203. Telegram From the Ambassador in Germany (Conant) to the Department of State1
2007. Reference: Paris telegram 2460, November 19;2 repeated London, The Hague, Rome, Luxembourg, Brussels unn. Position outlined of Monnet indicates major long range reason for getting on with EURATOM. Balance of payments position and dependence upon essentially unstable area for vital fuel supplies do raise problems. However, do not believe can realistically present atomic energy as real alternative to substantial or important quantities of petroleum [Page 490] imports for many years to come. Cost of alternative source of energy such as action by Western Europe, expanded coal imports from the US, or continued dependence on overseas petroleum (including giant tanker construction program) likely to prove decisively cheaper for several years to come.
Fear that stress on EURATOM to meet Middle East political problem and Western European energy problem may put whole EURATOM proposal in false light and at same time cloud fundamental issue involved in meeting already acute growing energy deficit Western Europe. Overemphasis on EURATOM may falsify picture during Parliamentary ratification process by exaggerating its effects and importance. Certainly effects of statements such as Monnet’s should they be disseminated on tough-minded German businessmen may tend to make less attractive in Germany prospect of economic integration.
On other hand, agree with principle US could indicate publicly more effective support EURATOM. Possibility this direction could be public announcement US proposed to make special agreement with EURATOM, if final terms made possible, to provide for special relationship between EURATOM and US. Such special agreement could recognize (1) primary importance of Western Europe in atomic energy field because of scientific and technical knowhow, level of industrial and economic development, etc., (2) continuing US interest in European integration, (3) special importance attached by US to cooperation with 6 countries within NATO and OEEC framework, (4) probability that intensive US–EURATOM cooperation would undoubtedly cut down the time before atomic energy can compete economically with oil imports.