208. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Secretary of State and Jean Monnet, Department of State, Washington, January 10, 19571

We talked generally about the movement toward European integration. He thought it was really gaining serious momentum.

He talked about EURATOM. He said he hoped that an agreement on this would be signed up within two or three weeks and that if we agree to give bilateral aid of a substantial character to Germany before EURATOM was signed up, it would almost surely mean the end of EURATOM. I told him I thought that Adenauer and his Government ought to take some responsibility for this themselves. He agreed but indicated that there were sharp differences within Germany and that if we could not slow down on the bilateral aid agreement it would be fatal. I told him I thought we could hold the line for a week or so at least.

Mr. Monnet said he was talking with Admiral Strauss within the week and thought he could persuade Strauss that he could get more credit by waiting and doing a big deal with EURATOM than by making the deal with Germany alone.2

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 840.1901/1–1057. Secret. Drafted by Dulles.
  2. Monnet spoke with Strauss on January 17 and reported his conversation to Dulles the following day. A memorandum of Dulles’ conversation with Monnet, drafted by the Secretary, reads in part as follows:

    “Mr. Monnet said he had had a long talk with Admiral Strauss at dinner from seven o’clock until midnight and felt that Strauss now understood better the EURATOM project and how closely it was identified with the creation of Europe, and that while Admiral Strauss had not committed himself, he thought he would not press for the bilaterals as long as there was an early prospect of the EURATOM Treaty being signed.” (Ibid., 840.1901/1–1857)