Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western European Security and Integration, Volume IV

59. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 25, 1957¹

Washington, October 25, 1957

SUBJECT

• Paul-Henri Spaak’s appointment with the President

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• Secretary of State John Foster Dulles
• Secretary General of NATO Paul-Henri Spaak
• Ambassador W. Randolph Burgess
• Assistant Secretary of State C. Burke Elbrick

The President opened the conversation by expressing his faith and confidence in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. He felt that things are looking much better for NATO and Mr. Spaak agreed. Spaak said he was very much struck by the replies of the European Socialist Parties to Khrushchev’s recent letters.² He said that certainly no fear had been shown by these Parties and he felt the trend now was very good.

In reply to the President’s question about the progress toward European integration, Spaak said that things are going well in connection with the Common Market and EURATOM. Secretary Dulles asked if there were any particular concern regarding the British attitude at the GATT Meeting in Geneva.³ Spaak replied in the negative, saying that consideration by the OEEC of the free trade area in Paris recently produced very good results.⁴ The Secretary explained that some people are worried that the British might use the GATT to nullify the effects expected from the Common Market. He said it is our opinion the Common Market must be preserved at all cost, with or without a free trade area.

There was some discussion of the economic situation in Germany and France, the President remarking that the Germans are increasing their gold reserves while those of France are falling. The President observed that France is most strategically located in the heart of Europe and that economic problems, accentuated by the Algerian situation, have produced a grave situation. Secretary Dulles said he had talked to Selwyn Lloyd today about Algeria and that the latter had informed him that the British will vote with France on the Algerian matter in the United Nations.⁵ The Secretary said that we and the British had recently told the Tunisians jointly that we would supply the arms that the Tunisian Government had requested. We felt that if the two of us took this action there was less possibility of France “lashing out” at either of us. He was glad to note that the situation had quieted down along the Tunisian-Algerian border and hoped this would provide the opportunity to solve this particular problem to the satisfaction of France and Tunisia. Spaak felt that the French had made a mistake in not using Bourguiba, who is obviously ready to play along with the West and with France.…

Secretary Dulles said that it is very fortunate that Spaak is here at the same time as Prime Minister Macmillan. The purpose of the meeting with Macmillan was not to forge an Anglo-American alliances, but to strengthen our alliances everywhere and particularly the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This fact is being pointed up in the joint declaration to be issued later in the day⁶ and we have discussed the matter with Mr. Spaak. The President said he was very glad to have Mr. Spaak in Washington at this time, since a purpose of the meeting with Macmillan was to devise ways and means of strengthening NATO and giving greater confidence to the peoples of the NATO countries. Spaak said that it is important to give the impression that all of NATO is interested in these matters.…

. . . . . . .

Mr. Spaak said that if the United States reduces its ground forces in Europe in the near future it would have a very bad reaction in Europe. He was assured by the President that, while the number of men in divisions might be reduced, there will be no reduction in actual strength for a long time. Mr. Spaak recommended that the United States make a very strong statement in NATO regarding the “fair share” concept. Secretary Dulles said that we had made such a statement in London, based on the assumption that the various countries in Europe would supply their share of the forces.⁷ The Germans will only produce five divisions by the end of this year, the French apparently are down to four divisions, and the British are reducing their forces. As a consequence, we are now supplying two times our share of European defense. The President said that six or seven years ago there was fear of a resurgent Germany; now we are very anxious to get them to make a greater effort in the military field. If the European Defense Community Treaty had been adopted, he said, there would be no trouble today. He felt that Adenauer now has a mandate from the people and should be able to move ahead more quickly. He agreed that nothing should be done which might hurt morale in Europe, but said the Europeans do not seem to remember the conditions on which our troops were sent to Europe, namely, until such time as the French and German forces were built up to adequate strength. Spaak felt the time had come to say these things in the North Atlantic Council, and he cautioned against basing any reductions in Europe on purely budgetary reasons. The President expressed the belief that if the Algerian question could be settled, these problems in central Europe would solve themselves.

The President said he had recently seen Malagodi, head of the Italian Liberal Party, who had told him that Soviet intervention in Hungary, in fact, had helped the Communist Party in Italy.⁸ This was a surprising thing but, according to Malagodi, the power and determination demonstrated by the Soviet Union had impressed many Italians. Spaak broke in at this point to say that this was not true of the northern European countries, particularly Belgium.

The group then adjourned for lunch.⁹

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, Dec 1957 NATO Briefing Papers. Secret. Drafted by Elbrick. Sent to the President for approval under cover of a November 1 memorandum of transmittal from Howe to Goodpaster. A handwritten notation by Minnich dated November 4 on Howe’s memorandum indicates the President approved it after making some corrections.
2. Reference is to the letters sent by the CPSU Central Committee on October 11 to the Socialist Parties of eight NATO countries urging joint efforts to preserve peace in the Middle East.
3. Reference is to the GATT meeting in Geneva, October 17–November 30.
4. At a meeting in Paris, October 16–17, the OEEC affirmed their intention to form a European Free Trade Area (FTA) to associate other OEEC member countries multi-laterally with the six-nation European Common Market.
5. A memorandum of this conversation of October 25 is scheduled for publication in the compilation on the United Kingdom in a forthcoming Foreign Relations volume.
6. For text of the Declaration of Common Purpose signed by Macmillan and Eisenhower on October 25, 1957, at the conclusion of their 3-day meeting, see Department of State Bulletin, November 11, 1957, pp. 739–741.
7. Reference is to Dulles’ statement at the fourth plenary meeting of the Nine-Power Conference in London, September 29, 1954. See Annex II A to the Final Act of the Nine-Power Conference, October 3, 1954, in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. v, Part 2, p. 1357.
8. The memorandum of the President’s conversation with Malagodi on October 23 is in Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries.
9. The Department of State and Eisenhower Library records indicate that the idea of a meeting of the heads of government at the NATO session in Paris in December 1957 originated with Dulles who first mentioned it to the President on October 22. Dulles then mentioned the idea to Macmillan on October 24, who in turn discussed it with Spaak that same day. Macmillan and Spaak then proposed it to the President at their meeting with him on October 25. Memoranda of these conversations are scheduled for publication in the compilation on the United Kingdom in a forthcoming Foreign Relations volume. In his memoirs, Spaak states that Macmillan first mentioned the idea to him and that together they invited Eisenhower to attend the NATO meeting in December of that year. “We had no trouble in convincing the President” wrote Spaak, “and he accepted our invitation.” See The Continuing Battle, Memoirs of a European, 1936–66, by Paul-Henri Spaak (London, 1971), pp. 265–266.