228. Letter From the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Strauss) to the Secretary of State1
Dear Mr. Secretary: This letter will express the views of the Commission in regard to certain questions which Mr. Spaak submitted in an informal note given to the Department of State on February 11, 1957.2
Mr. Spaak stated two aims: (1) to assure himself that there is no clause in the draft treaty creating EURATOM which would make cooperation between the United States and the European organization difficult and (2) to interpret by common accord the existing bilateral agreement with Belgium. He stated specifically that he would like to know if the United States Government has any objection to creating the system envisioned in the draft treaty so that he can be sure that the relations between EURATOM and the United States will be at least as good as those which exist under bilateral agreements with Member States. In addition, a question concerned with the disposition of uranium produced in Belgium and its territories is raised.
In considering the questions raised by Mr. Spaak, the Commission’s staff has had available to it draft provisions of the proposed EURATOM treaty. These draft provisions were prepared by separate drafting groups concerned with specific areas of interest, such as materials, dissemination of information, and security controls. We understand that these drafts are now in the hands of legal experts who plan to eliminate repetition and provide clarification wherever necessary. While we have, therefore, not had before us the final draft of the treaty, we have been informed that the draft provisions may be regarded as accurately representing the principles of the proposed treaty. In addition to these draft provisions we have had the opportunity to consult with members of the staff of the three representatives of EURATOM who recently visited Washington and, of course, the opportunity to consult with the representatives of the Department of State.
We do not consider that we have either the privilege or the responsibility of undertaking to transform the draft into a treaty that would suit us in every respect. It is impossible for Mr. Spaak to be assured that there is no provision in the treaty which would make cooperation between the United States and EURATOM difficult and that United States relations with EURATOM will be as good as those with any other Member State, as experience in the operation of [Page 538] EURATOM and subsequent interpretation of the treaty will have significant bearing on these questions.
We have considered it of primary importance to ascertain (1) if the adoption of the treaty would, without further agreement of the parties concerned, result in abrogation or modification of obligations which any of the six States have assumed under bilateral arrangements with the United States; and (2) whether the proposed treaty would permit EURATOM to assume in an agreement with the United States the same kinds of obligations as have been required in bilateral arrangements. In this connection we are concerned chiefly with those obligations relating to control of materials, equipment, and devices. Assurances on these points, of course, should come from the EURATOM representatives, and we understand that they construe the proposed treaty as not automatically resulting in abrogation of third-party obligations, and as permitting EURATOM to assume obligations similar to those in our bilateral agreements. The staff review of the draft provisions supports this conclusion, although it is noted that the Members would be expected to negotiate the transfer of all or part of the rights and obligations in the atomic field from bilateral arrangements to arrangements with EURATOM. In addition, it is noted that Mr. Spaak has stated that it is necessary that Belgian uranium be made available to EURATOM after 1960 and points out that such a disposition of Belgium uranium could appear to be in contradiction to the existing bilateral with Belgium.
With the understanding, therefore, that the ratification of the proposed EURATOM treaty will not automatically relieve the Member States of their obligations to the United States under bilateral agreements, we turn to the question “Would the United States Government have objection to creating the system such as envisioned in the draft treaty?” In connection with this question Mr. Spaak points out that the original conception of EURATOM has been modified to provide for the ownership of fissionable materials by private institutions under certain circumstances and to provide that Member States would have equal access to materials, including fissionable materials, for military as well as peaceful uses. As you know, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 does not permit the ownership of fissionable materials by non-government users in the United States. In our bilateral agreements we have accordingly required the government receiving special nuclear materials from the Commission to retain ownership of the materials. This has been done to provide an analogous situation to that existing in the United States and also with the thought that ownership by the Government was of value in maintaining the desired controls of the material. We understand that EURATOM in fact would be prepared to retain ownership of special nuclear material received from the United States. Since any such materials [Page 539] transferred from the United States to EURATOM could be treated in the same way as materials transferred by the United States to any individual State, and if EURATOM can adequately control materials acquired from other sources without requiring ownership by EURATOM in every case, the Commission would not consider the situation regarding ownership as being a bar to effective cooperation with EURATOM.
We understand that the method of dealing with the ownership of special nuclear materials has been devised to permit a Member State to use EURATOM materials for weapons. We further understand that France is the only country which has insisted on this right, and understand further that West Germany is precluded by other arrangements from making atomic weapons. As you know, materials provided by the United States may not be used for military purposes; but on the other hand, as indicated in connection with ownership of materials, we understand that the proposed treaty would permit the United States to be assured that no materials received from the Commission, and no materials derived as a result of the use of such material, would be used for military purposes. Therefore, strictly from the standpoint of meeting statutory requirements, the United States could cooperate with EURATOM, if EURATOM in fact took the steps necessary to guarantee that the materials furnished by the United States would not be used for military purposes.
However, it is the policy of the United States to make certain that no material, equipment or devices transferred to another country under an international arrangement, or material produced as a result of the foregoing, will be used for any military purpose. Accordingly, in our agreements for cooperation with other nations, we have sought various undertakings guaranteeing that materials so transferred or produced would be used only for peaceful purposes, with specific provisions relating to controls and safeguards. It should be noted that these provisions in our bilateral arrangements are consistent with those contained in Article XII of the approved Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The possibility of military projects existing within EURATOM does raise problems for United States–EURATOM cooperation, and may call for some steps by the Community to assure a separation within EURATOM of materials derived as a result of any future arrangements with the United States. Thus there can be no flow of materials from the EURATOM facilities subject to the provisions of an arrangement with the United States or an arrangement with the International Agency, into the “military” facilities which may be accommodated under EURATOM, and any flow in the reverse direction would entail the control of such materials, to insure that they were not used for any military purpose. Based on our understanding of the treaty, we do not believe [Page 540] that it would prevent the Community from accepting undertakings and provisions of present United States agreements for cooperation.
If EURATOM sets up a system under which materials obtained from the United States, and their derivatives, will be used exclusively for peaceful purposes, the Commission would not foresee that because of the weapon matter there would be any legal impediment to cooperation with EURATOM. Accordingly, if cooperation with EURATOM under these circumstances is, as we understand it to be, important in achieving this Government’s foreign policy objective in Western Europe, the Commission would be willing to cooperate with EURATOM notwithstanding the weapons feature.
The Commission, however, is concerned that EURATOM is being set up in a manner that would permit the manufacture of nuclear weapons by Member States. We note in this connection that the proposed treaty goes beyond merely permitting a Member State to use uranium produced in its own country for weapons but in addition permits it to acquire materials from EURATOM for this purpose. Since the treaty itself provides that any restrictions on the use of materials from third parties shall be observed, the Commission is of the opinion that the United States should not only require that its material be used exclusively for peaceful purposes but should use all reasonable efforts to obtain agreement of other uranium supplying countries outside of EURATOM, such as Canada and South Africa, to do likewise. We understand that Canada has already initiated discussions with other producer-nations with the view of adopting uniform policies in regard to the control of uranium supply. The Commission is prepared to cooperate with the Department in every way possible in developing with Canada and other friendly ore supplying nations a common approach to this problem.
In this connection, there is a related point that should be considered. The bilateral agreement with Belgium (Article VII C.) provides that Belgium will not transfer to any country other than the United States or the United Kingdom any special nuclear materials produced in Belgium or its territories unless the Government of Belgium is given assurances that the material will not be used for military purposes. As we understand the proposed treaty provisions, Belgium’s obligation to EURATOM would be inconsistent with this provision. The Commission would have no objection to relieving Belgium of its obligation in this matter to the United States, insofar as the EURATOM countries are concerned, to the extent the material is not subject to the applicable control provisions in an arrangement with the United States, since, for reasons we have already indicated, we are willing to cooperate with EURATOM despite the weapons feature.
Mr. Spaak indicated that he asked the question which we have just discussed for the purpose of assuring himself that the relations [Page 541] between EURATOM and the United States will be at least as good as those which exist between the United States and those States with which the United States has bilateral agreements. The Commission does not foresee that EURATOM will put into effect a security system which would permit the exchange of Restricted Data. This is an example of an area in which the relationship with EURATOM might not be as extensive as that with an individual State. There may be others. This area may not be of great importance, however, in view of the fact that substantially all the technology of reactors for peaceful purposes of atomic energy is declassifiable. On the other hand, there may be opportunities for cooperation with EURATOM where it might not be practicable to cooperate with one state. Part of the answer as to whether relations with EURATOM will be as good as those with individual nations will, we believe, depend on whether the treaty would interfere with or make difficult the development of mutually beneficial relationships between industries in the United States and those within the Community. It is our understanding that the draft of the proposed treaty is not intended to inhibit normal commercial relationships.
We turn now to Mr. Spaak’s questions relating to the matter of disposition of Belgian uranium. Mr. Spaak appears to be under the impression that an interpretation of the bilateral agreement with Belgium is all that is required to permit Belgium to transfer uranium ore produced in Belgium and its territories to EURATOM. Since Mr. Spaak states that this kind of disposition of material is an essential basis of the European Community, the Commission believes that it is important to forestall any possible misunderstanding concerning this matter. As you know, there are provisions in both the bilateral agreement between the United States and Belgium and an agreement between the United Kingdom and Belgium providing that the Combined Development Agency shall have an option to purchase a percentage, to be agreed, of the Belgian ores after 1960 and during the period of the agreement. These agreements must be amended in order to provide for the relinquishment of the option accorded to the Combined Development Agency; and, in the case of the United States, the amendment must be made in accordance with Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act, including submission to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy for thirty days. The Commission is not advised of the position the United Kingdom desires to take with respect to the Combined Development Agency’s option.
Aside from these procedural points, the Commission has given consideration as to whether its requirements of uranium and other sources of supply would permit relinquishing this option on the Belgian ore after 1960. Based on previous estimates, it would appear that our uranium needs could be met from other sources. However, [Page 542] our over-all requirements for uranium are again being reviewed in consideration of recent requirements, indicated by EURATOM representatives and other governments, which are in excess of previous projections on which planning and agreements with the Department of Defense on availability of special nuclear material for peaceful uses abroad are based. The Department of Defense has currently under review its projected military requirements. As soon as results of this review are received, consideration will be given to over-all requirements for uranium and to relinquishing our option on Belgian ore after 1960. In view of what we understand to be the importance of EURATOM to our foreign policy objectives it is believed that consideration on the United States side will be favorable. As to the immediate future, in response to a previous request by Mr. Robiliart of Union Minière, the Commission agreed recently to a deferral to a later date of contract deliveries of 550 tons U3O8 starting on July 1, 1958, in order that this material may be made available to EURATOM with the understanding that the Belgian Government will assure us this material will be used only for peaceful purposes.
In his note Mr. Spaak also asked that there be confirmed his understanding that when the existing commercial contract with Union Minière is completed the remaining available material could be allocated to the European organization. In this connection we must reiterate that the modifications of the existing agreements as described in the preceding paragraph must be made in order to permit such an allocation.
We hope the foregoing will be helpful to the Department in responding to Mr. Spaak’s questions. As we have indicated to you in the many discussions between our respective staffs during the last several months, we desire to be of every possible assistance in developing a means of cooperating with the Western European nations in the peaceful use of atomic energy in such a manner as to be of mutual benefit to those nations and the United States.
Sincerely yours,