do on such important questions as credit for the sale of military equipment in order to present a united and strong recommendation to Defense. Finally, our military programs in Latin America are not strictly military in the sense that NATO is military. This is probably so because the military in Latin America plays quite a different role in national affairs from what it does in the United States and Western European countries. Defense views our military assistance, for example, as part of the price we have to pay for Latin American support in the United Nations. Probably the best current example of the politico-military nature of military assistance is Brazil’s request for a carrier. As Admiral Wilkins pointed out in his discussion with you the other day, providing a carrier to Brazil has some military justification but, considering military requirements in Latin America as opposed to military requirements elsewhere, the Navy could not on a strictly military basis provide one. Taking into consideration the facts that the Army and Air Force need facilities in Brazil, and that Brazil has seized upon this requirement to demand a carrier for its own internal political reasons, we shall probably decide to loan Brazil a carrier.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 720.5/4–1856. Secret. A handwritten notation on the source text indicates that Lyon sent it to Holland for his information.
2. Document 32.