Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western European Security and Integration, Volume IV

149. Memorandum of a Conversation, Washington, January 25, 1956¹

Washington, January 25, 1956

SUBJECT

• Atomic Energy and European integration

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary of State
• Admiral Lewis L. Strauss, Chairman Atomic Energy Commission
• Mr. Thomas Murray, Commissioner, Atomic Energy Commission
• Mr. Willard F. Libby, Commissioner, Atomic Energy Commission
• Mr. John Hall, Director, Office of International Affairs, Atomic Energy Commission
• Mr. Gerard Smith, Special Assistant for Atomic Energy Matters
• Mr. Robert Bowie, Director, Policy Planning Staff
• Mr. Livingston Merchant, Assistant Secretary
• Mr. Joseph Palmer2nd, EUR/PA
• Mr. Robert Barnett, EUR/RA

The Secretary thanked Admiral Strauss for coming to a meeting where the Secretary intended to review the political factors underlying the President’s desire, and his own, to encourage European integration in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy.² The Secretary said that the President firmly believed that a great contribution to world peace could be made through unification on the Continent of Europe. There was in Western Europe the potentiality for integration of skills, resources and purposes. For this integration to take place, the participation of the United Kingdom was not essential. Were Western European integration to take place, this could remove the burden of Europe from the back of the United States, draw France and Germany together, and constitute a unified pool of power to balance the USSR. The general concept was given eloquent expression by the President in the speech he made in 1951 before the English Speaking Union in London.³

The forces in Europe which support this concept created the Schuman Plan where six countries were brought together in a supranational relationship for control of coal and steel. These six countries considered the establishment of a European Defense Community, but this effort failed in September 1954. The six countries, together with the United Kingdom, created in consequence a Western European Union whose ties together are looser but whose commitments to each other involve a U.K. contribution to the defense of Western Europe. The movement towards integration is now being revived under the leadership of M. Monnet and M. Spaak. Adenauer is devoted to the principles they attempt to advance but is not deeply involved at the working level. The Italians are also interested in the movement towards integration. France has been the laggard in this general movement.

After his resignation from the position of President of the High Authority of the Coal and Steel Community, M. Monnet began to organize a backlog of political support for a renewal of momentum towards integration. He has obtained the support of labor and other significant segments of political influence in the six countries. He has made notable progress by gaming the support of the Socialists in Germany. In France, labor and the Socialist Party—under the leadership of M. Mollet who is apt to be the next Prime Minister—have aligned themselves with Monnet’s plans. There now appears to be a real chance of getting the European integration movement off the ground.

The AEC bears responsibility for study and judgment on technical aspects of the potentialities in the field of atomic energy. Both the President and the Department of State, however, wish to give strong support to this most hopeful manifestation of interest by forces in Europe which have the capability of bringing Germany and France together, of becoming strong enough to withstand Soviet action, and engaging in programs which can catch the imagination of the West Germans and forestall a dangerous possibility of a German movement towards reunification in opposition to what might be the broad interests of the West. It is within this broad perspective that we wish to do something for European unification and encourage those forces now concerned with common development of atomic energy. If this succeeds, the community can then proceed into other fields of activity. If they fail, the integration movement is apt to fall apart with little hope that it can be reconstituted, thus presenting a very bleak outlook for the future.

The Secretary stated that he hoped that the Atomic Energy Commission could study this problem in a broad perspective and find ways to help the movement. He hoped that the commission would not think in terms of existing laws, regulations and inhibitions, but rather define in maximum terms what lay within the realm of possibility. If we chose as a Government to take certain actions which required amendment of laws, the Secretary said these laws could be amended. He believed that the Congress supported European integration perhaps more vigorously than the Executive Branch itself. This was evident in Congressional discussion of the Marshall Plan and in Congressional adoption of the Richards Amendment⁴ which related to the European Defense Community. Thus, if a Government program could be shown to be prudent and sound and would contribute to the national interest, the Congress would doubtless amend existing legislation to make that program possible.

The Secretary stated the belief that the possibilities for effective control of atomic energy programs might well be greater were these programs subjected to one authority than would be the case if they were administered by separate national authorities. Integration of control would reduce the dangers of a virulent rivalry between France and Germany in connection with production and use of weapons grade nuclear materials. There would be other advantages for a group approach and our study might well show that we could give more help to a community than to countries individually.

Mr. Merchant said that it was our view that the Europeans were determined to achieve atomic energy independence with or without the help of the United States. He stated the belief that what we can offer to the Europeans is a wasting asset. He stressed the urgency of a study clarifying the potentialities. On the basis of a determination of possibilities for U.S. action, we could then decide what to do.

Admiral Strauss expressed his gratitude for having heard directly from the Secretary an expression of views on this subject. He said that the Commissioners prized this experience, and that the Secretary’s observations would be of great assistance to the Atomic Energy Commission as it proceeded with its work. He said that the President’s directive was under study. He reported that M. Monnet had met him in Geneva during August and had advanced views regarding European integration and atomic energy. Admiral Strauss had been quite guarded in his reactions, believing himself without authority to evaluate M. Monnet’s viewpoint, and not knowing whether M. Monnet’s activities reflected a desire to repair his personal fortunes or something more. Admiral Strauss said that in the course of time the Commission would have worked up a report containing its views. As looked upon by the Commission, the problem at hand would not only involve a question of diversion of material but also a safeguarding of classified information. This problem had presented itself in connection with the French proposals for a bilateral. The Commission assumed that involved in the project were as many doubtful characters from the security standpoint proportionately as were to be found in France generally. The Commission has not concluded a bilateral with the French and could not, under existing laws and practices, execute a power bilateral involving classified material because it could not certify that the French security procedures were as reliable as our own. Admiral Strauss said that the French problem in a sense defined the general problem of security presented by dealing with a group of countries since the lowest common denominator of the group might well be controlling.

Mr. Murray asked whether the views expressed by the Secretary indicated a preference for European integration in the atomic field over continued support of the International Atomic Energy Agency. He also asked whether our purposes required holding back on atomic energy power bilaterals. The Secretary responded by distinguishing three general approaches to advancing United States’ interests in this field. One was the IAEA. He believed that this Agency would come into being very slowly. The second was the bilateral approach and he assumed that these could go forward. In fact, he had specifically opposed a suggestion that bilateral negotiations be suspended. The third was U.S. support, if possible, of efforts to create an integrated European institution in the atomic energy field. The Secretary did not believe that these three approaches were mutually in conflict and should go forward simultaneously.

Admiral Strauss said that the Commission objected to any foot-dragging in the handling of bilateral negotiations.

In further elaboration of his view, the Secretary stated that if an integrated European community is to be created, the initiative must come from the Europeans themselves, and that the United States should avoid actions of coercive character. He elaborated also upon the complications surrounding the successful completion of work leading towards an International Atomic Energy Agency.

Mr. Murray stressed the problem of secrecy in this field but said that if the Government should decide to go ahead with support of a Community of Six, we could give them a great deal of support and assistance. Mr. Libby observed that the French appeared to want to produce atomic weapons. Mr. Murray said that he believed that weapons manufacturing capacity would be developing in a number of countries. To forestall this would require keeping the French out of the gaseous diffusion process. Mr. Hall observed, however, that if the purpose of European integration is to achieve atomic independence, they should have a gaseous diffusion plant but perhaps such a development was precisely what was clearly contrary to United States interests. Mr. Libby added that the Europeans could well do this without our help, but that it would be extremely expensive and, in any case, we could not help them with it on account of inhibitions of United States law. Mr. Murray said that as a practical matter we could, if policy justified it, go as far as we wanted to go in helping the Europeans expand and accelerate their programs. He expressed the personal opinion, moreover, that we should get on with power reactor construction abroad.

At this point in the discussion, the Secretary expressed his regret that he was obliged to keep an appointment with the Ambassador of Israel⁵ and thereafter to proceed to the White House to receive the communication from the Soviet Ambassador.⁶

Admiral Strauss said that he wanted to cooperate with the Department to the hilt—up to the legal limit. The Secretary said that he hoped that the Commission might exceed those limits and consider all possibilities, leaving for subsequent AEC and State determination any decision as to which of the possibilities should be selected as safe, prudent and wise for the United States. Admiral Strauss stressed the urgency of the study since there are about sixty to ninety days within which amendments to current legislation might be prepared for submission to the Congress. As he departed, the Secretary mentioned the fact that he expected to discuss atomic energy matters with Prime Minister Eden at the end of the month. He anticipated a negative attitude by the United Kingdom to developments towards integration in Europe. The British tradition, almost instinctive, is to favor European divisions rather than emergence on the Continent of greater unity and strength.

After the departure of the Secretary, Mr. Merchant offered a few additional comments. He said that we should not lose sight of the fact that the United Kingdom is for the Europeans an alternative source of material and assistance. From the United Kingdom standpoint, competitive national developments in the atomic energy field might well yield considerable commercial advantage. He also said that he was concerned over conclusion of a bilateral with Germany in advance of conclusion of a bilateral with France since this would almost inescapably generate French suspicions and undesirable tensions on the Continent. He felt that the main point of our joint study of this problem was to look for the maximum potentialities of United States assistance and cooperation without regard to legal, economic or any other limitations which might now inhibit our planning. As this was done, we could then proceed to a second stage of determining what was prudent and safe in the way of a new relationship between the United States and Europe. The third stage would require formulation and presentation of legislation, as needed, to the Congress.

Admiral Strauss expressed his view that it was desirable to go ahead with a French bilateral and reported on the fact that the French had been deeply aggrieved thus far in their failure to obtain one.

Mr. Bowie offered the view that a joint agency might well help us substantially in solving the kind of security problem presented by the French. A new agency starting afresh in this field could choose new staff and institute new procedures in conformity with security standards and procedures acceptable from our standpoint. This could help us in meeting our problems.

Admiral Strauss replied that this presented the fundamental problems of sovereignty, to which Mr. Merchant and Mr. Bowie replied that the Coal and Steel Community already constituted an institution in which the six countries had waived sovereignty in favor of a common authority. Mr. Merchant also went on to say that the control over personnel, inspection, materials of a common authority would make possible on a collective basis what might not be possible for individual states to do.

Mr. Libby expressed an intense interest in the supra-nationality of the Coal and Steel Community and requested further information on this subject.

Admiral Strauss said that he was surprised to learn about the supra-national character of the Coal and Steel Community, and would like to know more about it.

Mr. Murray expressed the view that the AEC was not the place where a decision should be made on the desirability of changes in the law, but would have to be governed by a Government decision made by the Department of Defense, the State Department, etc.

Mr. Smith took this occasion to elucidate the role which we hope could be performed by the Commission. He stated that the Department needed a great deal of help from the Commission on all technical aspects of process for production and utilization of atomic energy.

Mr. Libby stated flatly that the United States could not tell the Europeans how to make a gaseous diffusion plant. Mr. Merchant wondered if this might not be a premature judgment at this stage. Mr. Libby quickly replied that the British gaseous diffusion plant does not work, that he doubted the efficiency of the Russian process, and that we do effectively possess a monopoly in this sector of the whole field.

Admiral Strauss added that a gaseous diffusion plant to be efficient would produce quantities of material far beyond the foreseeable power requirements of Europe. Further, for it to be operated, it would consume enormous quantities of power. We may, however, be in a position to supply the Europeans with materials which, from a price standpoint, would be advantageous for them to obtain from us rather than to produce themselves.

Mr. Bowie reported on a conversation he had had with M. Monnet⁷ where he argued that from an economic standpoint European erection of gaseous diffusion facilities made little sense. Notwithstanding this argumentation, M. Monnet reiterated the very strong sense of compulsion on the part of the Europeans to achieve atomic independence. Mr. Bowie expressed the belief that if European erection of gaseous diffusion facilities was undesirable, we should be prepared to meet the Europeans on better ground and the purpose of our joint study should be to define what this might be. Admiral Strauss said that the Commission was now working on this problem. Mr. Smith said that he hoped that the findings of the Commission might be coordinated with the Department prior to submission to the White House. Admiral Strauss explained that the White House directive had been acknowledged only and that future communication to the White House would be discussed with the State Department in advance.

Admiral Strauss summarized his understanding of the essence of the discussion by saying that he believed we were in agreement that the United States should help other countries develop peaceful uses of atomic energy, and that we should back developments leading to integration in Europe. He wondered, however, whether our policy with respect to atomic weapons was so clearly defined. He felt that it was important for us to spell out precisely what this attitude was or should be.

Mr. Bowie said that he felt certain that the Secretary’s view was that we should discourage production in Europe of atomic weapons.

Mr. Barnett said that members of the Commission might be interested in three distinguishable trends of thought and discussion in Europe on the subject of atomic energy. Atomic energy generally had caught the imagination of Europeans. In the OEEC—an Atlantic community-wide organization mainly concerned with economic cooperation—there had been active interest in cooperative arrangements designed to accelerate the economic use of atomic energy. At Brussels, under the leadership of M. Spaak, another study was going forward where the potentialities of atomic energy for contributing to integration among the Community of Six were being examined. Both of these groups had remained silent on the question of national atomic energy programs for weapons production. The third group, headed by M. Monnet and called the Political Action Committee for European integration, had agreed unanimously to adopt a resolution which addresses itself specifically to the weapons problem. Important political representatives from the six countries are agreed that their community should collectively deny themselves atomic weapons production. They were also agreed as to the imperative necessity of supra-national responsibility for the administration of effective control and inspection authority. Mr. Barnett dwelled upon the procedure whereby the Coal and Steel Community’s supra-national authority was created, observing that after Governments had agreed to a constitution, it was submitted for ratification to Parliaments which thus made the constitution a genuine supra-national entity. The Monnet resolution, therefore, offers prospect that in the atomic energy field an integrated authority would exist comparable to the authority of a single state in the control, financial, security and other fields.

Mr. Merchant said that from our understanding of the European situation we are led to believe that, regardless of the success of the movement towards integration, we can anticipate continuing momentum towards increasingly active and successful programs in the field of atomic energy. These were likely to go ahead regardless of what the United States chose to do.

Admiral Strauss said that so far as weapons production abroad was concerned he believed that in essence our role in this situation was to buy time within which we could determine what was in the best interests of the United States and the West, or perhaps there could be some resolution of the US-USSR deadlock.

Mr. Hall asked what the Department’s thinking was on timing of the study. Mr. Merchant said that he hoped that the AEC could complete its work within about two weeks. We considered ourselves to be under some pressure since the Europeans will be asking for our views, perhaps at a time over which we could exercise no control.

Mr. Bowie said that from the standpoint of the Department the impact of our findings might be greatest if we could be in a position to volunteer them prior to an initiative on the part of the Europeans themselves. If we must rule out the possibility of assisting in the creation of a gaseous diffusion plant, we should at least have in mind the range of things that it is possible for us to do.

Admiral Strauss said once again that the Commission was currently studying the problem and would, as soon as practical, let us know what its conclusions were. He believed that two weeks was too short a time since the Commission is imminently obliged to make appearances before the Joint Committee. This was certain to be a grueling period and, though the substance of the Commission’s work might be of a mere ephemeral importance than the question we have before us, he would prefer to deal with the European problem with greater concentration than would be possible now. Therefore, he suggested that we envisage completion of the AEC study sometime during February. He repeated once more the necessity of clarifying our views on the problem as quickly as possible since any changes in the law should be submitted to the Congress well before its adjournment, which can be anticipated in advance of the summer conventions.⁸

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 840.1901/1–2556. Confidential. Drafted by Barnett.

2. In a memorandum of January 19, Merchant and Smith suggested that Dulles meet with Strauss and the other AEC commissioners to discuss U.S. policy toward European atomic energy integration. The memorandum reads in part as follows:

   “We have in mind that at such a meeting, you, perhaps supported by Mr. Merchant and Mr. Bowie, would state the reasons, in broad terms, why the President and you attach importance to European integration. We would suggest that you then ask the Commission to submit by February 1 a comprehensive statement covering those actions which the U.S. could offer to the Community of Six to catalyze development of effective supranational integration in the atomic energy field. This would be a request for authoritative technical advice as to what the U.S. could do, without regard in the first instance to legal, economic, or other considerations.” (Ibid., 840.1901/1–2056)

3. Reference is to a speech made by General Eisenhower, then Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, before the English-Speaking Union in London on July 3, 1951. For text of the speech, see Department of State Bulletin, July 30, 1951, pp. 163–165.
4. This amendment to the Mutual Security Act of 1953, introduced by Representative James P. Richards (D.–S.C.), stipulated that half of the funds provided for European military aid could be made available only to the European Defense Community or to its member countries. For text of this law, enacted on July 16, 1953, see 67 Stat. 152.
5. Abba Eban.
6. Reference is to a letter from Soviet Premier Bulganin to President Eisenhower, proposing a 20-year treaty of friendship between the United States and the Soviet Union. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, February 6, 1956, pp. 193–195.
7. No record of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.
8. In a letter to President Eisenhower of January 25, Strauss referred to the President’s memorandum to him of January 12. “The Atomic Energy Commission has followed recent integration developments in Western Europe with great interest” he wrote, “and has today discussed with Secretary Dulles and members of his staff certain preliminary steps in order to begin work on his recommendations necessary to achieve the objectives outlined by the Secretary of State in his memorandum to you of January 9, 1956.” (Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records)