Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western European Security and Integration, Volume IV

204. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Elbrick) and the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Affairs (Smith) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, December 3, 1956.

SUBJECT

• Designation of EURATOM Wise Men and Visit to United States²

Capitalizing upon the favorable atmosphere created by the November 6 Mollet–Adenauer meeting³—which resolved the remaining major issues—the Brussels group now expects to complete the Euratom treaty by January 4, which would make possible signature by mid-January. The European supporters of Euratom, especially Monnet, are convinced that the treaty must be ratified quickly; by early summer at the latest. A report on the current status of the project is attached (Tab B). In addition to this sense of political urgency, Monnet and others realize that it is important that technical goals for Euratom be established at an early date. These goals must be related to two fundamental factors; first, the long-range energy crisis of Europe which is now being dramatically demonstrated by the current oil shortage and, second, by an imaginative but realistic assessment of the contribution that nuclear power can make in meeting the long range crisis.

This important task of defining the broad technical purpose of Euratom has been given to a competent and politically important group of Wise Men—Messrs. Etzel, Armand and Giordani. They begin their work on December 3, and are scheduled to finish in 60 days. Ambassador Dillon proposes, rather than await a request from the group to be invited to visit the U.S., that we take the initiative in issuing an invitation (Tab C).⁴ The presence of this group in the U.S. would permit a thorough exploration of prospects for Euratom and a systematic appraisal of the most mutually profitable U.S. collaboration with the Community. While the announced purpose of the Wise Men is to set production targets, identify the quickest feasible rate at which nuclear power station can be installed and the common budget and common installations requires, it is clear that an equally important objective is to keep up and stimulate further political interest in Euratom.

To issue the invitation would be timely reaffirmation of the sympathetic support the President and you have shown toward Euratom. Bearing in mind that Euratom covers a substantive field uncontaminated by the Middle East situation, a forthcoming invitation to the group could have important beneficial effects on the current relations between the United States and Western Europe.

Recommendation:

That you sign the attached telegram to Brussels (Tab A).⁵

[Tab B]

December 3, 1956.

CURRENT STATUS OF EURATOM NEGOTIATIONS⁶

The November 6th meeting between Adenauer and Mollet removed the major remaining obstacles to the drafting of a EURATOM treaty. This meeting recovered the ground that had been lost at the Saint-Cloud Ministerial Meeting of October 30, at which time German obstructionism, led by Erhard and Strauss, created a temporary impasse. There is now a general, although cautious, optimism in Europe that a treaty will be drafted by early January and signed by the middle of the month.

The following are the compromises that were reached on November 6 on the major outstanding issues:

1. The Germans accepted the position of the other five nations that the Community should have a purchase monopoly over nuclear fuel, with the proviso that this function should be subject to review after a definite period of time, and that exceptions for national procurement could be made by the Community if the prices for material were “abusive” or if there were an acute shortage of supply.

2. The five have made a concession to the Germans and are not insisting on full ownership by Euratom of fissionable material, but have agreed upon a sui generis interpretation which will subject all fissionable material to complete control by the Community.

3. The treaty will allow the French to engage in nuclear weapons research and development which would permit explosion of a weapon in four years, as demanded by the Chamber of Deputies last July. Presumably the Brussels group will insist, however, upon the inspection and control authority of the Community being complete, which means that the Community will have access to French weapons research and development work as well as to any subsequent weapons inventory, should the French decide to take advantage of this permissive right.

The major remaining threat to the successful negotiation of the treaty is the possibility of new demands by the French, inspired by their military, and drawn from the failure in the Middle East, for even greater freedom of action in the nuclear weapons field. French insistence on this point could destroy the project, as it would lead to a defection of the Socialist Party support of Euratom, especially the critically important German SPD.

The institutional, and especially the supranational character of Euratom, has not developed along the lines originally proposed by supporters of the Community. The supporters now see Euratom evolving into a supranational organization. Rather than writing into the treaty broad institutional provisions, the current tactic is to simplify the treaty, which will place responsibilities on Euratom itself to work out unresolved issues which would otherwise have been spelled out in explicit treaty provisions. Finally, there is the expectation that the sheer size of the task of atomic energy development which must be assumed by the Community will force it to assume supranational characteristics.

While the Euratom negotiators are unanimous in their intent to develop a comprehensive and effective control system covering all aspects of atomic energy development, the supporters are equally unanimous in their view that some special arrangement must be worked out between the U.S. and Euratom which will neither require inspection by the U.S. along the lines of existing power bilateral arrangements nor by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The Europeans insist that a subordinate status implicit in U.S. inspection would make the Community politically unacceptable to the participating countries. Inspection by the Agency, when neither the U.S. nor the U.K. are prepared to accept similar inspection, would be equally unacceptable and be subject to the further fundamental objection of permitting inspection of their facilities by Soviet and satellite personnel.

In recent weeks there has been a sharpening of European interest and hope in Euratom which has led to a sense of urgency on the part of its supporters in Europe. This new optimism and interest arises from the following factors:

The immediate oil crisis arising from the debacle in the Middle East has brought home to the man in the street and the politician the fact known to economists and industrialists that Europe faced a desperate long-range energy situation;

There has been increased awareness by leaders in the Six Nations that their individual national programs for developing the peaceful use of atomic energy were too modest;

Current arguments by the French military that the Middle East demonstrated the fact that no modern state can have an effective military organization without nuclear capability has intensified the feeling that Community development of atomic energy is indispensable in order to avoid or at least to minimize national competition in nuclear weapons development;

The disaster in the Middle East appears to have had on balance the effect of driving the Six Nations closer together and underscoring the need for closer economic and political integration; a further political incentive has been the surprising progress that has been made in negotiating a Common Market treaty, the tacit acceptance by the French of a “link” between Euratom and the Common Market treaty;

And finally, the political impetus given both of these projects by the willingness of the U.K. to become associated with the Common Market through a free trade area.

Parallel with the accelerated treaty drafting effort in Brussels, a group of three Wise Men⁷ began on December 3 a 60-day task which is to develop a “crash program” of nuclear energy development for EURATOM. Of equal importance, however, is the political objective behind the appointment of the Wise Men, which is to put new life into EURATOM. It will also be their responsibility to begin exploration of the kind of cooperation that EURATOM can expect from the U.S. and the U.K.

In the course of an imminent visit to the U.S. of this group, we shall be asked to spell out in greater detail just what was meant by the earlier general expressions of support for Euratom, in which we committed ourselves to treat more generously and liberally an integrated atomic energy Community than we would be prepared to treat the countries individually.

The progress that has been made in negotiating the treaty, and especially the recent action taken by Adenauer to overrule the objections of Ministers Erhard and Strauss and various dissident industrial groups in Germany has caused both the European supporters of Euratom as well as senior U.S. officials abroad to urge that great care be taken to avoid any American action which would upset the general agreement now achieved. In particular they are concerned about any negotiation of bilaterals which would provide a basis for new demands by German industrialists that the Community approach be scrapped in preference for bilateral arrangements.

1. Source: Department of State, Atomic Energy Files: Lot 57 D 688, Atomic Energy—General. Confidential. Sent through Under Secretary Hoover and initialed by him. Also concurred in and initialed by Murphy, MacArthur, Strauss, Bowie, and Timmons.
2. In late October, the Intergovernmental Conference for the Common Market and Euratom authorized the appointment of a committee of three “wise men” to develop production goals in the atomic energy field for Euratom, a timetable showing the quickest possible pace at which atomic energy plants could be installed, and list of the resources needed to achieve the goal. The “wise men” were Franz Etzel, Louis Armand, and Francesco Giordani.
3. See Document 198.
4. Not attached to the source text; the reference is probably to telegram 2661 from Paris, November 29. (Department of State, Central Files, 840.1901/11–2956)

5. Dulles approved the attached telegram, asking Ambassador Alger to approach Spaak with the suggestion of an invitation to the “wise men” to visit the United States. (Telegram 730 to Brussels, December 7; ibid., 840.1901/12–756)

   Alger responded in telegram 641 from Brussels, December 8, which reads in part as follows:

   “I approached Spaak late today along lines reference telegram regarding question visit EURATOM Wisemen to US. He warmly welcomes idea and thinks initiative should come from US. He concurs text proposed letter and pursuant his request I am forwarding to Foreign Office Monday morning text this letter from Secretary to Spaak. Foreign Office will send letter to Spaak in Paris where he will present to meeting of EURATOM group and Wisemen December 13 US proposal for visit. Spaak says Wisemen were already planning go US in January and only problem is exact date.

   “Spaak approves concurrent release Washington and Brussels and will get in touch with me after meeting in Paris in order coordinate timing to release.” (Ibid., 840.1901/12–856)

6. Confidential. Drafted by Schaetzel.

7. Etzel, Vice President of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community, who is often looked upon as a possible successor to Adenauer;

   Armand, head of French Railways, a strong “European” whose views carry great weight with the French Assembly;

   Giordani, former head of Italian atomic energy commission and prominent Italian scientist. [Footnote in the source text.]