Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western European Security and Integration, Volume IV

207. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Embassy in Germany¹

Washington, January 4, 1957—7:02 p.m.

1833. A. FYI.

1. Paris (Embtel 2984²), Bonn (Embtel 2354³), Mission Luxembourg (Colux 932²) judgment is that bilateral negotiations with Germany would adversely affect EURATOM treaty negotiations and be construed as lack faith EURATOM and consequent US preference for bilateral arrangements.

2. On the other hand, Department and AEC through failure to negotiate bilateral do not want US to be open to blame by Europeans or by US industry as standing in way European atomic energy development.

AEC also concerned to avoid any appearance of discrimination by United States against Germany and Italy with respect to power bilaterals in view existence bilaterals with Netherlands, Belgium, and France as well as fact power agreements being negotiated with Sweden, Norway, and Spain and finds present position awkward in discussions with German and Italian atomic officials and industrialists.

3. Especially pertinent to recall Faure’s forthright action last October (Paris Embtel 1855⁴) to suspend French-US power bilateral negotiations which had been initiated earlier by French Embassy in Washington.

4. Important that decisions this matter be taken at governmental level and with knowledge all EURATOM partners. Conflicting interests and views regarding bilateral negotiations at this time exist within each country. Action by any one country will affect position of others, particularly if taken without prior consultation. End FYI.

B. For Bonn and Rome: With appropriate modification to meet local situation, you should make following approach to Adenauer and Segni.⁵

1. Much encouraged by rapid progress Brussels Conference now making in drafting EURATOM, and also Common Market, treaties, and by determination Six Nations to have treaties ready for signature in February.

2. Brussels Group aware US policy of carefully refraining from interfering in Six Nation negotiations, while we have reiterated our continuing and strong support for this important European initiative. Consistent with this basic position, it has been our desire to avoid actions which would make the development of EURATOM more difficult.

3. We have realized that negotiations by individual members of Brussels Group with the US might contribute to difficulties in developing a treaty, and consequently, we have attempted to handle such negotiations in manner which would minimize any such adverse effects. We are now faced, however, by new approaches for comprehensive power bilaterals from two of Six Nations—Italy and Germany. French approach in October for power bilateral subsequently suspended by French Government in order prevent any harmful effects on EURATOM negotiations.

4. We of course wish avoid any appearance discrimination against any country in this field. U.S. readiness negotiate power bilaterals with friendly countries has been publicly stated.

5. It would be inappropriate for US to assume responsibility for decision as to possible effects bilateral negotiations on EURATOM. We believe however that Chancellor (and Segni) will wish consider this problem carefully in relation to EURATOM. Before deciding pursue matter further with US Government, we feel certain he will also wish consult with negotiating partners as has been done through Brussels Intergovernmental Conference for Common Market and EURATOM on other matters related to proposed European atomic energy community.

C. For Paris: Inform Faure of above approach and say we assume this procedure will be acceptable to French in light previous French position.

D. For Brussels: Inform Spaak of above approach.

E. For The Hague and Luxembourg: Inform Dutch and Luxembourgers of general position outlined paragraph B above.⁶

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 840.1901/12–1856. Confidential. Drafted by Cleveland and Schaetzel and approved by Elbrick. Also sent to Paris, Rome, Brussels, The Hague, and Luxembourg, passed to USRO and to Butterworth, and repeated for information to London. An earlier draft of this telegram was forwarded to Dulles for his approval on December 27, under cover of a memorandum from Elbrick and Farley. Dulles approved the draft and it was sent out as telegram 1833 with certain minor modifications. (Ibid., Atomic Energy Files: Lot 57 D 688, Atomic Energy—General)
2. Dated December 14, not printed. (Ibid., Central Files, 840.1901/12–1456)
3. Dated December 18, not printed. (Ibid., 840.1901/12–1856)
2. Dated December 14, not printed. (Ibid., Central Files, 840.1901/12–1456)
4. In telegram 1855, October 20, 1956, Ambassador Dillon reported a conversation with Faure regarding the proposed bilateral negotiations between the United States and France for an atomic energy agreement. Faure stated that he agreed with the position of the United States that the negotiations would be inappropriate at that time due to the possible conflict with EURATOM. He also said that the matter would be held in suspense until at least the first of the year, at which time the French Government would reconsider it. (Ibid., 611.0097/10–2056)
5. Italian Prime Minister Antonio Segni.
6. The various Embassy replies to this telegram are in Department of State, Central Files, 840.1901.