Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, American Republics: Multilateral; Mexico; Caribbean, Volume VI

35. Letter From the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Murphy) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Gray)¹

Washington, May 8, 1956.

Dear Gordon: We are concerned over the apparent deterioration of the preponderant military influence of the United States in Latin America and the effect of this deterioration on our general relations with the countries of the area. To find solutions to the outstanding problems in our military relations with Latin America is, we believe, of the utmost importance. The significance of these problems is increased by the recent Soviet bloc offers of military equipment to several of the countries in Latin America.

In its progress report on Latin America, approved March 28, 1956, the Operations Coordination Board cites the failure to make acceptable progress on standardization of military equipment (Paragraph 20 e, NSC 5432/1).² The OCB notes the adverse effect that this failure has on the fostering of closer United States-Latin American military relations (Paragraph 20 d), and may have on other policy objectives, such as the maintenance of United States military missions in Latin America (Paragraph 20 b). The OCB also suggests a reconsideration of the policy objectives that calls for Latin American contributions to collective defense efforts outside the Western Hemisphere (Paragraph 13 c). The foregoing problems, in the opinion of the OCB, require the attention of the National Security Council. The OCB, as you know, previously called attention to these problems, but in less specific terms, in its report for the period December 1, 1954–July 14, 1955.³

In a letter of February 14, 1956 to Mr. Dodge,⁴ Secretary Humphrey raised the problem of the possible adverse effect of Latin American military expenditures on the area’s economic development, and the Secretary asked Mr. Dodge to review this problem. On April 16, 1956, I sent you a copy of a memorandum⁵ which also went to Mr. Overby, Treasury Department, and to Mr. Dodge, offering our views on the relationship between military and economic development. In that memorandum we have made some suggestions for changes in the operation of the reimbursable assistance program. We would welcome your views on those suggestions.

Military Objectives

We have considered our military objectives to be:

1. Having each Latin American Government maintain forces adequate for internal security and protection of sea lines of communication through its coastal waters.

2. Safeguarding of the hemisphere, including sea and air approaches, by individual and collective defense measures against external aggression, through the development of indigenous military forces and local bases necessary for hemispheric defense.

3. Support by Latin America, by contribution of forces beyond the requirements of hemispheric security, of collective action in defense of other areas of the free world.

4. Keeping the Latin American military oriented toward the United States and excluding any foreign military influence, other than United States military influence, from Latin America.

5. Securing any base or other military rights that the United States might require in Latin America.

6. Adequate production in Latin America of, and access by the United States to, raw materials essential to United States security.

7. An orderly development of the Latin American military establishment with a greater loyalty to constitutional processes and duly constituted authority.

Although the policy paper lists standardization as a military objective, it has occurred to us that standardization might more properly be considered the overall program we are carrying out with a view to achieving the foregoing objectives. The standardization program includes:

1. Sale of military equipment for cash or credit.

2. Granting of equipment for hemispheric defense units.

3. Assignment of Army, Navy and Air Force Missions.

4. Participation of the United States in the Inter-American Defense Board and in joint military commissions with Brazil and Mexico.

5. Training of Latin American military personnel at the academies of the three services and in service schools in the Canal Zone and the United States.

6. Invitations to top military officials of Latin American countries to visit the United States and the visits of United States military leaders, and military and naval units, to Latin America.

7. Cooperation with Latin American Governments in a hemispheric mapping program through the Inter-American Geodetic Survey.

According to the latest progress report of the OCB, we are experiencing our greatest difficulty in carrying out the reimbursable and grant military assistance programs and this in turn is largely responsible for the failure to make adequate progress toward our objectives.

Reimbursable Assistance

Reimbursable assistance is, in the long run, perhaps the most important single aspect of our military relations with Latin America. We believe that the criteria for cash and credit sales to Latin America should be hemisphere defense and internal security. But to have a rational program founded on these criteria it would be necessary first to have an estimate by the Department of Defense of the forces each Latin American country needs and is militarily capable of maintaining for internal security and for its contribution, if any, to hemisphere defense other than the contribution already agreed to under the MDAP Program. On this basis, we believe, our cash and credit sales to Latin America would be more orderly and meaningful. Our two Departments would be in a position to encourage the Latin Americans to limit their military expenditures to recognized military requirements, and we would have a sound basis upon which to discourage unnecessary military outlays which waste financial resources that could better be devoted to economic development. We might then be able to discourage purchases in Europe by some assurances to the Latin Americans that we would assist them in fulfilling their requirements.⁶

I would appreciate knowing whether the Department of Defense would prepare the above estimate of force requirements. In his conversation with you on December 12, 1955,⁷ Mr. Holland made this proposal, and it was repeated by Mr. Lyon in a conversation that he had with Mr. McGuire on January 30.⁸

If we know what, if any, hemisphere defense units would be desirable for the Latin American Governments to maintain in addition to those being developed under the grant program, reimbursable assistance could become an extension of the principle of our grant aid.

The work that the Department of Defense is doing on an internal security program in Venezuela, as a result of the recent United States-Venezuelan staff talks is, in our opinion, an excellent example that could be applied to other countries for developing an appraisal of the internal security requirements of individual countries. I am not suggesting, however, that staff talks would necessarily be desirable or feasible with other Latin American countries or that other countries would require as much reimbursable assistance as may be necessary for Venezuela.

The extension of credit by the United States is, of course, an important feature of reimbursable assistance. I understand that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended a source of credit funds separate from MDAP funds or the regular appropriations of the three armed services. A separate fund was not, however, included in appropriation requests for fiscal year 1957, and until such a separate fund might be sought, we urge that credit sales be financed either by the three armed services or from MDAP funds. For a systematic and purposeful reimbursable assistance program, we believe that an assured source of a modest amount of funds for credit operations is indispensable. The Venezuelan request for credit purchases amounting to $180 million over the next ten years makes even more urgent the need for our developing a workable credit program.

Mr. Holland left with you on December 12 a draft memorandum, suggesting principles and procedures for credit operations, and that paper might serve as a basis for further consideration by our two Departments, including the International Cooperation Administration.

Grant Assistance

I understand that your Department now has under review the grant military assistance program to determine (a) which of the existing military assistance programs we should continue to support and (b) what, if any, added programs under existing agreements are desirable. It is assumed that military assistance agreements are desired with Argentina and Mexico if, and when, that proves to be politically feasible.

As exceptions to the principle of grant assistance for hemisphere defense purposes, the programs in Honduras and Nicaragua were established for political reasons, on the recommendation of the Department of State. We do not believe, however, that there is a continuing political need for grant assistance to those two countries. We suggest, therefore, that the Department of Defense may wish to consider whether the Nicaraguan and Honduran programs need be continued on an active basis.

I understand that under the existing MDA Programs in Latin America the United States is supporting 10 squadrons of F–47 and F–51 aircraft for which we can no longer supply spare parts. It would seem desirable to determine at an early date whether these squadrons are still required and, if so, whether the United States should modernize them on a grant basis.

Paragraph 13 c, NSC 5432/1

This provision of our present policy, providing for Latin American defense contributions outside the Hemisphere, is, as indicated above, questioned by the OCB. We have no objection to retaining this paragraph in NSC 5432/1, for there could develop circumstances in which its implementation would be in the interest of the United States. We believe, however, that in general its implementation would require grant aid for any Latin American units participating in extra-continental defense operations, and an amendment to Paragraph 14 of NSC 5432/1 to that effect would appear appropriate.

I hope that the Department of Defense may give early consideration to the suggestions I have made above and that Mr. McGuire and Mr. Lyon will continue their meetings to pursue the pending problems. I would be pleased to contribute in any way possible to the solution of those problems.

Sincerely yours,

Robert Murphy⁹

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 720.5/5–856. Secret. Drafted by Sayre and Sanders; cleared by Prochnow, Barnes, Lyon, Neal, and Bernbaum.
2. NSC 5432/1, “United States Objectives and Courses of Action in Latin America,” approved by the President, September 3, 1954, is printed in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. iv, p. 81. See Document 8 for the progress report.
3. Document 4.
4. Not found in Department of State files.
5. See the enclosure, ibid.
6. In the source text, this sentence began with the following words: “Just as in our military mission program,”. A line has been drawn through these words, and Sayre’s initials appear in the margin.
7. See Document 29.
8. See Document 30.
9. Printed from a copy which bears this typed signature.