183. Letter From the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Murphy) to the Chairman of
the Atomic Energy Commission (Strauss)1
Washington, August 7,
1956.
Dear Admiral Strauss: We have recently had prepared in the
Department a summary of the current status of the EURATOM project. I believe that this
will be of interest to the Atomic Energy Commission.
While there has been some unavoidable slippage in the time schedule the
six European nations originally established for themselves, they have a
continuing strong interest in pursuing the project and are making steady
progress on it. EURATOM surmounted a
difficult hurdle when the French Assembly debate on July 11 resulted in
strong affirmative support for EURATOM, although the positions taken by the French
Government in arguing their case pointed up a number of issues which
will have to be faced in the drafting of a treaty.
[Page 457]
The Department continues to feel that EURATOM can make an important contribution in the
achievement of American objectives in Europe. The work done last winter
by the Commission at the Secretary’s request2 to consider
those supporting actions which the United States might take to encourage
and assist EURATOM places the
Government in an excellent position to begin active negotiations with
the six nations when the latter are prepared to open discussions with
the United States. That such negotiations have not yet been held is
consistent with the basic political strategy we have followed, namely
that the initiative for this project must remain clearly and completely
with the Europeans. The responsible foreign government officials in
Europe are thoroughly aware of our broad support for the project and
that we are prepared to talk with them when they wish. It now looks as
though discussions between the United States and the Brussels Group
probably would not take place before October.
Sincerely yours,3
[Enclosure]
CURRENT STATUS OF EURATOM4
I. Timing
The six nations have not been able to maintain the stiff schedule
originally contemplated which would have produced a treaty ready for
consideration by the parliaments of the participating states during
the autumn of 1956. The EURATOM
Brussels Working Group, under Spaak’s direction, produced a paper setting forth
the functions of EURATOM which
was considered by the Foreign Ministers at Venice on May 29–30. At
this meeting the Ministers approved the Spaak paper and set up a further treaty drafting
committee, also under Spaak’s
direction. The customary August hiatus in European governmental
activities, complicated further by Spaak’s four-week trip to the Congo, means that it
is unlikely that a treaty draft will be ready for signature by the
Ministers and submission to the governments for parliamentary action
before late October or November at the earliest. The French Assembly
debate on EURATOM, July 6–11,
accelerated to some extent work on the treaty and the French
Government has expressed the hope that a draft could be prepared by
October. While this debate resulted in a surprisingly large majority
[Page 458]
supporting EURATOM, the Government accepted a
number of commitments which will complicate the work of the Brussels
Treaty Group, though they emphasized rather than created issues
which have always been latent in the project, and which are set
forth below.
- A.
- EURATOM
and Atomic Weapons: Many of the original supporters of
EURATOM in Europe,
particularly the Socialists, had insisted that EURATOM contain a commitment of
the participating states to renounce their rights to fabricate
nuclear weapons. This aspect of the project has been subject to
continuing erosion. In the course of its Assembly debate the
French Government committed itself to support a four-year
moratorium before any bomb could be exploded by one of the
participating states but after that time any one of the six
nations would be free to act unilaterally in this area (the
French assume, in our judgment unrealistically, that the Germans
will continue to be tied by the WEU commitments and hence this exception will not
be available to them). The French Government also stated that
EURATOM would not affect
its freedom or that of any of the participating states (except
for Germany) to continue research and development of weapons
during the four-year moratorium period.
- B.
- Extent and Character of EURATOM Control Over
Fissionable Material: The German interests hostile to
EURATOM and interested
in maintaining a free hand for German atomic development, center
their attack on the proposal that EURATOM exercise common ownership over fissionable
material, similar to the ownership and control which the Atomic
Energy Commission maintains over such material in the U.S. These
German interests, which are in a position to place strong
political pressure on Chancellor Adenauer, have charged that this aspect of
EURATOM will lead to
socialism in Europe. At Venice, the Germans reserved their
position on this point arguing that EURATOM should have “custody” but should not own
this material. The other five negotiating countries are solidly
behind the proposal for common ownership, and the EURATOM conference is virtually
deadlocked on this issue.
- C.
- Scope of EURATOM Program and Authority: Some
elements in the French and German Governments have also proposed
that the participating states retain a substantial freedom of
action, arguing essentially for a cooperative, rather than an
integrated atomic energy program. One suggestion put forward is
that when the supply of fissionable material is inadequate to
the requirements of the participating states, the states and/or
companies be permitted to buy outside EURATOM procurement channels
supplies of these materials from other sources. For somewhat
different reasons, related to their desire to maintain a free
hand in weapons development and also to hold their lead in the
atomic energy field, the French Government asserted
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in the Assembly debate
that EURATOM would control
no more than 20% of the French atomic energy program. Consistent
with this position the French Atomic Energy Commissariat is
currently engaged in an energetic effort to tie up on a
bilateral basis substantial amounts of Canadian uranium, a
position at odds with the concept that EURATOM would be the sole owner
of fissionable material.
- D.
- Relationship of the Common Market Proposal
to EURATOM:
Germany, with some support from Belgium and Holland, has pressed
for a close relationship between these two Messina projects
indicating that they must proceed together if any real progress
is to be made towards further European integration. The
extremely strong competitive position of the Germans means that
they would be major immediate beneficiaries of a European common
market; the French would suffer the most important immediate
strains. The French insisted that any link which tied these two
projects together in such a way that they would have to be
considered simultaneously by the parliaments would be totally
unacceptable.
- E.
- Separate Institutions for EURATOM: In the course
of the French Assembly debates and responding to the antipathy
of certain elements in France to the Coal and Steel Community
the commitment was made by the Government that EURATOM, when it came into
being, would not necessarily be governed by the institutions of
the Coal and Steel Community. It is uncertain at this stage how
serious a reservation this may be and the consequences it may
have on the development of the Community of Six. It may be
possible to reach an acceptable understanding on separate terms
of reference or delineation of staff which would permit use of
the Council and Court at least of the Coal and Steel
Community.
II. Anticipated Action by the
United States
Through diplomatic channels the U.S. has reiterated its strong
support in principle for an effective EURATOM and indicated in general terms a willingness to
lend practical support to the community should it be established.
The six nations are aware of our readiness to enter into technical
discussions with them. While all of the participating states have
indicated their gratification at U.S. support of their efforts and
particularly for the discreet manner in which this support has been
demonstrated, they have let it be understood that they do not wish
to enter into discussions with the U.S. until the treaty has been
developed. While this decision on the part of the Brussels Group is
awkward in that it may result in an instrument containing provisions
or omissions contrary to what we would like to see, it is based on
the apparent unanimous judgment of the negotiators that the origin,
inspiration, and development of EURATOM must be completely European. Consistent with
this tactical decision
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by
the six nations, Spaak’s
proposed visit to the United States last June collapsed. Therefore,
it is unlikely that there will be any approach to the United States
on this subject before October. We would hope at that time that it
may be possible to enter into negotiations at the technical level on
the basis of the lines set out in the AEC paper of April 13,5 to
examine the nature of the treaty, and to discuss the possible areas
of U.S. assistance to and collaboration with EURATOM assuming that the
examination of the treaty indicates that the institution is worthy
of U.S. support.
