227. Circular Telegram From the Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions1

735. A) London’s 4159 to Department2 (being repeated all other NATO capitals). B) Polto 1938.3 C) London’s 4462 to Department4 (being repeated all other NATO capitals).

1.
Paras 3 through 5 below contain preliminary US Government views on British FonOff paper on “Grand Design” (reftel A), taking account USRO comments reftel B, and London’s views reftel C, both most helpful. As we are not yet clear how much dissemination paper has received to other interested Governments, these views are for information of USRO and Embassies only at this time and until separately instructed. However, should officials your country bring up subject and indicate knowledge of British paper, you may draw on views below in commenting as appropriate on British thinking. You should emphasize that your comments are preliminary.
2.
FYI Department not fully clear motivation “Grand Design” paper nor degree UK Government clearance it has received. Flavor in paper of suspicion towards six-country institutions (CSC, EURATOM and Common Market) appears inconsistent with what we had understood to be Macmillan/Thornycroft/Eccles position that Common Market necessary base for Free Trade area, although this general element in British paper can probably be accounted for in terms of factors analysed paragraph 6 reftel C. Also not clear circulation new “constitutional” proposal at time attention concentrated on concrete plans for EURATOM, Common Market, Free Trade Area and implementation NATO Committee of Three Report. Despite these broad questions, “Grand Design” proposals are dealt with below on individual merits, on basis our present understanding these proposals. End FYI.
3.
General concept in FonOff paper of broad membership and flexible organization for Atlantic Community appears constructive [Page 535] and generally consistent with philosophy NATO Committee of Three Report. Following specific comments on proposals in paper:
a.
Fully agree NATO must give “necessary high direction in politico-strategic field.” Proposals in Committee of Three Report can contribute significantly to this end. This connection emphasize our feeling that protection NATO has provided has been basic element in realization political and economic progress in Atlantic framework, and will remain so in future.
b.
We question desirability conceiving WEU as “inner circle” in NATO. While we have of course no formal objection WEU discussion political and other matters of particular interest its limited membership, NATO primacy in political and military field must be clearly recognized. Duplication by WEU of other NATO functions should also be avoided where possible, and move of WEU Council to Paris could contribute this end. Above does not indicate any lessening US interest in WEU’s activities in fields clearly assigned to it, in particular arms control; this interest particularly relevant in view role WEU expected to play in connection control any atomic weapons production by EURATOM members.
c.
Agree OEEC most appropriate instrument for overall economic cooperation among Atlantic countries as whole, but distinction must be drawn between such cooperation and more far-reaching integration within six-country framework (see para 4 below).
d.
Proposal for consolidating CE, WEU and NATO parliamentary groups into single consultative body contains new elements which will require careful study by executive and legislative branches. We would in any case hope there is no intention on British part to propose inclusion of CSC, Common Market and EURATOM Assembly in parliamentary scheme. Former would have some real powers of decision, might eventually be directly elected, and have special role to play in development six-country integration movement.
4.

In our opinion, major weakness British paper is tendency blur vital distinction between merely cooperative arrangements (OEEC) and genuine integration (CSC). In particular we are seriously concerned over implication that six-country developments (CSC, EURATOM, Common Market) should in some way be subordinated to OEEC. (See third from last para USRO comments reftel B, with which Department fully agrees.)

In any developments along lines British paper, we consider it of major importance to safeguard integrity, cohesion and growth potential of existing and proposed institutions of six-nation Community. US support CSC, EURATOM and Common Market based not only on expected economic and technical advantages, but even more on hope these developments represent steps towards increasing political union, which would further contribute greatly to strength and cohesion of Atlantic area as a whole. We welcome increasing indications British support of and cooperation with six countries, and are sure British would not wish their proposals for bringing greater degree [Page 536] order to Atlantic organizations to dilute movement toward genuine integration or divide six-country group, which forms one of cornerstones in Atlantic construction. Rather we conceive that six should increasingly act as a unit within Atlantic organizations, and that integrity of developing institutions of six-country Community should be safeguarded.

US of course supports closest feasible association between institutions of the Six and looser cooperative arrangements embracing all of the other OEEC member countries, especially British association with the Common Market in a Free Trade Area. In particular, believe there may be much merit in organizing within framework of OEEC the association of other OEEC countries with EURATOM and the Common Market, but this must depend primarily upon view governments directly concerned, especially the Six.

5.
Final problem is timing. We believe that during next six months attention must be concentrated on bringing to fruition concrete projects already in process. This means ratification and entry into force of EURATOM and Common Market Treaties, pursuance negotiations in OEEC on Free Trade area, and implementation Committee of Three Report in NATO. We fear broad discussion in official, parliamentary and public arena of new proposals, regardless of their merits, could confuse opinion and possibly make difficulties, especially in ratification process. Therefore while we believe British paper should be given careful study by individual governments, we would hope any multilateral consideration (NATO or OEEC) or public discussion could be deferred until late summer. While British FonOff intentions on handling of “Grand Design” not clear, note statement in British paper that “for the moment our first concern is to get Free Trade Area successfully launched under OEEC.” Hope this indicates sense of relative priorities similar to ours.
6.
In summary, US believes British paper contains some ideas with real merit (particularly promotion ever-closer relations among OEEC countries); considers it essential that progress in Atlantic cooperative arrangements takes place in manner promoting integration of six-nation community moving towards political and economic unification; and hopes that consideration British paper can be so handled as to avoid any danger of confusing or interfering with next steps, especially ratification EURATOM and Common Market Treaties.
Dulles
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.00/3–657. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Timmons and Cleveland and approved by Dulles. Sent to Brussels, Bonn, The Hague, Luxembourg (for the Embassy and Butterworth), London, Paris (for the Embassy and USRO), Rome, Ankara, Athens, Copenhagen, Lisbon, Oslo, Ottawa, Reykjavik, Bern, Stockholm, Dublin, and Vienna.
  2. Telegram 4159, February 6, contained the text of a British Foreign Office paper on the “Grand Design” a set of proposals first introduced by Prime Minister Macmillan at the North Atlantic Council meeting of December 13, 1956, which called for a simplification of the network of European regional organizations. (Ibid., 740.00/2–657)
  3. Polto 1938, February 20, reported on the recent meeting of the Council of the Western European Union, which discussed the “Grand Design” proposals. (Ibid., 740.00/2–2057)
  4. Telegram 4462, February 22, concerned the United Kingdom’s proposed reduction of forces in Germany. (Ibid., 740.00/2–2257)