Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western European Security and Integration, Volume IV

170. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, May 14, 1956¹

Washington, May 14, 1956

SUBJECT

• Meeting with Franz Josef Strauss, German Minister for Atomic Affairs²

PARTICIPANTS

• German Federal Republic
  • Minister Strauss
  • Ambassador Krekeler
  • Professor Haxel
  • Mr. Geyer
  • Mr. Ernecke
  • Mr. Hess
• United States
  • Mr Elbrick, EUR
  • Mr. Holt, GER
  • Mr. Margolies, GER
  • Mrs. Dulles, GER
  • Mr. Creel, GPA
  • Mr. Miller, GEA
  • Mr. Timmons, RA
  • Mr. Cleveland, RA
  • Mr. Schaetzel, S/AE
  • Mr. Goldenberg, AmEmbassy, Bonn

[Here follows discussion of German reunification, defense matters, and the German political situation. This portion of the memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in a forthcoming Foreign Relations volume.]

EURATOM

Mr. Elbrick said that the United States Government is fully prepared to offer its support to a EURATOM project with common responsibility and authority, which could make a real contribution in the political and economic sense. Mr. Elbrick said the Department was glad the German Government and the Chancellor are supporting EURATOM.

Mr. Strauss indicated that he had heard two apparently conflicting American views, favoring EURATOM and the OEEC project. At the OEEC Conference, he had clear statements in favor of OEEC.

The German Government would like to combine the two approaches, i.e., have EURATOM as part of the OEEC approach. They would not like to have the British left out. Without them EURATOM would consist of five blinds and one half-blind (which he identified as France).

Mr. Strauss expressed the fear that socialism would arise out of EURATOM. What Jean Monnet proposed (agency possession and monopoly of the purchase of nuclear fuel, agency power to permit or veto plant designs, and the elimination of bilateral treaties between individual member states and non-members) was absolutely unacceptable to the German Cabinet and parliament, and this extreme should not be pressed. The April report had been more moderate. Brentano had been authorized to open negotiations on the basis of this report. This did not mean the German Cabinet approves all aspects of the report, however. It is a basis of negotiation. Mr. Strauss mentioned the following difficulties:

(1) Military Use: He would not wish to see all Europe abandon military use. This has nothing to do with Germany. In any case, weapons should not be produced by one Western European nation alone. However, it would encourage Moscow and might eventually become a means for neutralization. Mr. Strauss said he did not want raw material divided into civilian and military use and did not want research and technical secrets treated differently, e.g. withheld from the partners in EURATOM on the grounds of military use.

(2) Link to the Common Market: Mr. Strauss said he did not want partial integration; he wanted a link to the next stage of a general common market. He realized the common market could not be fully achieved at once. To insist on realization of the common market now as a condition for EURATOM would be to sabotage EURATOM. However, he did believe there should be some sort of real step toward a common market. If there were no such step in connection with EURATOM, the common market would never be accomplished.

(3) Powers of Authority: Mr. Strauss said he would like to have a European purchasing company and central registration of nuclear fuel purchasing, but not forbid bilateral purchases.

Ambassador Krekeler said that EURATOM should have an attitude toward private enterprise not less favorable than that of the United States, giving as much freedom to private enterprise as is consistent with security.

Mr. Elbrick said that we did not see why EURATOM should have socialistic results. The United States has a strong Commission with strong controls, and it is developing a private program.

Mr. Strauss said that AEC is part of the United States Government. He would favor a strong EURATOM without objections if it were a part of the government of a United States of Europe. Otherwise, he thought it necessary to maintain freedom for enterprise. He was willing to agree to any controls necessary to safety, but not to control of the building of plants. He indicated a fear that the result would be undue control of Germany in the interest of one or more of her partners.

Mr. Elbrick stressed the need of adequate authority to maintain security controls. He said that the United States could cooperate more closely with a EURATOM with adequate authority than with the member countries bilaterally. In response to Mr. Strauss’ question as to whether bilateral relations would be excluded, he said that we believe United States cooperation with such an authority could far exceed that which could be given individually.

Ambassador Krekeler reviewed the German attitude toward EURATOM, which he described as not reluctance to move toward integration, but wishing to do it the right way.³

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.62A11/5–1456. Limited Official Use. Drafted by William K. Miller and Robert C. Creel, Officer in Charge of German Political Affairs.
2. Strauss was in Washington for a series of conversations with U.S. officials on matters of mutual concern, May 14–17. A memorandum of May 11 from John B. Holt, Deputy Director of the Office of German Affairs, to C. Burke Elbrick enclosed extensive briefing material on the Strauss visit. (Ibid., 033.62A11/5–1156)
3. Shortly after the conclusion of this conversation, Strauss and his party met with Gerard Smith, J. Robert Schaetzel, and other Department representatives. A memorandum of this conversation, which largely dealt with technical atomic energy matters, is ibid., 033.62A11/5–1456.