Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western European Security and Integration, Volume IV

60. Memorandum of Conference With the President, Washington, October 28, 1957¹

Washington, October 28, 1957

OTHERS PRESENT

• General Norstad
• General Goodpaster

The President opened the meeting by referring to the very fine reports he had had from Mr. Perkins concerning General Norstad’s recent discussions with the Council.² General Norstad said that really for the first time NATO seems to be developing a single idea and concept on its military arrangements in Europe. He thought this was extremely important psychologically. He said he had just met with Secretaries McElroy and Quarles³ and had told them that, if a cut were made into U.S. combat elements at this time, such action would constitute a NATO incident even greater that the British action of a year ago. A few men could be cut out but the battle group should not be reduced.

The President recalled that we have five divisions and four separate regiments in Europe and that it has been agreed not to cut these but to cut out some headquarters and support units. In fact, he felt we were augmenting our fighting strength. On the point of cutting out headquarters, General Norstad reported that he is consolidating two Air Force headquarters (USAFE and 12th Air Force). He is trying to do the same for the Army, and is also cutting out one NATO echelon of command. In addition, he is turning back a large portion of the tactical air units since tactical missiles are now displacing them. He said he had asked Mr. McElroy to agree that, if it becomes necessary to cut manpower, he (General Norstad) would have the right to decide where the cuts should be made. He felt that now is no time to make substantial cuts in units in NATO. He recognizes that no one can plan in detail as far ahead as 1961.

The President agreed that we should not deal in figures so far ahead. He thought that Defense should give General Norstad a reasonable quota of men, but should not attempt to say which specific units or organizations should be cut out. General Norstad conclude on this point by saying that we now have a plan that will unify NATO—something they can believe in.

. . . . . . .

The President said that we ought to search out every useless expenditure, and added that personnel is basically the most expensive category. He felt that once Defense had specified cuts to be made, General Norstad should say where they would be achieved, but should also make clear that our military power is constantly growing. General Norstad said we could do this very effectively, since the power of our units is increasing; he added, however, that the Russians are increasing their total power at the same time, so that relatively the position is by no means so clear.

The President said he had thought it a good idea to organize small atomic groups which might form a theater-wide organization under General Norstad’s control. General Norstad suggested that I should look at a message he had sent to the Chiefs of Staff on this matter.⁴

General Norstad suggested that, if the President visits Paris this fall, he should stay at his former quarters in Marnes-la-Coquette. The President indicated that he would get in touch with General Norstad and see what action would be best if he should decide to go. It might be simplest for him to stay in the Embassy, particularly considering that he would probably not be in Paris for the full meeting. After further thought, he said that if Mrs. Eisenhower accompanies him, he might well take General Norstad up on the offer.

In concluding the session, General Norstad stressed strongly that if the President comes to the meeting, he must have something firm and definite to say. It would not be effective simply to come and put out a communiqué. In this connection, he said that although the NATO stockpile idea is no longer new, that could be the announcement the President would make.⁵

A.J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, NATO. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on October 30.
2. Reference is to Perkins’ visit to the President on October 26 where he reported on Norstad’s meeting’s with the NAC regarding the NATO military concept. Goodpaster’s memorandum of conference with the President, dated October 29, which describes Perkins’ discussion with Eisenhower, is not printed. (Ibid., Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries)
3. No record of this meeting has been found in Department of State files or the Eisenhower Library.
4. Not further identified.
5. In a memorandum of conversation of October 28, Dulles wrote that he came in at the end of the conversation with Norstad and that they spoke briefly about the communiqué which had been drafted by the Department of State for presentation to the heads of government at the December NATO meeting and its application to NATO. Dulles noted: “I said Norstad might not be enthusiastic about the aspect of it which sought to create a greater acceptability of long range striking power—the ‘sword’ as against the ‘shield.’ I gave Korea as an illustration of the need. Norstad said he did not quarrel with that but felt that each situation had to be judged on its own merits. We spoke briefly of the NATO ‘stockpile’ and General Norstad expressed the opinion that having waited so long, it might be well to let any announcement await the December meeting when we would need some good ‘fill in’ material.” (Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199) A copy of the draft declaration/communiqué is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 952.